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Jeffrey J. Archambault
and
Marie Archambault
MARSHALL UNIVERSITY
THE EFFECT OF REGULATION ON
STATEMENT DISCLOSURES IN THE
1915 MOODY’S MANUALS
Abstract: United States firms in the early 20th century were subject to
public and private regulation. Forms of regulation included rate regu-
lation and stock exchange listing requirements. These regulations cre-
ated incentives to report income statement information. This study
utilizes the 1915 Moody’s Analyses of Investments to test whether
regulated firms in the United States reported more income statement
information than unregulated firms. Rate regulation influenced utili-
ties to report income statements more frequently than industrial com-
panies. Stock market listing requirements also influenced the report-
ing of income statements. Therefore, the results indicate that both
public and private regulations influenced financial reporting in the
early 20th century. Another finding of the study is that income state-
ments were more frequently reported than balance sheets for both
railroads and utilities.
INTRODUCTION
The importance of income statement versus balance sheet
information has increased over time. A major shift from the
balance sheet to the income statement occurred during the 20th
century as the income statement began to be used to assess the
ability of a firm to generate wealth [Buckmaster and Jones,
1997; Jones and Aiken, 1994]. The need for financial reporting
may be better understood by investigating the causes of this
shift in emphasis.
Acknowledgments: The authors thank the editor and referees for their
comments which improved the paper. The participants at the Ohio Regional
American Accounting Association Meeting and the American Academy of Ac-
counting and Finance Meeting are also thanked.
Submitted June 2003
Revised April 2004
Revised August 2004
Accepted September 2004
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In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the balance sheet
was dominant because it provided information on the steward-
ship function of management and information about capital
[Gilman, 1939]. These were important issues for early investors
in stocks. They wanted a secure investment. Banks also sought
information on collateral for loans [Corcell, 1989]. As the fi-
nancing needs of corporations grew and reliance on equity is-
sues for capital increased, the income statement grew in impor-
tance.
Competitive factors were significant in limiting operating
and profit information. Profitable industries did not want to
attract competitors or cause labor to demand higher wages
[Michael, 1996]. Few details about income components were
reported [Lee, 1979; Morris, 1984; Baldwin et al, 1992]. The
‘British Secretive Model’ with minimal disclosure and a balance
sheet focus has been used to describe reporting at the turn of
the 20th century in the United States [Michael, 1996].
In the 1870s, the public and other businesses were unhappy
about what was perceived as excessively high fares by U. S.
railroads [Ulen, 1980; Trebing, 1984]. The debate that grew out
of these concerns resulted in railroad and utility regulation. The
1890s also saw the growth of individuals investing in stocks and
the rise of organized U. S. stock exchanges to facilitate these
investments [Navin and Sears, 1955; Bryer, 1993]. These ex-
changes then reacted to investor information needs and created
listing requirements to regulate the information that listed com-
panies had to provide investors [Sivakumar and Waymire, 1993;
Normand and Wootton, 2001; Gross, 2002]. U.S. legislation was
also passed to regulate the disclosures of listed companies
[Previts and Bricker, 1994].
This paper examines the role that these forms of public and
private regulation in the United States had on the amount and
content of income statement and balance sheet disclosure for
railroad, utility, and industrial companies. The study empirically
tests whether these regulated industries provided more frequent
income statements and greater amounts of income statement
disclosures, looking at rate regulation and stock market listing
requirements as separate types of regulation. The disclosure of
revenue by rate-regulated industries is also examined. The paper
examines whether regulation created pressure to disclose more
income statement information. The current accounting history
literature indicates that the income statement was not a promi-
nent nor consistently provided statement in the U.S. until the
1920s. This study will add to the debate about when the income
10
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statement became prominent and the factors that influenced its
rise to prominence and usefulness. Therefore, the role that regu-
lation played in the shifting focus from the balance sheet to the
income statement orientation is examined.
United States company reports in the 1915 Moody’s Analyses
of Investments are used to determine if income statements were
more commonly provided and/or were more detailed for regu-
lated versus unregulated companies. Moody [1915] reported the
information that was made public by companies followed by his
investment service. This public information was used to rate the
bonds and stocks of companies for investment quality. Moody’s
reported on a large number of firms. The company reports are
examined in this paper to determine whether an income state-
ment and balance sheet were provided. Statistical tests are uti-
lized to verify relationships. Large samples also enhance
generalizability of the results. This empirical approach extends
the literature base by using another methodology to examine the
issue of the importance and prominence of income reporting.
Different methodological approaches which find similar results
make those conclusions more credible. Conversely, the use of
alternative methodologies can often lead to different conclu-
sions.
The results for rate regulation indicate that utilities were
more likely to provide an income statement than industrial com-
panies. The utility income statements were also significantly
more detailed than the industrial statements. No significant dif-
ferences were found for frequency or detail of income state-
ments for railroads versus industrials or railroads versus utili-
ties. Furthermore, while almost all railroad and utility income
statements disclosed revenues, less than half of the industrials
examined that provided an income statement reported revenue.
Industrial companies were more likely to disclose a balance
sheet than railroads or utilities. The industrial balance sheets
were also significantly more detailed than those disclosed by
railroads and utilities. Thus, rate regulation was shown to be a
significant catalyst to the preparation and publication of an in-
come statement, calling into question the conclusion of the pre-
dominantly descriptive literature that the income statement did
not become prominent in the U.S. for another decade.
Stock market regulation (listing requirements) also influ-
enced the likelihood of reporting an income statement. Compa-
nies listed on a stock exchange were more likely to report an
income statement than unlisted companies. The detail of the
income statement was shown to be greater for listed companies
11
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as well. The results also indicate that listed companies are more
likely to report a balance sheet and the balance sheet of listed
companies is more detailed than those of unlisted companies.
The results concerning the regulatory influence of listing re-
quirements thus shows that they increased disclosure of both
statements.
The next section of the paper discusses regulation as it af-
fected income statement disclosure and develops hypotheses.
The succeeding section discusses the data and methodology
used to conduct the empirical tests. This is followed by a discus-
sion of the results, summary and conclusion.
REGULATORY EFFECT ON INCOME STATEMENT
DISCLOSURE
This study considers rate regulation for railroads and utili-
ties and stock market listing requirements as external factors
that influenced company reporting decisions. Both factors are
referred to as regulations, but only rate regulation is a true regu-
lation in the sense of being imposed by law. Stock market listing
requirements are a form of self regulation that companies sub-
scribe to on achieving stock exchange listing. Table 1 provides a
summary of the various statutory rate regulations and New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) requirements, the dates they became
effective, and the companies that were covered by the regula-
tion.
Rate Regulation of Railroads and Utilities: Trebing [1984] defines
economic regulation as control over prices and earnings and the
restriction of entry/exit by enterprises within regulated markets.
In the late 19th century, there were public outcries for economic
regulation of railroads and utilities in the U.S. [Ulen, 1980]. A
number of mid-west states passed the Grange Laws in the 1870s.
These laws gave states the ability to regulate railroad rates. The
rates were based on return on invested capital assets
[Boockholdt, 1978]. The United States Supreme Court upheld
the power of states to regulate prices of firms that possessed the
economic power to exploit customers in Munn vs. Illinois [1877]
[Trebing, 1984]. As a result, both railroads and public utilities
became regulated industries.
Boockholdt [1978] notes that the use of these return on
invested capital rate setting regulations coincides in time with
the increased use of the retirement method of depreciation and
a trend toward capitalizing rather than expensing new assets.
While he did not empirically test this relationship, the correla-
12
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TABLE 1
Regulatory Requirements to 1915
Regulation Type of Company Applied To
Rate Regulation:
1837 Virginia Law required railroads Virginia Railroads
to submit annual report to state
disclosing amount of stock, revenue,
and profit/loss
1870s Grange Laws allowed state rate Railroads operating mostly in mid-
setting, most based on return on assets west
Interstate Commerce Commission Railroads that transacted
(ICC), 1887 established system for using interstate commerce
accounting data to regulate rates
Railroad Regulation Bill, 1905 Wisconsin railroads
developed an accounting rate of return
to ensure fair return and fair rates
Hepburn Act, 1906 empowered the ICC Railroad that transacted
to establish uniform chart of accounts interstate commerce
Public Utility Law, 1907 allowed rates Wisconsin utilities
based on cost plus fair return
1909 ICC prescribed form of balance Railroads that transacted
sheet for railroads interstate commerce
Mann-Elkins Act, 1910 empowered ICC Railroads that transacted
to regulate railroads based on interstate commerce
accounting rate of return
Various state laws created rate Railroads and utilities operating
regulation of railroads and within state borders
utilities by 1913
New York Stock Exchange Listing
Requirements:
1866 created Committee on Stock
List to create stock listing requirements
1869 required issuers to provide annual All listed companies
financial report, to register shares in
New York City, and use transfer agents
1895 recommended annual balance All listed companies
sheet and income statement
1900 required balance sheet and Newly listed companies only
income statement
1910 required interim reports, All listed companies
balance sheet audits, and disclosure
of all material information
Moody’s Rating Requirement:
1909 required an income statement All companies included
to receive a rating
13
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tion between a regulatory change and a change in accounting
policies seems to have clearly existed. This change in accounting
policies was such that it would tend to increase rates. This
shows that rate regulation influenced accounting policy choice.
These early regulations did not solve the discontent over
rates so further rate legislation was introduced. The Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) was established in 1887. Henry
Carter Adams, the ICC’s first statistician, devised an accounting
system that served as a basis for examining revenues, expenses,
and earnings of railroads and utilities so that fair rates could be
established [Trebing, 1984]. The significance of this regulation
for this study is that it used data from the income statement to
help establish rates.
Regulation grew with the Populist/Progressive Reform Party
movement from 1877-1920 [Trebing, 1984]. Governor LaFollette
of Wisconsin (a Progressive Party member) and John Commons
of the institutional school of economics at the University of Wis-
consin were instrumental in the development of economic regu-
lation. The goal of the Progressive Party was to bring about a
rational deployment of public resources based on ‘reasonable
value’ and ‘rate of return’ [Covaleski et al, 1995]. Under
LaFollette, Wisconsin enacted the Railroad Regulation Bill,
1905, which established the Railroad Commission. The Commis-
sion developed an ‘accounting rate of return’ to regulate rail-
roads to ensure a ‘fair’ return and ‘fair’ rates. In 1907, Wisconsin
enacted the Public Utility Law where utility rates were to be
based on cost plus ‘fair’ return [Covaleski et al, 1995].
In 1907, Commons wrote Report to the National Civic Fed-
eration, which explored many fundamental regulatory issues.
This report led to accounting rate of return based regulation
laws in at least 29 states and the Federal government by 1913
[Trebing, 1984]. Federal legislation in the form of the Hepburn
Act, 1906 empowered the ICC to establish a uniform chart of
accounts for railroads. This would lead to more standardized
reporting to aid in rate setting [Boockholdt, 1978]. Subse-
quently, the Mann-Elkins Act, 1910 empowered the ICC to effec-
tively regulate railroads based on accounting rates of return
[Covaleski et al, 1995]. Regulatory pressures continued through
1917 when Federal attentions turned to war issues [Boockholdt,
1978].
The railroad and utility regulation of the early decades of
the 20th century was focused primarily on rate regulation. It
required entities to produce an income statement and share this
with regulators. These regulations did not require companies to
14
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provide this information to the general public; but with rates
being based on costs, the information contained in the income
statement could be inferred. Therefore, the utilities and rail-
roads did not have a competitive reason to keep the income
statement information secret. The ‘British Secretive Model’ of
reporting was no longer useful within the regulatory environ-
ment faced by these companies [Michael, 1996].
Boockholdt [1978] implies that the early rate regulation in-
fluenced accounting policy choice. It is contended here that
early 20th century regulation would have a similar effect on
disclosure. Because these regulatory acts required charts of ac-
counts (Hepburn Act, 1906) and formats for the balance sheet
and income statement (Interstate Commerce Commission,
1909), standardized accounting by railroads resulted. These
statements were then used by the companies to attract investors.
State laws by 1913 similarly regulated utilities. It is con-
tended that the similarity in regulation between railroads and
utilities would result in similar pressures on disclosure so that
utilities would also report income statements.
Industrial corporations did not face any disclosure regula-
tion other than that imposed by stock exchange listing require-
ments during the early 20th century [Sivakumar and Waymire,
1993]. As a result, these companies were still highly concerned
with the competitive issues of disclosure and, therefore, would
still operate under the ‘British Secretive Model’ of reporting,
which limited disclosure. The lack of rate regulation and its
influence on disclosures for industrial companies would result
in industrial companies reporting income statements less fre-
quently than railroads and utilities since railroads and utilities
faced the rate regulation pressures to prepare and disclose in-
come statements. Based on the existence of rate regulation for
railroads and utilities and lack thereof for industrial companies,
the following hypothesis states:
H1: Rate-regulated companies were more likely to dis-
close an income statement than industrial companies.
Stock Market Listing Requirements: As the economy grew, com-
panies had a greater need for venture capital [Corcell, 1989].
These funds needed to come from investors. Railroads were the
first companies to rely on outside investors. After 1850, rail-
roads in the U.S. needed investors to provide means to acquire
major fixed assets to operate [Boockholdt, 1978]. The growth of
the railroads at this time made them a reasonable investment
for small investors. However, other more risky companies also
15
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needed capital to grow. Small investors were uncertain about
these companies. While railroads sold at seven to ten times
earnings, industrials sold at three times earnings. However by
the 1880s, railroads had matured so the need for more capital
had declined [Navin and Sears, 1955].
Capitalizing on this situation, professional financiers devel-
oped trusts [Bryer, 1993]. Commencing in 1882, these trusts
allowed investors to rely on and have faith in the investment
banker or firm promoting the trust [Bricker and Chandar, 1998].
Trusts represented both regulated and unregulated industries.
Trading in trusts was significant (150,000 trust shares per week)
and drew attention to industrials as investment opportunities.
Many of these trust companies became corporations or holding
companies in the 1890s. Also, during the 1890s, many mergers
created large companies that imitated the trusts [Navin and
Sears, 1955]. These corporations began trading their shares of
stock, giving small investors the ability to acquire stocks in com-
panies other than railroads [Bryer, 1993].
The growth of interest in owning stocks of individual com-
panies created a need for easy exchange of shares. Organized
exchanges existed earlier, but it was not until later in the 19th
century that a market for industrial securities existed [Navin
and Sears, 1955; Baskin, 1988]. The New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) established its first listing requirements in 1866. To be
listed on the NYSE, a company had to have a transfer agent,
register their stock in New York City, and provide an annual
financial report [Normand and Wootton, 2001; Gross, 2002].
By 1902, large numbers of corporations (both industrials
and regulated companies) were trading on organized exchanges
leading to diverse ownership [Navin and Sears, 1955]. It was
estimated that in 1899, there were 500,000 shareholders on the
NYSE [Gross, 2002]. To provide for an active market, investors
needed to be comfortable about making purchase decisions.
When trusts and holding companies were common, investors
relied on the investment banker, underwriter, or promoter to
determine the investment quality of the trust or holding com-
pany [Bricker and Chandar, 1998]; but by the turn of the 20th
century, investors were buying individual companies. To make
these purchases, individuals needed more information about the
individual companies or guidance from professionals through
stock ratings. A prerequisite of a thriving, modern equity market
was developed financial reporting to provide the necessary in-
formation for investors to make informed decisions [Baskin,
1988].
16
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As the stock exchanges grew in importance as a tool to raise
capital, more companies became willing to disclose greater in-
formation and adhere to more stringent listing requirements
(regulations imposed by the stock exchange). In 1895, the NYSE
recommended that all listed companies provide an annual re-
port containing both a balance sheet and an income statement.
Prior to that, only a balance sheet was required. In 1900, newly
listed companies were obliged to issue an annual report contain-
ing a balance sheet and income statement, hold an annual meet-
ing, and distribute proxy statements [Gross, 2002]. In 1910, ad-
ditional listing requirements were introduced for providing
interim reports, restricting the use of certain accounting poli-
cies, requiring balance sheet audits, and requiring the disclosure
of material information [Sivakumar and Waymire, 1993].
Whereas NYSE listed companies were required to provide in-
come statements and significant amounts of disclosure, unlisted
companies were not under the same obligation. In fact, the
NYSE traded unlisted companies. The only disclosure require-
ment for those companies was a balance sheet [Sivakumar and
Waymire, 1993].
Increased information made it possible to analyze compa-
nies for investment purposes, but the average middle-class in-
vestor could not understand the disclosures that were being pro-
vided [Merino and Neimark, 1982]. This situation created the
need for professionals in finance to help investors evaluate the
various investment alternatives [Bryer, 1993].
In the 1890s, analyst services like Poor’s and Moody’s
started to provide published information about companies
[Sivakumar and Waymire, 1993]. John Moody provided analysis
that compared the relative investment quality of various railroad
securities in 1909. These reports included letter rating symbols
for public securities—the first analyst ratings provided to the
U.S. public [Moodys.com, 2001]. The ratings were for railroads
only until 1913 when industrial and utility companies were
added [Moodys.com, 2001]. To receive a rating, Moody required
that the company provide an income statement [Moody, 1915].
A rating was important to attract small investors and was
thus important to companies listed not only on the NYSE, but
on any of the other smaller stock exchanges. The need to attract
investors to acquire investment capital encouraged companies
to seek a stock exchange listing. The listing requirements of
these exchanges became a form of self regulation for listed com-
panies. Because of the increased disclosure requirements of list-
ing and the importance of analysts’ ratings, companies seeking
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investment capital through stock markets would be more likely
to disclose an income statement than unlisted companies.
Therefore, the following hypothesis states:
H2: Stock exchange listed companies were more likely
to disclose an income statement than unlisted compa-
nies.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To examine the extent of income statement disclosure by
industrial and rate-regulated companies in the early part of the
20th century, the 1915 Moody’s Analyses of Investments was cho-
sen as the data source. Moody’s was selected because it provides
a broad range of public companies. The 1915 edition was cho-
sen because it was the earliest edition to include a substantial
representation of industrial companies that comprised the non-
rate regulated sample.
The 1915 Moody’s included 5,334 companies. A random
sample of 533 companies was drawn from the manual. From
this sample, companies were eliminated if they did not have
public ownership or were incorporated outside the United
States. A large number of the companies (283 of the sample)
were wholly owned subsidiaries of another company. Five of the
sample companies were foreign. This left a sample of 68 rail-
roads, 85 utilities, and 92 industrial companies. Of these, 68
were listed on an organized exchange and 177 were unlisted.
The pages covering each company were examined to deter-
mine whether an income statement and balance sheet were pro-
vided. To examine the amount of detail provided in the financial
statements, the size of the statements was measured by placing
an overhead transparency on the page that had been sectioned
off into 20 x 25 blocks. The number of blocks that each state-
ment occupied was recorded. Using size as a proxy for extent of
disclosure is a common content analysis technique similar to
that used by Gray et al [1995]. The disclosure of revenue and
whether the stock traded on an organized exchange was also
noted.
Chi-square tests were performed to determine if the fre-
quency of disclosing an income statement or revenue within the
income statement was greater for railroads and utilities com-
pared to industrial companies in order to test the influence of
rate regulation on financial reporting. Chi-square tests were also
used to determine if the frequency of issuing an income state-
ment differed between listed and unlisted companies. The tests
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were also performed on the balance sheet to determine if bal-
ance sheet disclosure was influenced by rate regulation or stock
market listing.
Tests were also performed to determine if rate regulation
and listing requirements influenced the amount of detail in fi-
nancial statement disclosure as measured by the size of the fi-
nancial statements. Because of the large number of companies
not reporting an income statement, the size data was not nor-
mally distributed. Therefore, the Mann-Whitney test was used to
compare the size of the income statement among railroad, util-
ity and industrial companies and listed and unlisted companies.
The Mann-Whitney tests were also conducted on balance sheet
size to examine the influence of rate regulation and stock mar-
ket listing requirements on balance sheet reporting as well.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. This
table shows that most companies reported some statements.
Only 13.9% of companies failed to provide Moody with any
statements. Just over half (54.7%) of the companies disclosed
both an income statement and a balance sheet. Approximately
80% of the sample reported an income statement. This finding is
inconsistent with the conclusion in the existing literature that
the income statement did not become a consistently reported
item in the U.S. until the 1920s [Skinner, 1987; Buckmaster and
Jones, 1997]. In fact, for the sample as a whole, the income
statement is much more commonly reported than the balance
sheet. The fact that only 60% of the sample reported a balance
sheet is inconsistent with the conclusion in the literature that
almost all U.S. firms published a balance sheet [Brief, 1987].
Railroads were the least likely to report a balance sheet, and
utilities were the most likely to report an income statement.
Rate Regulation of Railroads and Utilities: Revenue was reported
in most railroad and utility income statements. This is probably
an artifact of the Hepburn Act, 1906 which established a uni-
form chart of accounts for railroads. The income statements for
regulated railroad and utility companies were very similar. They
started with revenue and included operating expenses. Some
listed other expense items such as fixed charges, depreciation,
interest, or taxes. Almost all companies disclosed ‘net income’.
The account title given to this number varied among the compa-
nies. (Surplus over charges, balance, surplus, net income, net
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earnings/profit, and total income were among the titles used.)
These statements were clearly recognizable as single-step in-
come statements. The industrial companies were less likely to
report income statements. Less than half of the industrials
which reported income reported revenue. Most industrial in-
come statements did not follow a consistent format across com-
panies. The inclusion of payments to bond sinking funds was
often reported as an expense. Thus, industrial income state-
ments, when provided, were not as well organized or as infor-
mative as the income statements of regulated companies.
The amount of statement coverage varied significantly
among companies within each industry grouping as indicated
by the standard deviation of the areas reported in Table 2. Utili-
ties provided the most detailed income statement disclosures
and the greatest overall Moody’s coverage. Industrials had the
most detailed balance sheets. Consistency in the form and con-
tent of railroad and utility income statements was most striking.
This was certainly a by-product of regulation which required use
of a common chart of accounts (Hepburn Act, 1906) and the
need for regulators to use consistent numbers in rate setting.
The chart of accounts helped standardize income reporting.
To test H1, Chi-square tests were performed to determine if
the frequency of disclosing income significantly varied across
industry groups. When industrials, railroads, and utilities were
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Sample
Industrials Railroads Utilities Entire
Sample
No statement 12.0% 17.6% 12.9% 13.9%
Income statement 73.9% 82.4% 85.9% 80.4%
Balance sheet 81.5% 36.8% 56.5% 60.4%
Both statements 67.4% 36.8% 55.4% 54.7%
Revenue 32.6% 79.4% 84.7% 63.7%
Mean income statement area 60.68 69.38 78.79 69.38
Standard deviation
income statement area 48.89 47.22 59.79 52.86
Mean balance sheet area 92.98 47.76 71.28 72.90
Standard deviation balance
sheet area 58.65 66.94 75.77 69.44
Mean total area 408.00 478.10 530.02 469.80
Standard deviation total area 204.50 390.64 388.90 335.14
Number of companies 92 68 85 245
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considered together, the Chi-square was not significant (p-value
= 0.12). The industries were then compared individually. The
Chi-square comparing the frequency of income statements for
railroads and industrials was not significant (p-value = 0.206).
Thus, railroads were not more likely than industrials to report
an income statement. Utilities were shown to be significantly
more likely to report an income statement than industrials (p-
value = 0.048). Utilities and railroads did not report income
statements at a different frequency (p-value = 0.551). Thus, H1
was supported with respect to utilities only. Utilities were more
likely to report net income than industrials, but railroads were
not. As Boockholdt [1978] contends in relation to earlier rail-
road regulation and accounting policy choice, these results show
that later rate regulation of utilities provided a catalyst to
change reporting and issue an income statement when a large
number of unregulated companies chose not to report income.
The fact that railroads were not reporting income more fre-
quently than unregulated companies is surprising. The railroads
faced similar rate regulation pressure as the utilities. The exist-
ing literature also contends that railroads were the leaders in
financial reporting [Boockholdt, 1978], but these results indicate
that utilities were more likely to report income.
Table 3 reports the results of the Mann-Whitney tests on the
amount of detail in income statements. The results are the same
as for the analysis of frequency; utilities provided significantly
more income statement disclosures than industrial companies.
Railroads did not provide more disclosure than either industri-
als or utilities. These results show that the income statements
provided by utilities were not only more frequent, but also more
detailed. Railroads did not have more income statement disclo-
sure than industrials. One possible explanation for the finding
that railroads were not reporting income more frequently and
with more detail is the period studied. Many of the railroads in
the sample were inter-urban transit railways. These lines were
already facing pressures from the automobile. As the prospects
of these railways began to decline, the tendency may have been
to reduce disclosure.
The Chi-square and Mann-Whitney tests were conducted to
determine if balance sheet frequency or size varied significantly
among the industries examined and thereby to consider the en-
tire reporting picture. Considering all three industries together,
a significant difference was found for frequency of reporting
balance sheets (p-value = 0.000). Industrials were significantly
more likely to report a balance sheet and railroads were least
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likely. Comparing railroads and industrials showed a significant
difference (p-value = 0.000) with industrials reporting balance
sheets significantly more frequently. Industrials were also more
likely than utilities to disclose a balance sheet (p-value = 0.000).
Utilities were more likely than railroads to disclose a balance
sheet (p-value = 0.015). Thus, industrials were significantly more
likely than railroads or utilities to disclose a balance sheet and
railroads were less likely than industrials or utilities to disclose a
balance sheet. These results on the lack of balance sheet disclo-
sure are interesting when compared to the findings reported in
the extant literature. This literature discusses how common bal-
ance sheets were [Brief, 1987] and how they were the focus of
reporting in the early 20th century [Morrison, 1935; Skinnner,
1987].
The findings reported in this study show that a significant
number of companies that provided income statements did not
provide balance sheets and that this practice was particularly
pronounced in the railroad sector, where regulation may have
directed focus on company evaluation almost entirely on the
income statement. This result again stresses the important im-
pact that regulation had on accounting during this period. At
this time, railroads were also considered to be the leading indus-
try for financial reporting [Boockholdt, 1978]. The results here
seem to indicate that utilities rather than railroads were the
leaders as utilities more often provided a complete set of finan-
cial statements.
Table 4 examines the amount of detail in the balance sheet
using Mann-Whitney tests. These results show that the balance
TABLE 3
Rate Regulation: Total Area of Income Statement
(Mann-Whitney Test)
Industrial vs. Industrial vs. Railroad vs.
Railroads Utility Utility
Industrial median 70 70
Railroad median 72 72
Utility median 76 76
p-value .12 .01** .20
P-values are one-sided for industrial vs. railroad and industrial vs. utility and
two-sided for railroad vs. utility.
** 5% significance
*** 1% significance
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sheets of industrial firms were larger than those of both railroad
and utility firms. The difference in balance sheet size between
railroad and utility companies was insignificant. These results
are generally consistent with those for the frequency of report-
ing for the balance sheet.
TABLE 4
Rate Regulation: Total Area of Balance Sheet
(Mann-Whitney Test)
Industrial vs. Industrial vs. Railroad vs.
Railroads Utility Utility
Industrial median 108 108
Railroad median 0 0
Utility median 76 76
p-value 0.00*** 0.03** 0.07
P-values are two-sided
** 5% significance
*** 1% significance
Chi-square tests were used to examine the reporting of rev-
enue. Considering all types of companies together, significant
differences were found for reporting revenue (p-value = 0.000).
Industrials were less likely than other firms to report revenue.
Comparing railroads and industrials showed that railroads were
significantly more likely to report revenue than industrials (p-
value = 0.000). This result also holds for utilities relative to in-
dustrials (p-value = 0.000). Utilities and railroads were equally
likely to report revenues (p-value = 0.393). Regulated companies
were more likely than industrials to report revenue.
Given the lower frequency of industrials to provide income
statements, this result is not surprising. However, the significant
differences still hold when a subsample of only those companies
reporting an income statement was considered. Industrials were
still significantly less likely than either railroads or utilities to
report revenue (p-value = 0.000 for both).
Overall, these results indicate that rate-regulated compa-
nies, especially utilities, were providing more complete informa-
tion on company performance than industrial companies in
1915. Rate regulation provided incentives to publish income
statements and include more detail within the income state-
ments that were published.
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Stock Market Listing Requirements: Among the sample of compa-
nies selected, trading on an unlisted basis (72.2%) was more
common than being listed (27.8%). A company was considered
to be listed if it traded on any organized exchange. While it is
not known what listing requirements existed for all local ex-
changes, the scrutiny of the listing process is assumed to en-
courage more complete reporting for listed companies regard-
less of the exchange listed on. If exchanges other than the NYSE
did not require income statements, then the inclusion of these
other exchanges as listed securities will only bias against the
hypothesis being found significant. Of the companies in the
sample that were unlisted, 137 disclosed an income statement
and 40 did not. For the listed companies in the sample, 60 dis-
closed income statements and eight did not. To determine if
income statement disclosure was statistically more common for
listed companies (H2), a Chi-square test was performed. The
results indicate that listed companies were more likely to dis-
close an income statement (p-value = 0.028). Thus, the stock
exchange listing requirements were acting as a regulation to
encourage the listed companies to disclose an income statement.
The previous section indicated that rate regulation was an
adequate inducement for utility companies to report income
statements. To determine if stock market listing requirements
encourage all types of companies to disclose income statements,
the Chi-square test was performed on the industrial, railroad,
and utility subsamples separately. Industrials that were listed
were significantly more likely to report an income statement
than unlisted industrials (p-value = 0.002). However, listing sta-
tus did not influence whether railroads (p-value = 0.342) or utili-
ties (p-value 0.378) reported an income statement. These results
indicate that the stock market listing requirement only acted as
a regulatory influence on income statement reporting for those
companies that did not already report income because of rate
regulation. However, for those companies not required by law to
prepare an income statement, the stock market listing require-
ments did act as an adequate incentive to report income. Thus,
those listing requirements regulated the disclosures of compa-
nies seeking to be listed, supporting H2.
Table 5 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney test on the
detail of the income statement for listed and unlisted compa-
nies. The results are similar to those for frequency in that listed
companies reported a more detailed income statement than un-
listed companies. This again indicates the significant influence
that stock market listing requirements had on company disclo-
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sure. The NYSE had a listing requirement about disclosing all
material information, which would be expected to result in
listed companies reporting more information. This was sup-
ported by the results. Also, to get small investors to invest in
their shares, companies needed to provide information for indi-
viduals to make investments decisions.
TABLE 5
Stock Market Listing Requirements: Total Area of
Income Statement (Mann-Whitney Test)
Listed vs Unlisted
Listed median 76
Unlisted median 72
p-value 0.00***
P-value is one-sided.
** 5% significance
*** 1% significance
The frequency of reporting balance sheets and their size
was also examined for listed and unlisted companies. For the
unlisted companies, 89 reported a balance sheet and 88 did not.
Only nine listed companies did not report a balance sheet and
59 listed companies did report a balance sheet. Listed compa-
nies were shown to be significantly more likely to report a bal-
ance sheet (p-value = 0.000) for the Chi-square test. Thus, listing
requirements that required a balance sheet did significantly in-
fluence the disclosure of the statement. To examine whether this
effect occurred for industrials, railroads, and utilities, the chi-
square test was repeated for each industry separately. The re-
sults indicate that for all industries listed companies were more
likely to report a balance sheet (p-value = 0.004 for industrials;
p-value = 0.009 for railroads; p-value = 0.032 for utilities). This
result is very interesting when considered in tandem with the
results from rate regulation. Stock market listing requirements
influenced all types of companies (rate regulated or not) to re-
port a balance sheet, but only influenced non-rate regulated
companies to report an income statement. Rate regulation was
focused on the income statement. Thus, the rate regulation did
not encourage regulated companies to provide a balance sheet.
However, for those rate-regulated companies that chose to be
listed on a stock exchange, the stock exchange listing require-
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ments acted as a regulation to disclose a balance sheet as was
required for listing status.
The size difference for the balance sheet across listed and
unlisted companies was tested with a Mann-Whitney test. The
results are reported in Table 6. Listed companies reported sig-
nificantly more detailed balance sheets than unlisted companies.
Thus, the stock market listing requirements that stipulate the
disclosure of a balance sheet not only encouraged companies to
disclose a balance sheet, they also encouraged a more detailed
balance sheet. This increased level of detail may have resulted
from the listing requirements concerning the disclosure of all
material information that unlisted companies did not have to
satisfy.1
1 The tests reported in this section were repeated using only the 36 NYSE
listed companies in the sample. The results were generally the same for the tests
that could be performed. The only exception occurred with the test for the
importance of listing for industrials to report a balance sheet. NYSE listed in-
dustrial companies were not more likely than other industrial companies to
report a balance sheet, while the body of the paper indicates that listing on any
exchange did create a significant difference with listed companies reporting a
balance sheet more frequently. The paper reports all listed companies because of
the increased power of the test with the larger sample size and the ability to run
all tests. There are only four NYSE listed railroads all of which report income
statements and balance sheets. This resulted in an inability to run tests sepa-
rately for railroads when the NYSE only sample is used.
TABLE 6
Stock Market Listing Requirements: Total Area of
Balance Sheet (Mann-Whitney Test)
Listed vs Unlisted
Listed median 114
Unlisted median 18
p-value 0.00***
P-value is two-sided.
** 5% significance
*** 1% significance
Taken together, the results reported here indicate that vari-
ous forms of regulation motivated the management of compa-
nies to disclose income statements and, to a lesser extent, bal-
ance sheets, in the early part of the 20th century. Regulatory
effects were an important force in encouraging companies to
provide adequate disclosure. The results indicate that these
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regulatory measures helped bring about more complete and
consistent financial reporting.
A limitation of this study is that the results cannot be gener-
alized to other periods where different pressures existed on re-
porting. Neither can the results be generalized to companies
operating in other countries where regulatory pressures were
different. For instance, currently the SEC regulations would
dominate those of rate regulation. Likewise, Boockholdt [1978]
notes that rate regulation was not aggressively pursued during
World War I. Thus, the effect of rate regulation on statement
disclosure may not be detected during that period because of
poor enforcement. The paper also fails to consider other forces
that may have acted as regulatory influences.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has examined the effect of rate regulation and
stock market listing requirements on the frequency and size of
income statement and balance sheet disclosures by companies
in the 1915 Moody’s Analyses of Investments. The results strongly
support the hypotheses that both types of regulation influenced
reporting. Thus, regulatory pressures influenced company re-
porting practices and helped to move company reporting to a
more complete and consistent model.
Rate regulation laws required regulated industries to pro-
vide income statements to regulators. This study hypothesized
that rate regulated companies would be more likely to publicly
report income statements because they were already provided
for the regulators. The results, with respect to rate regulation,
showed that utilities were more likely than industrials to report
income and that the income statement disclosures were larger
for utilities than those for industrials. The analysis also showed
that both railroads and utilities were more likely to disclose
revenues than industrial companies. Industrials, however, were
more likely to disclose a balance sheet and have more compre-
hensive balance sheet disclosure.
Stock exchanges impose listing requirements on companies
choosing to list on the exchange. These regulations are essen-
tially voluntarily entered into rather than imposed by law; but,
nonetheless, these regulations are hypothesized to influence
statement disclosures. The NYSE required the reporting of both
an income statement and balance sheet by 1915. Unlisted com-
panies did not face this requirement. Therefore, stock market
listing would increase the likelihood of reporting both income
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statements and balance sheets. The NYSE also required disclo-
sure of all material items. This requirement would tend to in-
crease the size of financial statements. The results of this study
supported these hypotheses. Listed companies were more likely
to report income statements, although this effect was only sig-
nificant for industrial companies when examined by industry.
Also, the likelihood of disclosing a balance sheet increased when
a company traded on an exchange. The size of both statements
also increased among listed companies relative to unlisted com-
panies.
These results provide empirical support to the literature
that discusses the leading role of regulated industries in report-
ing income [Boockholdt, 1978; Bryer, 1993]. The most surpris-
ing result was the infrequency of U.S. firms to disclose a balance
sheet in 1915. This finding is inconsistent with the assertion in
the literature that almost all firms published a balance sheet
[Brief, 1987] and that it was the only necessary statement
[Gilman, 1939; Skinner, 1987; Kendig, 1993]. The results re-
ported here indicate that regulation was a significant influence
on the reporting of income by companies in the early 20th cen-
tury. Greater detail in the income statement was also a by-prod-
uct of regulation. The format of rate-regulated company income
statements was generally consistent across firms, using a single-
step presentation. In contrast, industrial firm income statements
lacked a consistent format and often omitted important disclo-
sures (such as revenue). Thus, rate regulation also had an im-
pact on the format and content of income statement disclosures.
Regulation was a significant force in the evolution of finan-
cial statement disclosure at the turn of the 20th century. Utility
companies seemed to be the leaders in financial disclosure. They
were the most likely to provide an income statement. This in-
come statement almost always provided details about revenue
and operating expenses. The majority of utilities also reported a
balance sheet. The balance sheets were not standardized. The
biggest contribution of early 20th century rate regulation on
accounting was in encouraging a consistently formatted, de-
tailed income statement that was subsequently made available
for investors to use in financial statement analysis.
The stock exchange listing requirements were shown to only
be associated with increased income statement reporting for in-
dustrials, which were not rate-regulated. Thus, the stock ex-
change listing requirements played a major role in encouraging
these companies to report income. The stock market listing
requirements also resulted in more frequent balance sheet
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disclosures for all types of companies. This was the only regula-
tion that required balance sheets. Therefore, the stock exchange
listing requirements were a key regulatory influence in encour-
aging complete financial statement disclosure.
The results of this study also call into question the conclu-
sion by some previous authors that the income statement did
not become a consistent, prominent, and useful disclosure until
after 1920 [Skinner, 1987; Buckmaster and Jones, 1997]. The
income statement was more commonly disclosed than the bal-
ance sheet by the entire sample considered in the current study.
Analysts used income statement information to provide advice
to investors [Moody, 1915]. In fact, since ratings would not be
provided without an income statement, it was viewed by Moody
as a necessary statement. Regulation played an important role
in bringing income statement information to the status of use-
fulness before 1920.
The impact of regulation on the format of the income state-
ment is also very evident. Rate-regulated company statements
followed a consistent and informative format, disclosing rev-
enues and operating expenses. Without this regulatory pressure,
industrial statements lacked consistency as well as detail. Thus,
regulation played a very significant role in the growing promi-
nence and disclosure of income by American companies in the
early 20th century.
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INTRODUCTION
“ . . . the maintenance of corpus has been stretched be-
yond its natural usefulness” [Littleton, 1953, p. 89].
In Britain, the courts provided some of the earliest public
arenas for the examination of accounting practices. Accounting
practices were invariably ancillary to the main issues of cases,
these being disagreements over matters of disclosure and finan-
cial measurement. Disputes classified as disclosure-based gener-
ally concerned the rights of members and directors of compa-
nies to inspect books of account. While these types of cases
outnumbered measurement-related disputes brought before the
courts, many of the key concerns were subsequently resolved
through legislative intervention [Rahman, 1992, pp. 182-184,
191]. In contrast, disputes concerned with measurement issues,
while relatively few, centered on the recurring debate over the
amount of profits available for the purposes of dividend distri-
bution [Reid, 1988, p. 2; Mills, 1993, p. 776]. To resolve such
disputes, judges selectively turned to the notion of capital main-
tenance for guidance.
The doctrine of capital maintenance, the precept whereby
the payment of dividends cannot be made out of capital, was
inherited ostensibly from 18th century British charter corpora-
tions [Mills, 1993, p. 775]. In order to protect creditors a general
consensus emerged. The capital of a company should be main-
tained so as to provide a fund that creditors could conceivably
look to for the payment of their claims. This consensus ulti-
mately became enshrined in law [Gibson, 1971, pp. 26-29;
Benson, 1981, p. 22; Morris, 1986, p. 76].
Despite successive legislative requirements precluding the
payment of dividends out of anything other than ‘profits’, it was
not until the Companies Act, 1980 that a definition of distribut-
able profits was incorporated into legislation.1 This absence ap-
pears to have significantly constrained the British judiciary.
While matters relating to the calculation and payment of divi-
dends clearly fell within the courts’ jurisdiction [Ford, 1993, p.
100], the lack of a substantive definition for the term ‘profits’
limited the judiciary’s ability to make any significant determina-
1 Sections 39 and 40. Additional requirements in relation to investment com-
panies are laid out in section 41, and in relation to insurance companies in
section 42. See also Companies Act, 1985 (U.K.), section 263ff as amended in
1989.
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tions on the issue [Dunn, 1975, pp. 16-17; Morley, 1979, p. 36;
Corcoran, 1993, p. 100].
When applying legislation the courts are generally assumed
to interpret public interest in terms of accepted notions of natu-
ral justice, statutory interpretation and precedent [Peirson and
Ramsay, 1983, p. 292; Mills, 1993, p. 772]. Consequently, com-
mon law emphasizes justice between parties in a process that
results from, and also tends to maintain, a society characterized
by voluntary behavior and customs [Johnson, 1987, p. 67]. It
would seem reasonable to assume, therefore, that the courts
would take a negative view of companies contradicting the capi-
tal maintenance concept. However, in February 1889, Lindley,
L.J. in the English Court of Appeal permitted the defendant in
the case of Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company (1889),2 a quarry-
ing company, to omit amortization for depletion of its mining
lease when calculating profits available for dividend distribution
[Morris, 1986, p. 71]. In turn, the Lee case provided the prece-
dent for a succession of court cases that effectively marked the
end of the capital maintenance concept as a means of directing
profit and loss for dividend determination [Morris, 1984, p. 59].
French [1977] argues that a common aim amongst Lindley
and the other reforming judges was to ensure effective creditor
protection while at the same time providing significant free-
doms for directors to allocate scarce resources to their best uses.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate this emphasis. With
reference to legal precedents established during the 19th cen-
tury, our intention is to explain the general unwillingness of
British courts at the time to mandate any particular accounting
valuation policy which could inhibit the flexibility of manage-
ment to grow and prosper benefits to the shareholders collec-
tively in the longer term [Littleton, 1953, Ch. 1 & 5].
While French’s work provides a useful framework for un-
derstanding the court’s views on matters of dividend distribu-
tion, it does not provide a comprehensive explanation as to why,
at the time of the Lee case, some accounting methods were ac-
cepted by the courts as being satisfactory in certain situations
but not in others. Moreover, there appears to be no general
consensus in the literature as to the significance or role of capi-
tal maintenance in British judicial reasoning during the 19th
century. This would apply to accounting methods for the pur-
poses of dividend determination, either before or after the Lee
case [Reid, 1987a; 1987b].
2 41. Ch. D. 1.
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It will be argued here that in both pre- and post-1889 peri-
ods, in addition to French’s [1977] principle of ‘freedom for
action’, the courts were also influenced by the authority for any
proposed distribution and by the need for transparency of profit
calculations. These had a variety of affects in terms of fairness
and/or value for money to participants. Furthermore, unifying
these two explanations into a common theme amounts to recog-
nition of the sui generis nature of court decisions under prece-
dent and the specific natures of the situations being encoun-
tered. Taken together, these guiding principles constituted a
logical framework for judicial decision-making which ultimately
conspired against the courts adopting the surplus approach of
profit measurement under economic market valuation. Instead,
they favored the profit and loss or double entry approach for
profit determination and distributive purposes.
The remainder of this paper is divided into seven sections.
The first section provides a brief description of the profit and
dividend requirements contained in 19th century British compa-
nies legislation. The second section provides a summary of the
main approaches available for determining capital maintenance.
The third section reviews the literature regarding capital main-
tenance and the role of the Lee case in defining capital mainte-
nance for judicial purposes. The fourth section details the main
social, economic and institutional influences over British legisla-
tors during the 19th century. The fifth section provides a frame-
work for understanding British judicial reasoning during the
19th century with regard to justifying accounting methods for
the purposes of dividend determination. The sixth section pro-
vides a review of British court cases and judicial reasoning, both
before and after the Lee case, within the context of the frame-
work outlined in section five. The seventh section contains some
concluding remarks about the links between present develop-
ments in cost and management accounting and the financial
reporting function for organizations as a whole, and raises
doubts about the use of microeconomic measures outside of
perfect markets.
BRITISH COMPANIES LEGISLATION
DURING THE 19TH CENTURY
Early British examples of the legislative rule relating com-
pany profits to dividends can be found in the Joint Stock Com-
panies Registration and Regulation Act, 1844 and the Compa-
nies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. While the 1844 Act
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provided that registered companies could declare dividends out
of profits, the 1845 Act was more specifically formulated with a
view of statutory companies’ capital as the minimum value of
the net assets which must be raised initially and then, so far as
possible, retained in the business [Gower, 1979, p. 98]. Accord-
ingly, the 1845 Act provided that the company shall not make
any dividend whereby its capital stock will be in any degree
reduced [clause 121].
Both the 1844 and 1845 Acts treated dividend policy as an
aspect of capital maintenance generally, principally because the
interests of shareholders and creditors were regarded as being in
competition. Assets distributed to one group are not available
for distribution to the other. Given that the power to determine
dividends is delegated to directors by shareholders, then credi-
tors were often in a relatively disadvantaged position [Ford,
1993, p. 92].
Following Parliamentary acceptance in 1855 of the principle
of limited liability for joint stock companies (Limited Liability
Act, 1855), British company law was consolidated in the Joint
Stock Companies Act, 1856. Following almost 20 years of re-
form, the 1856 Act integrated the Joint Stock Companies Regis-
tration and Regulation Act, 1844 and the Limited Liability Act,
1855, as well as introducing other changes. Most evidently, the
provisions relating to profits and dividends contained in the
1844 Act were not replicated in the 1856 Act itself but were
inserted in the model Articles of Association [Ford et al., 1999,
pp. 38-41]. While the Articles specified that dividends should
only be paid out of profits and that a model ‘full and fair’ bal-
ance sheet should be drawn up so as to give a true and correct
view of companies’ financial affairs [Hein, 1978, pp. 171-172],
the 1856 Act provided no guidance regarding the underlying
accounting principles to be applied [Bryer, 1998, p. 57; Maltby,
1998, p. 11]. Moreover, being relegated to the model Articles
meant that the disclosure requirements were optional.
Several consolidating acts followed the introduction of the
1856 Act, culminating in the Companies Act, 1862. Like the 1856
Act, the 1862 Act contained no compulsory accounting or audit-
ing provisions dealing directly with the payment of dividends. As
with the 1856 Act, all such provisions were contained in the
model Articles of Association. For instance, Article 73 (Table A)
provided that no dividend should be paid except out of the prof-
its arising from the business of the company. Table A also sug-
gested that before recommending any dividend, the directors
could, but were not compelled to, set aside out of profits for the
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company a reserve fund for repairing or maintaining the works
connected with the business of the company.
Companies legislation introduced in Britain during the 19th
century was customarily drafted with the purpose of protecting
creditors by allowing a proportion of the nominal value of the
share capital either to remain uncalled or to be retained within
the company [Hadden, 1972, p. 70]. However, this purpose was
eventually undermined when companies issued capital fully
paid. Furthermore, as there were no legal requirements that the
liabilities secured by companies were to bear any reasonable
relationship to the company’s assets, or that the original capital
should be paid to the company in cash, a company could con-
tinue to trade despite having lost a substantial proportion of its
capital courtesy of legitimate trading losses.3
ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF CAPITAL MAINTENANCE
Two broad approaches have been identified by the courts
for determining profits for dividend determination. One of these
models can be described as the ‘surplus’ approach, whereby the
profit and loss statement plays a secondary role to the balance
sheet by only verifying the accuracy of the underlying calcula-
tions. Profit is determined as the difference in net asset valua-
tions adopted at the beginning and the end of the financial pe-
riod [Kehl, 1976]. For instance, in Binney v Ince Hall Coal and
Cannel Company (1866),4 Kindersley, L.J. suggested that in de-
termining net profits:
The first step would be to make good the capital by
taking stock and putting a value upon all the assets of
the company, of whatever nature, and deducting there-
from all the liabilities (including amongst those liabili-
ties the amount of contributed capital), and the surplus,
if any, then remaining of the gross receipts would be
net profit.5
Similarly, Fletcher Moulton, J. remarked in re Spanish Pros-
pecting Co Ltd (1911)6 that:
3 Section 13 of the Companies Act, 1855 provided that companies were to be
wound up and dissolved when three quarters of their capital had been lost.
However, this provision was not repeated in subsequent legislation [French,
1977, p. 315].
4 35 L.J. Ch. 363.
5 See also City of Glasgow Bank v Mackinnon (1882) 9. Court Sess. Cases, 4th
Series, 535 (Court of Session, Scotland).
6 1. Ch. 92; (1908-1910) All E.R. Rep. 573.
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‘Profits’ implies a comparison between the state of a
business at two specific dates usually separated by an
interval of a year. The fundamental meaning is the
amount of gain made by the business during the year.
When viewed as an accretion to the original investment, the
existence of profits under the surplus approach implies that the
removal of the surplus would leave a balance of assets equal in
value to the original amount of the investment. Accordingly,
profit determination under a surplus approach requires entities
to incorporate changes in the value of all of their assets, includ-
ing non-current and fixed assets, in the computation of profit
[Kehl, 1976, pp. 3-13]. This approach also implies, by necessity,
specifying the concepts of capital and capital to maintenance be
adopted [Jones and Aiken, 1994, p. 201]. Therefore, profits un-
der a surplus approach suggest that capital has been maintained
for the owner under the proprietary theory of economics, which
implies general application of market buying or selling prices
current at period’s end [Revsine, 1981].
The alternative to the surplus approach concentrates upon
the profit and loss account as the primary evidence of the avail-
ability of profit. Described as the ‘profit and loss account
method’, profit has been determined by the courts as the excess
of total revenues received within a financial period, over that
proportion of each production input’s purchase price allocated
in proportion to the contribution it makes to each period’s rev-
enues. In addition, a comparison might also be made of the
opening and closing values of the inventory and other assets
intended to be consumed or turned over within the business
cycle. Any difference is then added or deducted from the differ-
ence between revenue receipts and expenditures [Ford and Aus-
tin, 1995, p. 663].
The profit and loss method places most importance on
those financial transactions in which the specific reporting en-
tity is directly involved, and little or no emphasis on the current
market values of assets, particularly non-current or fixed assets.
Nevertheless, the market prices of non-current or fixed assets
may become relevant in certain circumstances, but only as
proximate justifications of certain ‘unexpired costs’ by auditors.
The profit and loss method, therefore, is driven primarily by the
conventions of revenue recognition for a legal entity and by the
matching principle of relevant costing under double entry
[Littleton, 1953, Ch. 2 & 5]. Relevance is in relation to
management’s business strategies and the specific nature of the
expenditures involved [p. 55].
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The existence of profits under the profit and loss account
method may or may not mean that capital has been maintained
overall in terms of market prices in a proprietary sense of eco-
nomic ownership. It ultimately depends upon whether or not
market events have occurred, and the ways in which they have
interacted during the financial period as a timing issue congru-
ent with managerial strategies. For example, the unrealized loss
on the value of a current asset could be completely offset by an
unrealized gain on a non-current asset. Nevertheless, under tra-
ditional accounting procedures and for dividend determination
purposes, any unrealized gain is unlikely to be accounted for
whereas any unrealized loss will almost certainly be incorpo-
rated in the final profit figure. Historically, this is in accordance
with the ‘lower of cost or market’ principle. However, it should
be noted that professional accounting standards have increas-
ingly permitted management to use the option of adopting
management values, historic costs or current market prices for
financial accounting and disclosure purposes. Under the separa-
tion of ownership and control it is management’s perception of
the unexpired cost of assets yet to be allocated, not the general-
ity of market prices, which is relevant.
By incorporating changes in the values of all assets and
limiting managements’ discretion over the timing of revenue
and expense recognition, the surplus approach could possibly
provide a more theoretically rigorous measure of profit that is
relatively less susceptible to managerial opportunism or conser-
vatism [Chambers, 1966; Baxt, 1970]. It might also provide a
means of measuring profit that is most closely aligned with the
economic view under this concept of accountability and control
[Edwards and Bell, 1961; Sterling, 1971]. However, this presup-
poses that assumptions and deductive logic can replace compli-
ance with social codes for general acceptance of managements’
responsibilities for strategic planning and operations. Accord-
ingly, both the British judiciary and accounting profession re-
jected the surplus method in favor of the profit and loss account
method for a variety of legal, ethical and commercial reasons
[Weiner, 1928, pp. 1046-1050; Littleton, 1934, pp. 140-148;
Yamey, 1962; Kehl, 1976; Jones and Aiken, 1994, p. 202]. Never-
theless, differences of opinion still exist amongst academics as
to whether the Lee case represented a ‘watershed’ in terms of
legal precedent with respect to the doctrine of capital mainte-
nance. The matter can be somewhat clarified by Beaver and
Demski’s [1979] view that current market prices can be gener-
ally applied in perfect markets.
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LITERATURE SURVEY
Published work on court cases dealing with disputes over
the payment of dividends and capital maintenance tends to view
the Lee case as a turning point in British judicial precedent.
Interestingly though, there appears to be no general consensus
as to the status of capital maintenance prior to 1889. Some
authors have suggested that prior to this date the British courts
refrained from imposing a capital maintenance view with regard
to accounting matters, except to enforce private contracts or to
redress fraud.7 Therefore, the Lee decision was consistent with
the judicial precedent laid down in previous cases. An alterna-
tive view is that prior to 1889 the courts attempted to protect
creditors by advocating a ‘capital maintenance view’ and refused
to permit the payment of dividends out of capital [Reid, 1987a,
p. 10]. Consequently, the Lee decision marked a change in the
law.8
Based on the findings from pre-Lee cases, Reid [1987a]
claims that it was not uncommon for British judges to reject
contractually-based accounting and dividend policies if they
contravened the capital maintenance doctrine or other equitable
considerations. Nevertheless, no consistent conceptual declara-
tions of asset valuation and income determination were evident
[Reid, 1987b, p. 247]. Furthermore, prior to 1889 the provision
for depreciation received support although “not all decisions
were in accord” and “no consistent concept of profit or deprecia-
tion emerged” [Reid, 1988, pp. 2-3].
Bryer [1998] suggests that prior to the Lee decision judicial
views on asset valuation and income determination were consis-
tent with Dicksee’s [1903] concept of ‘capital-revenue account-
ing’ (CRA). However, following the Lee case, general agreement
on CRA evaporated. Consequently, Bryer [1998, p. 57] argues
that the Lee case signaled the end of the general acceptance of
CRA. Bryer discusses Napier’s [1997] suggestion that the Lee
decision was ‘anomalous’ in the sense that it was consistent with
the feudal law of settlement trusts, suggesting lingering feudal
attitudes amongst the judiciary. However, he rejects Napier’s
thesis on the grounds that it is inconsistent with his own views
7 For instance, Dickinson [1904, p. 71], Hatfield [1916, p. 203], Weiner
[1928, p. 1051], Edwards [1939, p. 179], May [1943, p. 52] and Johnston [1961,
p. 545].
8 For instance, Palmer [1898, p. 147], Strachan [1910, p. 233], Robson [1927,
p. 266], Briggs [1934, p. 228], Cooke [1937, p. 440], Yamey [1941, p. 274], Gower
[1954, p. 112], Edey and Panitpakdi [1956, p. 378] and French [1977, p. 307].
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on the general socialization of capital. Furthermore, while the
accounting allowed in Lee was feudal in form, it was not feudal
in substance [Bryer, 1994], nor was the accounting in subse-
quent cases such as Verner v General and Commercial Investment
Trust (1894)9 [Cooper, 1894]. Nevertheless, Bryer’s view that
managers in the 19th century were functionaries of investor or
establishment interests may require some modification given
the nature of the legal and accounting decisions and practices
emphasized here.
A.C. Littleton, arguably the pre-eminent American account-
ing scholar and historian of the first half of the 20th century,
discussed the extent of general agreement with decisions by the
courts [Littleton, 1933, p. 221]. This is interesting as Littleton
had a marked affinity with and knowledge of the ‘historical evo-
lution’ [1953, pp. 84-89] of accounting in both the UK and the
USA during the previous one hundred years.
The central premise of Littleton’s [1953] views on account-
ing was the overriding need for flexibility in measuring periodic
performance of the whole organization, especially when long-
term planning was involved. His belief was that managers have
been given flexibility to the extent necessary to fulfill business
activities and strategies in terms of community needs [1953, p.
55 & Ch. 5]. This appears to have grown out of his historical
interpretation of the growth of regulation [1953, Ch. 1 & 6].
Given this focus, Littleton argued that the purpose of account-
ing is “(T)o make possible the periodic matching of costs (ef-
forts) and revenues (accomplishments)” [1953, Ch. 2]. Further-
more, there must be a congruency between the measurement of
costs for reporting purposes and managements’ strategies and
accomplishments (periodic revenues) for the organization as a
whole. Managements’ congruent costing at period’s end (includ-
ing unexpired costs of fixed assets) in terms of overall strategic
plans coincided with Littleton’s own edict of fairness amongst
competing parties [1953, Ch. 1 & 2, pp. 84-95]. Consequently, in
his view, capital maintenance is a policy option of management
and not a fundamental objective for accounting itself [1953, p.
23]. Moreover, no current market price can have a general status
of fairness applicable to all firms [1953, Ch. 12], particularly
where long-term strategies for periodic assets exist [see also Bell
et al., 1997].
Littleton knew from examining over four hundred years
of history that managements’ attempts to adopt their own
9 2. Ch. 239.
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‘exchange values’ for fixed and current assets generally had been
too hazardous in practical terms [1953, p. 84]. While possibly
relevant and theoretically consistent in financial terms with
managements’ economic planning and financial strategies,
management’s valuation in exchange was impracticable for gen-
eral use because of speculation and reporting abuses [1953, p.
85]. Thus, Littleton elected to revive and support the general
application of historical cost. This move was expedient, not
ideological, in that it brought together his logical and historical
reasoning for congruent values in exchange and generalized
conservatism. However, cost as the central focus for accounting
units remained, as it remains today, with revenues as compensa-
tion and profit as reward [Littleton, 1953, p. 95].
The profit and loss method under Littleton’s [1953, pp. 84-
91] structure, whereby established professional justification pro-
cedures provide for methodological objectivity [Dewey, 1947] to-
gether with periodic costing relevant to management’s existing
strategies, represents the core of his structural theory. This pro-
cess does not in itself justify the generalized expediency of man-
datory historical cost. Strictly speaking within the framework,
costs are specific to managerial strategies for the firm in its
environment. Under more recent professional attempts at stan-
dardization these might often be justified through the use of
historic and current market prices as surrogates for manage-
ment values in exchange. Nevertheless, generalization cannot
posit some kind of ideal for accounting practice. The environ-
ment for observation of a complex set of operations under
longer-term planning has different conditions for observation
and more variety in its natural setting than does observation for
valuing a corner store in a perfect market at two points in time.
Accountants had grown to understand this complexity of pro-
duction issues as the emphasis for relevant periodic costing
since the 17th century [Howard, 1932]. In fact, professionalism
in accounting practice had moved, and continues to move, to-
wards providing credibility for reduced reliance on non-proxi-
mate market prices as values.
Littleton’s argument, which is accepted here as having been
adopted by the courts, is that the gradual movement away from
market valuation methods at discharge of venture responsi-
bilities to periodic income determination as a product of the
double entry system was scientific [1953, pp. 80-90]. It reflected
evolutionary changes in various social, commercial and legisla-
tive conditions. Moreover, legislators never intended managers
to be overwhelmed or thwarted by charge/discharge financial
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reporting of valuations reflecting shorter-term perspectives, a
problem evident in many securities markets today. The success
and security of investment plans for the contribution of capital
by shareholders collectively were agreed to be important. How-
ever, these issues had to be placed in perspective against the
invention and growth of goods and services for the community
as a whole. For instance, the Joint Stock Companies Registra-
tion and Regulation Act, 1844 was introduced to assist produc-
tive enterprises towards longer-term objectives for invention, in-
novation and growth. Consequently:
The maintenance of capital is indeed important, but
maintenance is an objective of management policy . . .
The proper matching of costs and revenues carries the
relation of capital and income further than does the
relation of principal and interest. The action of match-
ing treats capital as a means, income as an end
[Littleton, 1953, p. 23].
Emphasis by the courts on freedom of contract over arbi-
trary and restrictive creditor and shareholder protection propos-
als and concepts appears to have mirrored the nature and gen-
eral tenet of companies legislation introduced by the British
Parliament during the 19th century.
INSTITUTIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONTEXTS
Dicey [1905; 1914] argues that after 1825, British legislative
history comprised two relatively distinct periods of ‘laissez-faire’
individualism (1825 to 1868) and ‘collectivism’ (1868 to 1900).
Company legislation introduced and adopted during the laissez-
faire period generally aimed at avoiding any restrictions over
freedom of contract [Dicey, 1914, p. 146]. In contrast, the collec-
tivist era was characterized by company legislation designed to
secure protections such as compulsory financial disclosure, par-
ticularly for those individuals who lacked influence over the di-
rectorate [Dicey, 1914, p. 264]. While convenient as a framework
for examining the evolution of corporate legislation for disclo-
sure in Britain during the 19th century [Jones and Aiken, 1995;
1999], Dicey’s [1905; 1914] thesis has been subject to a number
of criticisms [Brebner, 1948, p. 71; Roberts, 1961, pp. 78-83;
Cosgrove, 1980, pp. 171-194; Perkin, 1981, pp. 57-60; Walker,
1996, pp. 306-312].
Questions about Dicey’s [1905; 1914] framework highlight a
number of issues, including characteristics of laissez-faire and
collectivist elements in both pre- and post-1870 legislation
42
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 32 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss1/10
35Ardern and Aiken: Legal Precedents for Managerial Autonomy
[MacDonagh, 1977, pp. 9-11; Wood, 1982, p. 126; Harris, 1992,
p. 118]. Also, multiple political and public doctrines either com-
pete against or encapsulate laissez-faire and collectivist ideolo-
gies [Parris, 1960, pp. 35-36; Parris, 1969, p. 273; Lubenow,
1971, p. 9; Henriques, 1979, p. 260; Robb, 1992, pp. 17-18, 148-
158]. The malleability of definitional boundaries is also a prob-
lem [Taylor, 1972, p. 12; Holmes, 1976, pp. 683-685]. While im-
portant, the debate surrounding Dicey’s division of public policy
making in Britain into distinct periods is relevant here only to
the extent that it highlights two significant themes: (1) the ap-
parent coexistence of both laissez-faire/economic liberal and
collectivist/interventionist ideologies in 19th century British
companies legislation [MacDonagh, 1977, pp. 9-11; Wood, 1982,
p. 126; Checkland, 1985, pp. 158-159]; and (2) the general ascen-
dancy of economic liberal strategies in social and macro-
economic policy up until the early 20th century [Crouch, 1967,
p. 199; McCord, 1970, pp. 126-128; Taylor, 1972, p. 39; Crouzet,
1982, pp. 108-109; Parker, 1990, pp. 54-59; Robb, 1992, p. 189].
Undoubtedly, any attempts to categorize history into dis-
crete and coherent periods is likely to yield anomalies. For in-
stance, while the 1840s and 1850s have been described as the
high point of laissez-faire in Britain [Court, 1962; Hobsbawm,
1973, p. 190ff], there appeared to be implicit acceptance of state
intervention to secure individual rights and to protect private
property [Dicey, 1914, pp. 260-261; Taylor, 1972, pp. 53-64;
Paul, 1979, pp. 47-48]. Furthermore, Maltby [1998, p. 14] argues
that laissez-faire is not, in itself, an adequate explanation for the
way in which companies were regulated during the 1850s and
1860s:
Although politicians invoked laissez-faire, they were not
prepared to pursue it rigorously, because of the impos-
sibility of making a clear distinction between the pres-
ervation of individual and collective rights [Maltby,
1998, p. 12].10
Consequently, it appears that legislators were not trying to do
away with company regulation, but merely seeking to identify a
minimalist framework within which companies could operate
[Maltby, 1998, p. 13].
Despite the important restrictive disclosure and auditing
provisions contained in the 1844 and 1845 Acts, both were in
substance more liberal than restrictive in character. Underlying
10 See also Brebner [1948, p. 71], Perkin [1969, p. 325; 1981, pp. 57-68] and
Seaman [1972, p. 170].
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the 1844 and 1845 Acts was the expectation by legislators that
economic progress through capital centralization and the result-
ant economies of scale in production would contribute towards
economic prosperity [Court, 1962; Hobsbawm, 1973]. Accord-
ingly, one of the principal tasks of limited liability was to eman-
cipate free enterprise by harnessing the increasing glut of do-
mestic investment capital that had appeared because of the
Industrial Revolution [Dicey, 1914, p. 202; Hunt, 1936, p. 118ff].
For example, during the 1790s, industry funding needed for
merchandise and other inventories and fixed capital formation
were on an equal footing. However, by 1835 the fixed capital
needs of industry were three times that of merchandise and
inventory requirements combined [Crouzet, 1972, pp. 32-33].
Accordingly, neither the 1844 or 1845 acts represented simply
an attempt to increase investment opportunities for banks and
other financial institutions.
As the demands for increasingly larger and more productive
plant began to outstrip the ability of banks to accommodate
effectively the ensuing requests for funds, the banks responded
by gradually withdrawing from long-term industrial involve-
ment [Littleton, 1953, Ch. 5]. As a consequence, the responsibil-
ity for long-term funding of industry and commerce increasingly
fell to the mechanism of limited liability [Jefferys, 1938, p. 160;
Goodhart, 1972, p. 135; Kennedy, 1976, p. 160]. The vast major-
ity of private companies initially availed themselves of limited
liability to reduce risks associated with soliciting investments
from close associates [Lavington, 1921, p. 208; Jefferys, 1938, p.
119; Kennedy, 1976, p. 161] or ‘inside’ investors [Bryer, 1998;
Maltby, 1998]. However:
. . . when private or internal resources were insufficient
and short term bank accommodation was too limited
and risky, British firms and entrepreneurs after the
1880’s were forced to turn to the second means of
implementing limited liability, that of public quotations
on a stock exchange [Kennedy, 1976, p. 162].
Both Jefferys [1938] and Bryer [1997] contend that the in-
troduction of limited liability was in the interests of capitalists
seeking suitably large investments. Likewise, Maltby [1998, p.
30] argues that:
The interests of large investors, the ‘merchant bankers
and merchant princes’ . . . predominated throughout.
Limited liability favoured them, by offering the possi-
bility for profitable but less risky investment.
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However, notwithstanding the benefits provided by limited li-
ability to large investors, the legislation also benefited entrepre-
neurs with innovative ideas by providing them with more ready
access to capital. This occurred despite their initial cautious
behavior. For instance, the preponderance of high denomination
company shares with large reserves of uncalled capital [Maltby,
1998, pp. 19-20] could be interpreted as typical of an immature
market in which creditors were hesitant to relinquish old lend-
ing habits. Consequently, directors were compelled to act as if
they were operating unlimited liability companies [Kennedy,
1976].
Most significant compulsory British companies legislation
was passed during the ‘collectivist’ era.11 Much of this legislation
either introduced compulsory disclosure and auditing require-
ments, or else strengthened and modernized pre-existing audit-
ing and accounting provisions. However, the move towards col-
lectivism was not necessarily at the expense of freedom of
contract. For instance, the 1862 Act provided that companies
were required to adopt the set of articles provided in the Act
unless shareholders and directors specifically negotiated a set
[Jones and Aiken, 1995, p. 76].
The shift back to disclosure requirements evident in the
Companies Act, 1900 can be tied directly to increasing absentee
ownership, and the concomitant disappearance of financial in-
termediaries [Kennedy, 1976, p. 164]. Maltby [1998, pp. 27-28]
argues that the general fall in nominal values of shares, com-
bined with a declining use of uncalled capital, had a significant
impact during the last third of the 19th century:
Diversification by large investors, as well as increased
participation by small ones, meant that the limited li-
ability company was running into problems of the sepa-
ration of ownership and control.
Nevertheless, it appears that the legislators were aware of the
problems associated with the separation of ownership and con-
trol before the advent of the collectivist era.
While the disclosure and auditing provisions contained in
the 1844 and 1845 Acts may have discriminated against small
investors, their introduction was specifically directed at the
11 For instance, the Regulation of Railways Act, 1868, the Life Assurance
Companies Act, 1870, the Gaswork Clauses Act, 1871, the Metropolis Water Act,
1871, the Building and Friendly Societies Act, 1874, the Companies Act, 1879,
the Electric Lighting Act, 1882, the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 and the
Companies Act, 1900 [Brown, 1905; Dicey, 1914; Edey and Panitpakdi, 1956].
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prevention of willful acts of ‘fraud and illegality’. Compulsory
accounting disclosure was not necessarily invoked as a remedy
for companies ‘faulty in their nature’ or ‘fraudulent in their ob-
jects’. It was recommended as a means of warding off ‘misman-
agement’ by making directors answerable increasingly to ‘out-
side’ shareholders [Maltby, 1998, p. 18]. Hence, restrictive
accounting provisions were specifically linked by the legislators
to the protection of private property and the maintenance of law
in line with classical economic philosophies of regulation [Jones
and Aiken, 1995, pp. 69-70].
Against this backdrop of legislative and economic change,
the accounting profession was undergoing significant changes
of its own. Based on the listings in the London Post Office Di-
rectory, the number of accountants increased dramatically be-
tween 1860 and 1880 from 264 to 700. Following on from this,
in 1870 the Institute of Accountants was formed in London. It
was subsequently merged with a number of other professional
accounting associations in 1880 to form the Institute of Char-
tered Accountants in England and Wales [Edwards, 1989, p.
277].
Several authors have linked this growth in the accounting
profession to changes in companies legislation and the market
for company shares [Maltby, 1998; Bryer, 1998, p. 59]. Joint
stock companies registered under the Companies Act, 1844 were
required to comply with a series of provisions relating to the
production and registration of audited balance sheets [Maltby,
1998, p. 11]. While these mandatory requirements were not car-
ried over to the 1856 and 1862 Companies Acts, a number of
specific industries were subsequently required to adopt compul-
sory disclosure and/or audit requirements. For instance, disclo-
sure requirements were introduced for gas companies (Gaswork
Clauses Act, 1871) and for electricity companies (Electric Light-
ing Act, 1882). Compulsory disclosure requirements and audit
requirements were also introduced for railway companies
(Regulation of Railways Act, 1868), water companies (Metropo-
lis Water Act, 1871) and joint stock banks (Companies Act,
1879) [Morris, 1993; Jones and Aiken, 1995, p. 72].12 Conse-
quently:
12 After 1868, auditing and accounting preparation provisions also appeared
in a number of Acts relating to the governance of counties, municipalities and
parishes, such as the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 [Brown, 1905, pp. 319-
320].
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. . . as a more dispersed group of investors was begin-
ning, albeit slowly, to demand accounting information,
an accounting profession was emerging which could
supply that information” [Maltby, 1998, p. 28].
While auditing and financial disclosure requirements were
eventually granted compulsory status in the Companies Act,
1900 [Edey and Panitpakdi, 1956], audits could have been per-
formed by arrangement for such companies and institutions as
the Forth and Clyde Navigation Company (1786) using govern-
ment loans in earlier times [Forrester, 1980]. In later times,
trustee and government monies would have been audited in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Exchequer and Audit De-
partments Act, 1866.13 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that govern-
ment inspectors would have accepted anything but financial
statements drawn up by fully skilled financial professionals
[Funnell, 2004].
Even though companies legislation provided managers with
the freedom to act as innovators in reporting, accountants do
not appear to have been passive participants, and many made
formative moves to establish themselves as recognized authori-
ties on accounting practice. As such, they would have been vocal
about the need for flexibility of directors, as their clients, to
achieve their longer-term plans [Lavington, 1921, p. 213;
Jefferys, 1938, pp. 295-314; Kennedy, 1976, p. 168; Maltby, 1998,
p. 28]. On the other hand, economic advisors to investors and
creditors would have noted the increasing opportunities for sup-
plying their services under the new arrangements for lending
and the transfer of securities, as well as the need for safeguards
in such an environment.
INTERPRETATIONS OF JUDICIAL REASONING
While the uncertainty evident with respect to legislative ori-
gins raises questions about whether court cases can reveal fun-
damental principles of accounting, or of law itself [Rahman,
1992, p. 185], it is possible that one can overemphasize these
problems. Accordingly, it will be argued here that questions ad-
dressed by the law in considering the acceptability of particular
accounting methods for the purposes of dividend determination
have usually focused upon: (1) authority for the distribution; (2)
transparency of its effects in terms of fairness and/or value for
13 29 & 30 Vict. Cap. 39.
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money to participants; and (3) managerial freedoms to provide
for the on-going capacity for distribution.14
With respect to the authority for the distribution, it appears
that English judges during the 19th century entertained a hierar-
chy of priorities consistent with legislative priorities. This hier-
archy of priorities began with evolving customs and legislative
provisions. For instance, despite the courts generally embracing
freedom of contract, there were occasions prior to the Lee case
when they returned to older principles of equity [Atiyah, 1979,
p. 404, in Mills, 1993]. Some of these more traditional principles
of equity are evident in companies legislation, such as in the
Joint Stock Companies Act, 1862. Once it was clear that legisla-
tive provisions were not being breached, the courts reasoned
down to non-compliance with contracts and other specific con-
straints on persons and firms. Consequently, the capital mainte-
nance requirement was only enforced when clear-cut violations
of the law occurred [Johnston, 1961, p. 545; Keown and Mann,
1956, p. 163].
In their attempts to evaluate the transparency, fairness and/
or value for money of profit calculations and dividend pay-
ments, the judiciary was compelled to pay particular attention
to specific revenues and expenses. They were undoubtedly as-
sisted towards this end by the increasing popularity of the
double account system [Dicksee, 1895, pp. 117-120; Yamey,
1962; Edwards, 1985, p. 19]. While the double account system
comprises a method of classifying the balance sheet, a detailed
profit and loss account is a conventional feature of this system
[Parker, 1990, p. 66; Jones and Aiken, 1994, pp. 202-204]. More-
over, the production of a profit and loss statement is integral to
the objectives of the double account system, which are: (1) to
demonstrate stewardship or accountability about how capital
raised by companies is used or spent; and (2) to distinguish
capital from revenue expenditure [Carter, 1937, pp. 1024-1026;
Morris, 1993, p. 172].
With respect to managerial freedoms, the increasing distinc-
tion between shareholders and directors after 1856 led the
courts to adopt the view that financial accounting was primarily
determined by the priorities of management. These priorities
then focused upon the financial capacities of business opera-
14 It is interesting to note that normative economists of the 1960s who fol-
lowed Canning [1929, p. 319] believed practicing accountants were not inter-
ested in distribution [Chambers, 1966, p. 99].
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tions to fund future operations as directors thought best, and to
distribute periodic dividends which were fair to shareholders
collectively [French, 1977, p. 322]. In doing so, the courts rel-
egated capital maintenance to a policy option of management
[Littleton, 1953, p. 23]. A common theme that links accounting
principles is the recognition of the rights of stakeholders under
the specific circumstances in question. With respect to the
specific circumstances encountered, no two legal disputes were
identical.
Prior to 1889, Master of the Rolls, Sir George Jessel, pro-
vided a number of interpretations of the capital maintenance
notion that were seemingly consistent with the intentions of the
legislature at the time.15 The model balance sheet annexed to
Table A clearly indicated, by its format, that the amount consid-
ered available for dividends was to be discovered by deducting
from the value of total assets the sums owing to outsiders to-
gether with the amount credited as paid up on the share capital.
Consequently, the view emerged that dividends: (1) could not be
paid out of capital; and (2) could only be paid out of profits.
Furthermore, the two restrictions were ostensibly treated as syn-
onymous. Both were interpreted to mean that only the surplus
of net assets over paid up capital could be divided.
After 1889, an alternative interpretation began to gain as-
cendancy. By substituting the legal notion of capital with con-
cepts of ‘fixed’ and ‘circulating’ capital [Dicksee, 1916, p. 14;
Yamey, 1941, p. 280], and by rejecting the idea that legal prece-
dent did not permit companies to pay dividends if net assets
were less than the paid up share capital, the reforming judges
were able to provide important freedoms to businessmen with
respect to dividend policy. Furthermore, they were able to main-
tain consistency with the broader legal precedent that dividends
must not be paid out of ‘capital’ [French, 1977, p. 318]. How-
ever, in the process the courts significantly undermined the im-
portance of the surplus method of accounting measurement in
favor of the profit and loss account method. This followed an
emphasis on production rather than on consumption, a focus
which had existed since larger firms emerged in numbers during
the 17th century [Howard, 1932].
15 For instance, re Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Company (1877) 4. Ch.D.
327, re Dronfield Silkstone Coal Company (1877) 17. Ch.D. 76, re National Funds
Assurance Company (1878) L.R. 10. Ch.D. 118, Dent v. London Tramways Com-
pany (1880) 16. Ch.D. 344 and re Exchange Banking Company (Flitcroft’s Case)
(1882) 21. Ch.D. 518.
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By suggesting that the two major legal limitations in fact
had different meanings, the judiciary managed to maintain con-
sistency with the precedent that dividends should only ever be
paid out of profits. However, profits were no longer necessarily
tied to the surplus of net assets over paid up share capital, as
was evident from the findings in Verner v General and Commer-
cial Investment Trust (1894).16 While attempting to distinguish
between circulating and fixed capital for the purposes of profit
measurement, Lindley, L.J. concluded that:
Perhaps the shortest way of expressing the distinction
which I am endeavouring to explain is to say that fixed
capital may be sunk and lost and yet the excess of cur-
rent receipts over current payments may be divided, but
that floating or circulating capital must be kept up as
otherwise it would enter into and form part of such
excess, in which case to divide such excess without de-
ducting the capital which forms part of it will be con-
trary to the law.
Similar views were expressed by judges in other cases.17
The adoption of notions of fixed and circulating capital was
also likely to have been aided by the increasing use of the double
account system [Dicksee, 1895, pp. 117-120; Yamey, 1962;
Edwards, 1985, p. 19], which actually presupposes a distinction
between fixed and circulating capital [Cooper, 1888, p. 744].
However, because neither circulating nor fixed capital could be
defined without reference to the specific accounting situations
and strategies from which they had arisen, the courts relied
increasingly upon management and company objectives to aid
in establishing distributable profit for legislative purposes. Fur-
thermore, where there was no suggestion of illegal activity or
bad faith, the courts deferred to accepted accounting practice
and therefore maximized management’s opportunities to act
and provide on-going distributions to shareholders [Yamey,
1962, pp. 430-431].
Critical to the acceptance and promulgation of these views
was their compatibility with other forms of creditor protection,
such as the solvency rule [French, 1977]. The solvency rule,
whereby it was illegal for a company to pay a dividend if to do
16 2. Ch. 239.
17 Binney v Ince Hall Coal and Cannel Company (1866) 35. L.J. Ch. 363; Lord
Rokeby v Elliot (1880) 41. L.T. 537, modifying (1878) 38. L.T. 846; and Ammonia
Soda Company Limited v Chamberlain (1918) 1. Ch.D. 208.
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so would make the company insolvent, was first introduced in
the Companies Act, 1855 (section 9). Although the provision was
carried over to the Companies Act, 1856 (section 14), it was
subsequently omitted from the Companies Act, 1862. Neverthe-
less, the solvency rule clearly made an impression on the judi-
ciary at the time, and appears to have had an on-going influence
over judicial reasoning.18
French [1977, p. 320] suggests that the similarities between
the solvency rule and other contemporary legal requirements,
such as the fiduciary duties contained in trust law, encouraged
the courts to adopt the solvency rule as a guide to creditor pro-
tection. Nevertheless, having real world references in the form
of liquidity and leverage, the solvency rule was less likely to
constitute an arbitrary constraint over management’s ability to
control and direct longer-term business activities, particularly
the provision of on-going distributions to shareholders.19 Conse-
quently, the rule was able to provide a guide to minimum credi-
tor protection without inhibiting legitimate trading activities.
EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL MAINTENANCE ISSUES
Authority for the Distribution: The authority and legitimacy of
the dividend distribution appear to have been foremost amongst
the concerns of the judiciary and on many occasions these pri-
orities overrode the upholding of agency type contracts. For in-
stance, in MacDougall v. Jersey Imperial Hotel Co. (1864),20 Sir
W. Page Wood held that the payment of dividends during a
period when there were no revenues clearly amounted to a pay-
ment out of capital and, therefore, was illegal.21 Subsequent
18 Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company (1889) 41. Ch.D. 1; Verner v. General
and Commercial Investment Trust (1894) 2. Ch. 239; in re National Bank of Wales
(1900-1903) All E.R. Rep. 484; Dovey and the Metropolitan Banks of England and
Wales Limited v. John Cory (1901) A.C. 477; and Wilmer v. McNamara and Co.
Ltd. (1895) 2. Ch.D. 245.
19 Lubbock v. British Bank of South America (1892) 2 Ch.D. 198; Ammonia
Soda Company Limited v. Chamberlain (1918) 1. Ch.D. 208; and Dimbula Valley
(Ceylon) Tea Co. Limited v. Laurie (1961) 1. All E.R. 769.
20 2 H.& M. 528.
21 It should also be noted that in 1864 there were no statutory provisions
requiring companies to pay dividends out of profit and that the rule was invoked
on the basis of public policy [Ford et al., 1999, p. 40]. See also re Ebbw Vale
Steel, Iron and Coal Company (1877) 4. Ch.D. 827, re National Funds Assurance
Company (1878) L.R. 10. Ch.D. 118, Guinness v. Land Corporation of Ireland
(1882) L.R. 22. Ch.D. 349, re Alexandra Palace Company (1882) 21. Ch.D. 149 and
Flitcroft’s Case (1882) 21. Ch.D. 519.
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cases overwhelmingly confirmed the view that dividend pay-
ments could not be made to shareholders where there are no
‘profits’ reported, even where private contracts guaranteed such
payments.22
If it was clear that individual stakeholder rights were not at
risk, the courts most often appeared satisfied to enforce express
agency-type agreements stipulating the use of particular ac-
counting methods for profit and dividend determination. This is
consistent with the view that the judiciary reasoned downwards
from evolving customs and legislative provisions to non-compli-
ance with agency contracts. For example, in Davison v Gilles
(1879),23 Jessel, M.R. concluded that in the company’s articles,
profits meant ‘net’ profits, principally “ . . . because you do not
get a reserve fund at all until you have paid your current ex-
penses” [p.193n].24
Accounting principles and practices, or more precisely the
numbers they generate, are often used to define competing
property rights between contracting parties [Watts, 1977]. How-
ever, with respect to judicial priorities the need to uphold spe-
cific rights established under agency contracts overrode the ex-
pectation that companies should comply with generally accepted
accounting principles and procedures. As long as neither the
legislation nor creditors’ protection had been violated, the re-
quirements of the articles of association were respected. For
instance, in Dent v London Tramways Co. (1880),25 Jessel, M.R.
sanctioned the payment of a preference dividend on the basis
that, in accordance with the companies articles, there existed a
profit for the year. Therefore, to have decided otherwise would
have caused an obvious injustice [Yamey, 1962, p. 441]. Like-
wise, in Lambert v Neuchatel Asphalte Company (1882), Bacon,
L.J. rejected the claim that the company should provide for de-
preciation of a long-lived mining lease on the grounds that the
company’s articles required no such reserves to be established.
Bacon suggested that although Jessel’s definition of ‘net’ profits
22 See also Salisbury v Metropolitan Railway (1870)(2) 22. L.T. 839, re Oxford
Benefit Building and Investment Society (1886) L.R. 35. Ch.D. 502, Trevor v
Whitworth (1887) 21. App. Cas. 409, Leeds Estate, Building and Investment Com-
pany v Shepherd (1887) L.R. 36. Ch.D. 787 and re Walters’ Deed of Guarantee
(1933) 1. Ch. 321.
23 16. Ch.D. 347n.
24 See also Dent v London Tramways Co. (1880) 16. Ch.D. 344 and Kehoe v
The Waterford & Limerick Railway Co. (1888) L.R. 21, Ir. Ch.D. 221.
25 16. Ch.D. 344.
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in Davison v Gilles (1879) was no doubt appropriate in the cir-
cumstances of that case, Neuchatel Asphalte’s articles stated
otherwise [pp. 884-885].26 Similar reasoning to this was used
subsequently in the Lee case.
In the lower court proceedings of the Lee case, Stirling, J.
had refused to enjoin a dividend since the plaintiffs had failed to
prove that the value of the company’s assets had deteriorated
[Kitchen, 1974, p. 124].27 Stirling, J. indicated that his views on
capital maintenance were closely aligned to those of Jessel’s
[Reid, 1987b, p. 251 and footnote 19].28 However, he suggested
that at some future time the company might have to set apart a
substantial sum to represent depreciation in the value of the con-
cession. This implies that at the time the charging of depreciation
was regarded as indicative of the making of a good faith valuation
of assets and that, provided there was nothing to suggest manage-
ment had acted illegally, capital was being maintained [French,
1977, p. 309].29 Nevertheless, the charging of depreciation was not
compulsory, and specific rights established under agency con-
tracts could in fact override the requirement that companies com-
ply with generally accepted accounting principles.
Transparency of Distributional Effects: Another important influ-
ence over judicial reasoning with respect to dividend payments
was the transparency of the profit calculations and the fairness
of the resulting distribution. By adopting such a viewpoint, the
courts were compelled to concentrate on specific revenues and
expenses within the overriding considerations of the objectives
of management and the company. For instance, in Bale v
Cleland (1864),30 Martin, J. agreed with the company’s account-
ing treatment of preliminary expenses on the basis that allo-
cating capitalized cost as an expense over future periods was
consistent with the accounting practices adopted by railway
26 Furthermore, Bacon, L.J. suggested that while “ . . . the Court will interfere
to redress any wrongs, . . . the Court never interferes to prescribe to companies
what they shall do as to their own internal affairs” (p. 883).
27 Not only had the terms and size of the concession recently been extended,
but it was also being held on more favorable terms than had originally been the
case.
28 As suggested by Yamey [1941, p. 277], Stirling, J. “ . . . merely reaffirmed
the earlier series of decisions”.
29 For instance, Binney v Ince Hall Coal and Cannel Company (1866) 35 L.J.
Ch. 363 and Mills v Northern Railway of Buenos Ayres Company (1870) L.R. 5.
Ch.App. 621.
30 4. F. & F. 117.
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companies in similar circumstances at the time. However, the
court rejected the company’s treatment of expenditure incurred
for research and development purposes as it had been applied in
an arbitrary manner. Subsequent cases generally affirmed the
courts’ acceptance of companies capitalizing preliminary expen-
ditures when applied in a systematic manner and when consis-
tently confirmed by the company’s auditor [Best, 1885, p. 573;
Dicksee, 1895, p. 55].31
The courts focus on specific revenues and expenses as they
applied to management’s objectives was also evident in the Lee
case, and a number of cases that followed Lee. By emphasizing
the distinction between capital and revenue accounts, both
Lopes, L.J. and Lindley, L.J. averted the possibility of including
accretions or diminutions of capital in the determination of
profits.32 In doing so, the presiding judges effectively focused the
legal fraternity’s attention upon commercial and accounting is-
sues, such as the significance of the accounting principle of
revenue recognition [Littleton, 1953; Myers, 1959], rather than
on a broad definition including principles of capital mainte-
nance [Ford, 1993, p. 100].
Because most of the cases dealing with depreciation heard
prior to Lee did not involve mining assets,33 recognized opinion
at the time suggested that the Lee decision may have applied
only to companies working with wasting assets [Morris, 1986,
p.72]. Nevertheless, Lee marked the beginning of a succession of
court cases that further undermined the capital maintenance
concept as a means of determining profit for the purposes of
dividend distribution [Morris, 1984, p. 59].34 It also highlighted
the role of management and company objectives in determining
the distinction between fixed and circulating assets. For in-
stance, in Verner v General and Commercial Investment Trust
(1894),35 the court sanctioned a dividend from income received
31 For instance, Turquand v Marshall (1869) 20. L.T. 766, Rance’s Case (1870)
L.R. 6. Ch. App. 104 and re Oxford Benefit Building and Investment Society (1886)
L.R. 35. Ch.D. 502.
32 See also Glenville Pastoral Co. Pty. Ltd. v. FCT (1963) 109. C.L.R. 199 and
BTR Nylex v. Churchill International Inc. (1992) 9. A.C.S.R. 361.
33 Davison v. Gillies (1879) 16. Ch.D. 347n; Dent v. London Tramways Co.
(1880) 16. Ch.D. 334; and Leeds Estate, Building and Investment Society Ltd. v.
Shepherd (1887) 36. Ch.D. 787.
34 Re Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Company (1877) 4. Ch.D. 827; Re
Dronfield Silkstone Coal Company (1877) 17. Ch.D. 76; Dent v. London Tramways
Company (1880) 16. Ch.D. 344; and Lawrence v. West Somerset Mineral Railway
Company (1918) 2. Ch. 250.
35 2. Ch. 239.
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from securities despite the trustees failing to make good the loss
in the value of the securities. However, Stirling, J. did suggest
that had the company been an ordinary trading company his
decision would have been different.36
Cases subsequent to Lee further reinforced the courts’ rights
to consider each case presented on its own merits. For instance,
in the case of Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co. (1902),37 prefer-
ence shareholders had urged that a dividend payment be made
on the grounds that the losses arising from the flooding of
mines and miners’ cottages on a lease of mining rights could be
ignored. However, in his judgment Farwell, J. declared that his
opinion coincided with that of the experts, inasmuch as he
thought that the money invested in these items (mines, etc.) was
properly regarded in this company as circulating capital. Conse-
quently, losses caused by the flooding had first to be made good
before distributable profits were calculated [Ford and Austin,
1995, p. 666]. Following the precedent established in Dovey v
Cory (1901),38 Farwell, J. stated that:
. . . the real question for determination, therefore, is
whether there are profits available for distribution and
this is to be answered according to the circumstances of
each particular case, the nature of the company, and the
evidence of competent witnesses (emphasis added).39
Underpinning the judicial decisions described above was
the court’s wish to avoid any ruling which could fetter the legiti-
mate activities of the company under the particular conditions
encountered [Littleton, 1953, Ch.11]. For instance, Lindley ar-
gued in the Lee case that it was not for the court to interfere in
the activities of businessmen, particularly as there had been no
suggestion of bad faith. Lindley also suggested that the
appellant’s argument that capital be maintained at all costs
should be dismissed. By entertaining such ideas the court was
being invited “to lay down certain principles, the adoption of
which would paralyze the trade of the country”.40 Lindley had
36 See also Bolton v Natal Land and Colonisation Co. (1892) 2. Ch. 124 and re
Kingston Cotton Mills Co., No.2 (1896) 1. Ch. 331.
37 1. Ch. 353.
38 Dovey and the Metropolitan Banks of England and Wales Limited v John
Cory (1901) A.C. 477.
39 Interestingly, Farwell would have come to the same conclusion whether he
had followed the House of Lords in re National Bank of Wales (1900-1903) All
E.R. Rep. 484 at 365, or if he had followed the Court of Appeal’s Lee ruling.
40 41. Ch.D. 1, at 24.
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based his views on the fact that the legislation contained no
direct reference to the payment of dividends [Yamey, 1941, pp.
277-278].
Managerial Freedom to Provide for the On-Going Capacity for Dis-
tribution: While the findings in the Lee case did not require
depreciation to be charged on fixed assets in that particular
case, nothing in the judges’ findings forbid the practice outright.
This appears to be borne out by the limited impact the Lee case
had on the rate of adoption of depreciation accounting amongst
British mining companies [Morris, 1986]. Of paramount con-
cern to the judges was that funds should not be arbitrarily
locked into business entities that may not have any immediate
or longer-term prospects. Thus, the Lee decision was not so
much a special situation only generally applicable to companies
working wasting assets [Morris, 1986, p. 72], but a special situa-
tion which was only generally applicable to companies operat-
ing specific projects with limited lives.
In the Lee case, the directors did not intend that the com-
pany would carry on the business in perpetuity. Consequently,
there was little point in providing for the continuity of the asset
[Dicksee, 1895, pp. 128-129; Morris, 1986, p. 72]. However, in
cases where the charging of depreciation was considered appro-
priate for the circumstances, the courts held that the
businessman’s view on depreciation should be accepted.41 Con-
sequently, the role of depreciation in company accounting was
interpreted by the courts to facilitate continuity of the firm in its
environment where continuity was an objective of management.
Where it was not, real world outcomes from the reporting pro-
cess itself, such as dividend restriction, were not supported by
principles which were unfair in the context.
General acceptance of the profit and loss method by manag-
ers may well have guided the courts towards the view that funds
should not be arbitrarily locked into business entities. For in-
stance, it was conventional under the profit and loss system that
fixed assets were neither valued nor depreciated [Jones and
Aiken, 1994, p. 204]. Nevertheless, the profit and loss method
still permitted managers to charge depreciation if the circum-
stance warranted. In contrast, profit determination under the
surplus approach required entities to incorporate changes in the
value of all their assets, including non-current and fixed assets,
41 For instance, Rishton v Grissell (1868) L.R. 5. Eq. 326 and Kehoe v The
Waterford & Limerick Railway Co. (1888) L.R. 21, Ir. Ch.D. 221.
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in the computation of profit [Kehl, 1976, pp. 3-13; Revsine,
1981; Jones and Aiken, 1994, p. 201].
While cases subsequent to Lee did little to clarify the main
problems with capital maintenance issues, they did confirm the
trend in the post-Lee decisions [Yamey, 1941, p. 282]. For in-
stance, when the National Bank of Wales case reached the House
of Lords as Dovey v Cory (1901),42 the view was taken that rigid
rules could be potentially disastrous to companies:
People put their money into a trading company to give
them an income, and the sudden stoppage of all divi-
dends would send down the value of their shares to
zero and possibly involve its ruin.
Judicial hesitation over forcing trading entities to retain
funds beyond an amount which was considered ‘economically
sensible’ diminished any opportunities to make the capital
maintenance concept explicit. However, as the continuity of a
harmonious relationship between shareholders and manage-
ment depends on the regular payment of dividends as well as
management’s control over strategy formation, the law’s conces-
sion was of great value. It also provided a means by which the
judges could ensure capital was not bound up in any particular
investment profile. Nevertheless, if there had been any confu-
sion surrounding the issue of paying dividends out of the excess
of receipts over current expenses despite fixed capital being lost,
the National Bank of Wales case was probably the best opportu-
nity available to the judiciary to re-establish the position taken
prior to 1889. However, the judiciary declined to take up this
opportunity [French, 1977, pp. 314-316], the Lord Chancellor
doubting whether dividend questions could ever be treated in
the abstract at all [Yamey, 1962, p. 436]. Furthermore, the capi-
tal maintenance principle enunciated in the Lee case, that busi-
ness matters are the province of business men, was reaffirmed
by the highest tribunal [Yamey, 1962, p. 437].
The findings in subsequent cases, such as Lawrence v West
Somerset Mineral Ry. (1918),43 established conclusively that the
judiciary had clearly rejected the doctrine of capital mainte-
nance. While the payment of a dividend and the imminent ter-
mination of the lease on the firm’s principal asset would have
left inadequate assets to repay the bondholders in the event of
42 Dovey and the Metropolitan Banks of England and Wales Limited v John
Cory (1901) A.C. 477.
43 2. Ch. 250.
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dissolution, the court refused to intervene on behalf of the bond-
holders because the dividend was being paid out of divisible
profits [Yamey, 1962, p. 437].
CONCLUSIONS
Principles, conventions and rules of science-based profes-
sions have respected, sustained and empowered the method-
ological precedents of their respective disciplines over time. This
is especially so in the human and biological sciences [Dewey,
1939, 1947; Foucault, 1970, p. 363; Grene, 1985, p. 7]. In this
sense decisions of the courts in the 19th century and the associ-
ated schema of Littleton [1953, Ch. 1, 5, 8 & 12] presume a
continuing duty to avoid epistemological anomalies and unfair
outcomes in practice. These might be associated with the use of
microeconomic theories. That is, accounting choices imposed
on management which give rise to values and other amounts
which lack congruency with managerial strategies could distort
accounting practices for the firm as a whole in its specific and
continuing environment. These numbers potentially lack au-
thenticity as traditional justifications, being a first step in
knowledge towards the discovery and establishment of a new
‘situation’ for observation and analysis [Dewey, 1939, Ch. 6;
Grene, 1985, pp. 7-8]. They might also lack the capacity to facili-
tate understanding of pre-conditions as analytical observations,
thus necessitating change to methodological traditions
[Hopwood, 1987].
On numerous occasions both before and after the Lee case
British courts were asked to adjudicate on the appropriateness
of particular measurement methods for the purposes of divi-
dend determination. In general, the judges exhibited a consis-
tency in their decision-making. Furthermore, no substantial evi-
dence exists to suggest that the courts took the view that
longer-term management strategies should be subsumed by an-
nual disclosure of current ‘value to the owner’ calculations un-
der the surplus method. Judicial attempts to understand ac-
counting valuations as they related to distributional issues were
predominantly concerned with management capacity to control
and direct business activities and to determine on-going distri-
butions to shareholders, particularly in the longer-term [Yamey,
1941; Littleton, 1953]. Consequently, it has been argued here
that the British courts rejected the surplus method of profit
determination for distributive purposes on the grounds that as a
methodology it is insufficiently robust to envisage many of the
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specific risk factors, estimates of cash flows and resultant divi-
dend distributions incorporated into management’s planning
horizons [Bell et al., 1997].
Hopwood [1987] may have divined the element of tradi-
tional accounting practice as determined by the courts from his
observations of the transformation of Josiah Wedgwood’s ac-
counting system (1772) for the firm as a whole. This was in its
overall role of matching performance of the firm to its environ-
ment. The matching principle based on relevant costing has
been established in Europe since the 17th century [Howard,
1932, p. 93]. Unless facing a perfect market [Beaver and Demski,
1979], this ethic for matching under double entry cannot be
displaced by selection of historic or current market prices, al-
though they may be used as proximate prices for justification of
unexpired costs under the traditional production emphasis.
Thus, when Wedgwood established his new system based on
accounting practices relevant to both the strategies and the deci-
sion structure of the organization as a whole, then innovative
qualities empowering origin and persistence of accounting prac-
tices could come into play:
The fine details of the production process could now be
related to the aims and performance of the organization
as a whole. Policies created at the top of the organiza-
tion could be related to specific aspects of organiza-
tional functioning” [Hopwood, 1987, p. 218].
In other words, Hopwood’s basic measurement structure should
ultimately be related downwards to Kaplan and Norton’s [2001a;
2001b; 2004] ‘balanced scorecard’ for congruence with estab-
lished and on-going management strategies and related profiles.
The basic ethic of accounting measurement captures the
spirit of traditional macro evolutionary practice and legal prece-
dents where periodic evaluation of prospects and strategies for
the firm as a whole becomes aligned with management aware-
ness under the profit and loss method favored by the courts.
Accordingly, the judiciary did not prohibit the use of economic
concepts such as depreciation. Rather it was a discretionary
responsibility of managers who would be expected to justify the
calculations and the resulting periodic financial outcomes
[Dicksee, 1895, pp. 128-129; Morris, 1986, p. 72]. Littleton, al-
though an economist, followed the tradition and suggested that
“ . . . depreciation measures the productive contribution of the
asset in question” [1953, pp. 212-213]. However, without justifi-
cation he chose to adopt the expedient solution of linking peri-
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odic assessment of asset prices and depreciation to ‘invested
cost’ in market places, being generalized historic cost. Despite
protestations to the contrary [1953, Ch. 2, 5 & 8], this historical
market price process turns his profit and loss structure into a
quasi-surplus method having no status in periodic reporting. It
mandates depreciation as an accounting principle, a process not
endorsed by the British courts under the double entry reification
of management responsibilities for control in financial terms.
Traditionally, market prices of any kind are proximate prices
and surrogates for ‘objectivity’ in practice. The do not imply the
‘essence’ of periodic accounting measurement [Hopwood, 1987,
p. 211]. Under Littleton’s [1953] macro-evolutionary approach,
costs become outputs as benefits to the community as a whole;
revenues are compensation to the entity; and profits are rewards
[p. 95].
This ethic of justification would have been seen by the Brit-
ish courts as driving the double entry system for the firm as a
whole entity in practice; not current market prices as increases
of value to the owner being an economic reference to periodic
capital maintenance. However, this only applies if business in-
stitutions have not given up long-term planning for production
in favor of shorter-term asset revaluation to enrich speculation
in the buying and selling of securities.
While microeconomic measures of market prices may be
relevant in certain specific circumstances, they may not of them-
selves provide outside of perfect markets a picture of the firm’s
whole performance under managerial strategies [Bell et al.,
1997]. For instance, a study of Lindley, L.J. in re London and
General Bank (no.2) (1895)44 shows that more than the discovery
and ‘adding up’ of market prices is required for the inde-
pendence and competence of auditors. In addition, the distinc-
tion between circulating and fixed capital has come to be gener-
ally regarded as arbitrary and, therefore, unworkable for the
purposes of economic-based models of profit measurement
[Cooper, 1894, p. 1041; Revsine, 1973; Prakash and Sunder,
1979; Samuelson, 1980]. Nevertheless, this has failed to this day
to inhibit the general acceptance in practice of costing methods
based broadly upon fixed and variable concepts. These are aids
in determining congruence with management strategies unless
constrained by the ‘lower of cost and market’ rule [Aiken and
Ardern, 2003].
44 2 Ch.673; 64 L.J. Ch. 866.
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In more recent times, accounting standard setters in Britain
and Commonwealth countries such as Australia have adopted a
different approach to that of the British judiciary. In an attempt
to restrict the role of managerial judgment, policy makers have
increasingly sought to limit the permissible number of classifi-
cation, measurement and transformation procedures [Brom-
wich, 1985, p. 1; Taylor and Turley, 1986, p. 1; Langfield-Smith,
1990, p. 6]. Policy makers have also recommended that eco-
nomic values be allowed under professional accounting stan-
dards and that companies produce abridged financial reports.
Many of these changes appear to be reactions to events such as
corporate collapses that reveal systematic abuses of accounting
procedures. However, some appear to be reactions against his-
torical cost as a general rule. The first step toward avoidance of
disclosure type losses is, however, enforcement of managerial
valuation obligations.
The British courts in the 19th century clearly assumed that
the legislators had not intended to force companies to disclose
periodic changes only in the market prices of fixed assets where
management’s strategies were longer-term. Moreover, they ap-
preciated that these reporting behaviors could diminish on-go-
ing economic opportunities and social responsibilities, and thus
potentially restrain management’s capacity to plan and to adapt
to new challenges for the firm. Instead, the courts focused on
the periodic matching of costs (‘efforts’) and revenues (‘accom-
plishments’), and whether there existed a congruency between
the measurement of costs (both expired and unexpired) and
management’s long-term strategies.
If something different to a periodic overall macro portrayal
of the whole firm under management’s strategies in its specific
evolving environment for continuity is required in the modern
era, then governments, economists, stock market analysts, liqui-
dators and potential investors may need to be prepared to spon-
sor individual specialized reports. This is how markets for micro
information should work in a free-enterprise society [Beaver,
1981]. As for capital maintenance, environmental factors relat-
ing to a diversity of planning horizons and risks have varied, but
not necessarily or generally corrupted, choice of accounting
measures under standardization [Aiken and Ardern, 2003]. His-
torically, a need for objectivity and economic measurement for
the community did not cloud the focus of the British courts on
management’s mission as the longer-term criterion of financial
success. This may provide relevance for accounting assessments
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of unexpired costs as congruent residuals of periodic activity
[Littleton, 1953, p. 98].
The courts in 19th century Britain would have been aware
that the emergence of large-scale private organizations facing
imperfect markets since the end of the 17th century had given
emphasis to accounting for relevant costs with a focus on pro-
duction, not consumption [Canning, 1929, p. 319; Howard,
1932, p. 93]. Relevant costing for ‘unexpired costs’ [Littleton,
1953, Ch. 5] is not the expediency of generalized historical costs.
It must be congruent with management strategies for the orga-
nization as a whole under the double entry based profit and loss
approach [Hopwood, 1987, p. 218; Bell et al., 1997]. Away from
complete and competitive markets [Nickel, 1995], macro-evolu-
tionary accounting reports of this nature cannot be reduced gen-
erally to scientific laws and principles of microeconomics as a
theoretical and legal ideal under capital maintenance hypoth-
eses or related efficiency criteria [Shwayder, 1967; Beaver and
Demski, 1979; Ayala, 1985].
Financial accounting and auditing has often focused on the
application of historic and later current market prices, for busi-
nesses operating in complete and competitive markets. How-
ever, the avoidance of too heavy reliance on such prices, and
emphasis on relevant cost control by management congruent
with overall strategies (Kaplan and Norton, 2004), not simply
upon the collection of more revenues in the shorter-term, is
pertinent. Such cost control is pivotal to the extent of innovation
and future profit sharing in imperfect markets.
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THE ROARING NINETIES:
ACCOUNTING HISTORY COMES OF AGE
Abstract: The paper outlines developments in the accounting history
literature during the 1990s. The introduction chronicles the immense
broadening of publication opportunities in accounting history that
characterized the decade. To a certain extent, this enhancement of
outlets resulted from a richer dialogue among accounting historians
who became increasingly willing to debate paradigmatic and method-
ological issues. In this context, the paper identifies and discusses
“traditional” and “critical” forms of accounting history and reviews
work within the paradigms of economic-rationalist, Foucauldian, and
Marxist/labor-process studies. The major elements of debate between
“old” and “new” perspectives on accounting history are discussed and
linked to later collaborative efforts and refinements in the work of
each genre. Major research projects published during the 1990s are
identified, tabulated, and discussed. The paper concludes with a dis-
cussion of accounting history as the decade closed, with a particular
focus on the opportunities and threats that may lie ahead for the
field.
INTRODUCTION
While accounting history has enjoyed a distinguished pres-
ence as an academic discipline for over a half-century, it was
only in the last decade of the 20th century that a substantial
expansion and maturation of its research agenda occurred. Con-
comitant with the growing number of accounting historians,
practitioners whose first language is other than English have
been welcomed into the field in ever-increasing numbers. Many
Acknowledgments: The authors acknowledge with gratitude the sugges-
tions of Steve Walker and two anonymous reviewers for the Accounting Histori-
ans Journal. Funding support was provided from the Jack Wasmer Fellowship at
John Carroll University.
Submitted November 2003
Revised May 2004
Revised August 2004
Accepted September 2004
69
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2005, Vol. 32, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2005
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200562
of these newer entrants espouse willingness to debate paradig-
matic and methodological issues that in earlier generations went
largely undiscussed. In this article, we will examine how ac-
counting history during the 1990s has built upon the precedents
established by the founders of our craft.
Perhaps more than anything else, accounting history’s com-
ing of age is reflected by the wide expansion of publishing op-
portunities for research. The range of outlets for historical work
is discussed in Fleischman and Tyson [2003] and need not be
reiterated here. What is germane to this study of the discipline
under review is the fact that three of the six journals which have
taken the lead in publishing accounting history – Accounting,
Business & Financial History (ABFH) (U.K.), Accounting History
(AH) (Australia/New Zealand), and Critical Perspectives on Ac-
counting (CPA) (U.S./Canada) – commenced operations during
the 1990s. Only Accounting, Organizations and Society (AOS)
and the Accounting Historians Journal (AHJ) have significantly
older ancestries, while the Accounting, Auditing & Accountability
Journal dates from 1988.
A further indication of accounting history’s forward march
during the decade has been the proliferation of international
conferences in which the discipline’s scholarship is featured.
ABFH sponsors an annual fall conference in Cardiff; AHJ,
through its parent organization, the Academy of Accounting
Historians, holds an annual research conference, typically in the
late fall; and AH is now sponsoring biannual conferences. A
three-year conference rotation features the Asia Pacific Interdis-
ciplinary Research in Accounting conference coordinated by
AAAJ; the Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting confer-
ence, traditionally hosted by the University of Manchester; and
the CPA’s conference in New York City. The World Congresses
of Accounting Historians have continued to meet through the
1990s, most recently on a two-year cycle. Also, the European
Institute for Advanced Studies in Management has conducted
specialist conferences in accounting history.
There has been one negative change in the overall mix and
character of publication outlets available to accounting histori-
ans, especially in North America. Formerly, certain flagship U.S.
accounting journals were willing to publish quality history ar-
ticles.1 Although not a stated editorial policy, these journals no
1 The Accounting Review typically published one or two history articles per
year throughout the decade of the 1980s. To the best of our knowledge, there
have been no purely history publications there since 1991. This direction is
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longer send history pieces out for review. The effects of such
treatment on the flow of history manuscripts to these journals
are predictable. The productive pressures of the day mean that
research-minded academics cannot afford to send work to jour-
nals with such a reputation of treatment, effectively compound-
ing the exclusion of historical work. Since these periodicals re-
main the ones by which others are measured at certain
prestigious, North American institutions of higher education,
this exclusion is particularly painful.
This paper will consider two themes in depth that have
characterized the accounting history discipline in the 1990s. The
first reflects the enrichment of accounting history as increasing
numbers of historians provided theoretical groundings for their
research findings. While there has been passionate debate
among scholars in defense of their paradigms, and sometimes
overly zealous discourse, the additive knowledge derived from
these interchanges has moved our discipline forward. In this
section, we will examine how paradigms matured from earlier
origins during the 1990s, along with the major points of conten-
tion that defined the predominant paradigms and the respective
critiques of each. The discussion will feature key differences that
separate critical and traditional historians philosophically on is-
sues such as objectivity, partisanship, the importance of archival
research, and factualism. Here also we consider the 1990s as the
decade in which the phrase “new accounting history” came into
popular parlance. We will examine its implied distinction from
an older tradition and whether this dichotomy has been a
healthy one for the discipline.
A second focus will be the general themes and directions
reflected in the historical literature of the 1990s. Here we con-
sider topics such as the major projects accounting historians
have undertaken; the broad methodological and subject areas
that dominated the decade’s historiography, including the spe-
cial journal issues that focused attention on these pivotal mat-
ters; and the historiographic debates that so enriched the jour-
nal literature. In conclusion, we hypothesize about research
directions that we see ahead for accounting history as it devel-
ops at the start of the 21st century.
This paper does not attempt to chronicle a third and very
dramatic development in accounting history during the 1990s –
clearly out-of-step with the perceptions of accounting academe as to the impor-
tance of history to undergraduate and graduate students, as well as to the pro-
fession [Slocum and Sriram, 2001].
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the emergence of high-quality, non-Anglo-American history that
utilizes accounting records in languages other than English.
While English remains the lingua franca of accounting history
publication, the work of scholars whose first language is other
than English now appears prominently in leading journals that
publish history, allowing for new sources of empirical evidence
to be brought to bear.2 This work is sufficiently diverse as to
warrant its own review; others are attending to this in projects
now underway [e.g., Carmona, 2002].
HISTORIOGRAPHY
Traditional and Critical: The dichotomy between “traditional”
and “critical” accounting historians developed against the back-
drop of an older traditional/critical contretemps that was quite
unrelated to the discipline itself. An international corps of criti-
cal accounting scholars rose to prominence in the 1980s, partly
in protestation against the U.S. accounting research main-
stream. This research agenda was initially dictated by the
Carnegie and Ford Foundation reports of the late 1950s and was
perpetuated by a singularly small number of academics who, in
actuality, have lost very little of their privileged position in the
past two decades. During the 1990s, critical scholars continued
this assault on the North American mainstream for its overcon-
fidence in its own objectivity [Lodh and Gaffikin, 1997], its
single-minded research agenda [Baker and Bettner, 1997], and
its conservative defense of the status quo [Gallhofer and
Haslam, 1997]. Any critical/traditionalist debate within this con-
text has been one-sided in that the mainstream has refused to
become engaged. These struggles are significant here only in
that the labeling of accounting historians as critical and tradi-
tionalist raises connotations of an unhappy past and present.
2 In response to a reviewer’s request, we do wish to mention some of the
studies undertaken in the 1990s which featured non-English accounting records
and researchers whose first language was not English. Spanish scholars have
been particularly active, including Carmona, Donoso Anes, Esteve-Hernandez,
and Gutierrez. The contents of French archives have seen light of day thanks to
researchers such as Berland, Lemarchand, and Nikitin. An opening of historical
Chinese documents has occurred, thanks to the efforts of Xu-Dung Ji and Wei
Lu. Significant projects are under way with Ezzamel’s study of ancient Egyptian
accounting, DeBeelde’s research into Belgian coal mining, and Zan’s investiga-
tion of the Venetian Arsenal’s records. The authors are grateful to Salvador
Carmona for providing us some ideas for the compilation of this list.
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Traditional Historiography: A good starting point for discussion
is the “traditional” accounting historian caricature portrayed by
Carnegie and Napier [1996, p. 8]. They depicted an historian
who “decontextualizes accounting,” “subtly denigrates the past”
by measuring it in terms of the present, deploys Neoclassical
economics as a sole explanatory paradigm, and is embarked on
a “treasure hunt” to locate origins and precedents for present-
day practices and technologies that are revered as representing
linear progress from former darkness. These attributes have all
been raised in critical, historiographic analyses of the tradition-
alist position.
Traditional and critical accounting historians have had sub-
stantial disagreements about issues such as objectivity, facticity
in history, and the significance of primary-source material. Tra-
ditionalists have tended to think themselves the neutral re-
porters of information they have gleaned from the past through
archival investigation. These data are seen as reflective of an
historical reality. The post-modernist wing of critical historiog-
raphy does not hold to this interpretation of the historian’s craft.
The possibility for an historian to provide an objective narrative
is seen by them as inherently problematic. On this there is some
agreement; some traditionalists concede that the mere selection
of which pieces of information to report from the larger archive
is itself subjective [Fleischman and Tyson, 1997]. Related to the
objectivity issue is the question of historical facticity. Some tra-
ditionalists would argue, as did Tyson [1995], that facts tran-
scend mere perception and should be viewed as representative
of reality. Funnell [1996a, p. 48] put the traditionalist position
well, observing that many were comfortable with interpretation
and theorizing, but that it should “be tethered in its wandering
to a spike of facts.”
Traditionalists emphasize primary sources as the medium
through which the past speaks. However, there are two issues
here that critical historians feel constrained to contest. First, do
the documents themselves achieve either neutrality or objective
reality? The Marxist commentary, especially that of Tinker and
his coauthors, has been particularly focused on this point. While
much of this debate is a product of the preceding decade, Tinker
et al. [1991, p. 37] summarized from the Marxist perspective
how accounting becomes an “ideological weapon” in the class
struggle over wealth distribution. Second, there are the numer-
ous categories of people who because of economic or social
position are not represented in an historical accounting archive.
Consequently, the voices of the past speaking to us through
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primary sources are severely limited. Traditionalists tend to be
less pessimistic about the value of primary-source material.
Certain developments of the late 1990s indicate that tradi-
tional historians may be moving in more critical directions in
exposing events from the darker side of accountancy’s past. Ini-
tial contributions during the decade include the complicity of
accountants in the Holocaust [Funnell, 1998a] and racial control
on Hawaiian sugar plantations [Fleischman and Tyson, 2000b].
Subsequent investigation topics that lie beyond the period under
review include American and Caribbean slavery [Vollmers, 2003;
Fleischman and Tyson, 2004] and the plight of the Irish during
the potato famine [Funnell, 2001]. One wonders why such epi-
sodes have not become agenda items for critical scholars. We
hypothesize that their collective plate is full with those historical
events that have more direct contemporary ramifications, such
as gender issues, conflicting economic classes, and the plight of
minority groups entering the accounting profession. The tradi-
tional/critical division of labor on accounting’s seamier side may
well reflect the linkages perceived to exist between past and
present.
Most accounting historians who bear the “traditionalist” la-
bel subscribe to an economic-rationalist paradigm wherein ac-
counting developments are explained in terms of rational, cost-
beneficial decisions on the part of entrepreneurs within the
context of a Neoclassical, transactions-based theory of the firm.
Indeed, given this theoretical grounding, a charge of economic
reductionism has been leveled against much accounting histori-
cal research of this genre. Critical researchers, prior to the
1990s, began to broaden the contextual expansion of their ac-
counting history to include political, cultural, and social param-
eters to complement traditionally privileged economic factors
[Loft, 1986; Hopwood, 1987]. However, economic rationalists
would hardly concede the point that their investigations failed
to transcend economic parameters.
Significant elements of the Carnegie-Napier caricature con-
cern the traditional historian’s perception of how the present
impacts efforts to narrate the past. We do not believe that most
accounting historians, as distinct from mainstream positivists,
subscribe to the Whig theory of history; namely, that the present
is the end result of progress and continuous improvement from
the past and, thus, constitutes best practice. Johnson and
Kaplan [1987] certainly did not in subscribing to the theory that
there have been no significant managerial accounting develop-
ments in the U.S. since 1925. Strident was the charge leveled by
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Miller and Napier [1993, p. 639] when they wrote of traditional-
ist work [Edwards, 1989; Edwards et al., 1990; Fleischman and
Parker, 1990, 1991; Edwards and Boyns, 1992], “within the tra-
ditional evolutionary model, the now is always present, if only in
utero, in the then.”3 Fleischman and Tyson [1997, pp. 93-96]
argued in response that it is not realistic to think that historians
can so envelop themselves in the past that contemporary biases
and agendas can be precluded from intrusion upon the analysis.
Moreover, by establishing linkages between past and present,
the historian is able to engage the reader more fully into the
reading and comprehension of the narrative.
At the other end of the spectrum, traditionalists have also
been accused of “antiquarianism” for investigating episodes in
accounting history perceived to be of limited importance to an
audience other than themselves. This pejorative term is used
more typically to describe traditionalists who opt not to become
embroiled in paradigmatic posturing, a failure to answer the “so
what?” question [Napier, 1989; Hopper and Armstrong, 1991;
Stewart, 1992]. However, we believe that traditionalists are just
as disapproving of history that fails to meet a high standard of
interpretation; they are perhaps less vocal in their complaint.
Critical Historiography: The critical research project is extraordi-
narily broad, and its basic components were firmly established
in the decade of the 1980s with a substantial grounding in phi-
losophy. In terms of accounting history, Marxism/labor process
and Foucauldianism have emerged as pervasive critical para-
digms. These approaches will be discussed at length in the fol-
lowing section. The reader is invited to see the excellent sum-
mary article by Lodh and Gaffikin [1997] for an appreciation of
the wide range of theory that underpins critical research. Tradi-
tionalists might argue that by religiously adhering to their theo-
retical groundings, critical scholars are themselves reductionist.
Even Laughlin [1999, p. 75], an eminent critical scholar, pointed
out that we must not become totally dependent upon these “gi-
ants” (Derrida, Foucault, Habermas, Marx, Adam Smith, etc.) as
the sole repository for our insights, but that we add to them
with revelations of our own.
The 1990s witnessed the forceful articulation of critical
accounting’s broad agenda that does not end with a description
3 Napier subsequently modified the intensity of this comment by downgrad-
ing it to a “warning against historical approaches that view the past as a shadow
or simulacrum of the present” [Carnegie and Napier, 1996, p. 16].
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of the world, past or present. Rather, many critical accounting
researchers see a duty to change practice [Cooper, 1997, p. 15,
referencing Neimark, 1990]. In this sense, an “overwhelming
priority” is to deal proactively with questions of justice
[Arrington, 1997, p. 13] and to act in the public interest
[Bebbington et al., 1999, p. 50]. Laughlin [1999, p. 73] recently
provided a good working definition of critical accounting’s pro-
active agenda as:
A critical understanding of the role of accounting pro-
cesses and practices and the accounting profession in
the functioning of society and organisations with an
intention to use that understanding to engage (where
appropriate) in changing these processes, practices and
the profession.
In relation to history, Laughlin [1987, p. 482] argued that the
past provides critical research with insights that help forge
“methodological tools” to change the future. One can immedi-
ately see in these descriptions the proactive orientation of criti-
cal accounting research. While Laughlin [1999, pp. 74, 77-78]
believed that the critical engagement could precipitate meaning-
ful change, he conceded that this parameter of critical research
was its weakest heretofore and wondered if it was not the case
that too many of his colleagues felt their “job” was to expose
injustices rather than to participate actively in seeking remedies.
While it is doubtful that researchers acting alone might effect
change, alliances have been forged by critical researchers in de-
bates as contentious as coal-mine closures during the violently
confrontational U.K. miners’ strike in the 1980s [Cooper and
Hopper, 1988] and in discussions of financial scandals [Sikka
and Willmott, 1995].
Prominent in critical action is the power of accounting as
an enabler, “to act as a force for radical emancipatory social
change through making things visible and comprehensible and
helping engender dialogue and action towards emancipatory
change” [Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997, p. 82]. Part of this en-
abling task of accounting is to give voice to suppressed groups
who historically have had no voice; including women [Kirkham
and Loft, 1993], ethnic minorities [Hammond and Streeter,
1994; Gaffney et al., 1995; Annisette, 1999, 2000; Fleischman
and Tyson, 2000b; Hammond, 2002], the poor, indigenous popu-
lations [Hooper and Pratt, 1995; Neu, 1999], post-colonial soci-
eties [Arnold and Hammond, 1994; Elad, 1998; Catchpowle and
Cooper, 1999], and less visible participants in the accounting
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function itself [Cooper, 1997]. At times, it may seem that critical
researchers would have themselves added to the list of the disad-
vantaged given their perception of “accounting’s repressive ten-
dencies” [Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997, p. 77] and the
marginalization that critical researchers perceive arising out of
their stance against the status quo and their advocacy of
changes to the prevailing system [Baker and Bettner, 1997, p.
307]. If critical researchers are indeed marginalized, their argu-
ment is with the traditional accounting mainstream and not
with traditional accounting historians whose marginalization, at
least in the U.S., is every bit as severe.
We conclude this section by urging that the gulf between
traditional and critical accounting historians is not as wide as
some of the literature seemingly suggests. Critical research has
added to traditional studies a diversity that should be “cel-
ebrated” [Fleischman et al., 1996a, b; Merino, 1998, p. 603]. We
believe that many traditionalists would agree that the re-
contextualizing and reinterpretation of revealed archival materi-
als is as valuable an exercise as the discovery of new ones [Me-
rino, 1998, p. 607]. Napier [1998, p. 696] identified some
common ground:
Rather than being rivals, traditional and genealogical
approaches to accounting history complement each
other. However, genealogical approaches, by explicitly
aiming to understand accounting in the (historical)
contexts in which it operates, provide a broader basis
for determining the ways in which accounting ideas
and practices emerge and influence (often in subtle and
indirect ways) the operations and  activities of wide
elements of society.
Our feeling is that this greater contextualization has been a
feature of critical historical research in accounting, but that the
best of traditional historiography embraces wider parameters
and perspectives as well. It has also been the case that critical
researchers have tended to be more combative in staking out
their positions, though some traditionalists have responded
strongly when under attack. One thing was for certain both dur-
ing the 1990s and beyond as traditional accounting historians
and critical scholars tilted at their favorite windmills. There was
and continues to be a common threat – the substantial numbers
of academicians and practitioners who devalue and marginalize
history.
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HISTORICAL PARADIGMS
Much of the investigation of the origins of accounting prac-
tices, as well as the processes of change through history, was
done within the context of a number of prevailing paradigms in
the 1990s. Arthur [1999, pp. 17-18] suggested that the applica-
tion of paradigms to accounting reflected “a lack of confidence”
in the traditional view of what for the discipline was obvious
and rational. The extension to accounting history came in the
1980s as the developing body of literature critical of mainstream
traditionalism embraced history as an integral component of its
commentary. During the 1990s, not only did the volume of criti-
cal accounting history expand dramatically, but traditional ac-
counting historians became engaged in theoretical dialogue. The
debates in the early years of the 1990s were conducted with a
fervor that some would describe as passionate and others would
consider unhelpful. Notwithstanding, the late 1990s and beyond
witnessed a softening of tone. Some joint venturing occurred
between researchers of different paradigmatic persuasions, and
several traditional historians even moved in distinctly critical
directions. Critical researchers became sensitized to the need for
persuasive evidence from the archive and other sources.
Since the mid-1980s and particularly in the 90s, published
writing on the history of accounting generally focused attention
on three major research paradigms or “worldviews.” Previously,
the Neoclassical or economic-rationalist perspective held sway
as the historical, mainstream approach. Subsequently, as para-
digmatic dialogue became more prevalent, this privileged posi-
tion came under challenge from critical theorists whose voices
are now forcefully heard. The schools represented here are the
Marxist/labor process, from a tradition older even than Neoclas-
sicism, and the Foucauldian, a product in the first instance of
French post-modernism. Critical historiography is wider than
these two, but Marxism and Foucauldianism were the most
prominent during the 1990s. We are, however, mindful of poten-
tial problems inherent in categorizing research under particular
paradigms, including a lack of full understanding and the attri-
bution of one classification to studies that draw upon multiple
perspectives. In this exercise, we attempt a thumbnail sketch of
the basic tenets of the paradigms, as well as a statement of
directions taken in the critique of each. These synopses will be
kept very brief as the accounting history literature of the past 20
years has covered this material in minute detail and with great
frequency.
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Neoclassicism: Economic rationalism (a.k.a. Neoclassicism) is
the hardest of the three paradigms to characterize because of
the sheer volume of its constituency. Many traditionalists who
are disinclined to become involved in paradigmatic statement
are at heart economic rationalists as evidenced by descriptive
narratives and/or archival investigations that conclude how ac-
counting innovation has led to the economic betterment of a
business entity, an industry, a country, or an historical epoch.
Investigations of retrogressive developments rarely see light of
day. Others delight in seeking the origins of contemporary ac-
counting practice and tracing those roots through historical de-
velopment. Although Foucault disavowed the search for origins,
some of his leading disciples have written extensively regarding
the accounting developments that accompanied the genesis of
modern management [Ezzamel et al., 1990; Fleischman et al.,
1995; Hoskin and Macve 1988, 1994, 1996, 2000].
The theoretical basis of Neoclassicism was established well
before the 1990s as traditional explanations linked accounting
developments since the 18th century to the aspirations of entre-
preneurs to improve efficiency. Building on the economic his-
tory of Chandler [1977] and the economic theory of Williamson
[1985], Johnson formed a bridge to accounting history. Cost
accounting, he argued, developed as a rational business re-
sponse to opportunities involving new technologies and markets
[Johnson, 1972]. The economic-rationalist position was most
prominently promoted with the publication of Relevance Lost
[Johnson and Kaplan, 1987]. Though the conclusion that per-
ceived efficiency gains drive accounting change is not univer-
sally accepted by scholars, it might be acknowledged, as by lead-
ing Foucauldians, that the book “moved accounting’s history
centre-stage” [Ezzamel et al., 1990, p. 157].
During the 90s, economic-rationalist historians mobilized in
defense of the paradigm’s basic assumptions. As we have seen
previously, Marxist theorists in particular criticized the neutral-
ity traditionalists find embedded in primary-source materials.
Likewise, the charge of economic reductionism, whether justi-
fied or not, was addressed in recent work that attempted to
broaden the parameters of historical investigation [e.g., Boyns et
al., 1997; Fleischman and Parker, 1997; Williams, 1997a]. Mills
[1993a, p. 802], herself a defender of Neoclassicism, has cau-
tioned against the “economic fallacy,” a “privileged position”
accorded economic activities.
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Foucauldianism: The disciplinary paradigm conceived by Fou-
cault to chronicle the history of closed institutions (asylums,
prisons, barracks, schools) appears in many ways to parallel the
factory system and other facets of modern life in which accoun-
tancy is implicated. In the factory and in other environments
mediated by managerial action, it seems that accounting tech-
niques serve as a vehicle for the normalizing gaze required to
accommodate discipline at a micro-level.
As the case with economic rationalism, several classics of
Foucauldian historiography predated the 1990s and clearly es-
tablished the paradigm’s applicability to accounting history
[Burchell et al., 1985; Hoskin and Macve, 1986]. Hoskin and
Macve [1988] detailed how cost accounting at the Springfield
Armory in the 1830s and 1840s provided a technique of “hierar-
chical surveillance” that rendered labor “calculable” and “total
human accountability” achievable. Miller and O’Leary [1987]
traced the history of standard costing and budgeting through
the first three decades of the 20th century to show how account-
ing and kindred disciplines (e.g., psychology and sociology) con-
structed a “governable person” out of all individuals within the
business enterprise. As the decade of the 90s dawned, similar
studies were conducted for the British Industrial Revolution.
Walsh and Stewart [1993, p. 797] documented how Robert
Owen utilized a reporting structure that became “the backbone
of a regime of surveillance and hierarchy,” permitting the moni-
toring of individual workers. Foucauldians in collaborative ef-
forts have sought but failed to find in the British Industrial
Revolution the genesis of modern management, labor controls
that quietly order people about [Fleischman et al., 1995;
Fleischman and Tyson, 1996; see also Hoskin and Macve, 2000].
The bulk of commentary on Foucauldianism has come from
Marxists who accuse Foucauldians of “symbolic reductionism,”
ignoring the materialist basis to reality occasioned by their pro-
nounced emphasis on language and their failure to establish
priorities in analyzing various discursive possibilities [Neimark,
1990, 1994]. It is charged that Foucauldians under-theorize ma-
terial, economic, and political realities, particularly issues of re-
sistance and material conditions. As Cooper and Tinker [1994,
pp. 2-3] put it, “without theorizing these features, researchers
cannot articulate effective action to change regimes of power.”
Armstrong [1994] found that the Foucauldian paradigm did not
fit the pattern of worker resistance to disciplinary regimes and
charged that Foucault presented a monolithic view of power as
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one common to all disciplinary regimes that served universally
to enhance human capacities.
Traditional historians of a Neoclassical persuasion have
joined the critique of Foucauldian work. Tyson [1990, 1993]
recast into economic-rationalist behavior the “transforming
events” of the historical discontinuity that Hoskin and Macve
found at the Springfield Armory [Tyson, 1993, p. 7]. Similarly,
economic rationalists are critical of the Foucauldian emphasis
on labor control to enhance efficiency as the sole preoccupation
of management [Tyson, 1993, 2000; Edwards et al., 1995; Boyns
and Edwards, 1996b, 1997, 2000].
Marxism/Labor Process: Contemporary Marxist accounting his-
torians, though not having lost contact with a Marxist view of
class conflict, have moved away from an older economic reduc-
tionism into a broader investigation of the social, cultural, and
political underpinnings that define industrial relations. As we
have seen previously, Marxist scholars have looked to communi-
cate to academics the partisan nature of accounting records and
methodologies through which accounting practices can be de-
ployed to suppress classes of people. Bryer [1994a, 1999a] inves-
tigated subjects as diverse as feudalism and the FASB’s concep-
tual framework, all from a Marxist perspective. Hopper and
Armstrong [1991] reinterpreted early American industrializa-
tion, formerly studied by economic rationalists Johnson and
Chandler. Committed to an historical hypothesis that social and
economic conflicts arising from labor-control practices give rise
to new techniques, they demonstrated how cost accounting
came of age to accomplish labor intensification. Historians of all
theoretical persuasions might appreciate the intensely detailed
analysis and the erudition of the narrative represented by these
works, but, at the same time, question a references list com-
prised entirely of secondary sources.
The Marxist paradigm has come under significant attack,
not so much from Neoclassicism, but from Foucauldians, kin-
dred spirits in critical scholarship. Foucault himself criticized
Marxism for its positivism and conviction that its perspective
dominated various conflicting interpretations of meaning.
Marx’s scientific approach, according to Foucault, allowed its
adherents “to escape the figurality of language” and to advance
definitive posturing where “no single order of validating
method” should hold sway [Norris, 1991, pp. 86-87]. Cooper
[1997, pp. 21, 25] complained how Marxism has become
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marginalized in post-modernism with Lyotard’s [1984] invective
against the “grand narrative” and post-modernism’s emphasis
upon pluralism and difference rather than enduring class inter-
ests. Arnold [1998, p. 666], in defense, pointed out how much
critical theory has to lose if the abandonment of historical mate-
rialism leads to an inability or a disinterest in critiquing capital-
ism.
Synthesis?: The prevalence of paradigmatic accounting histori-
ography in the 90s has precipitated discomfort in certain quar-
ters. Tyson [1993, p. 13] was concerned that writing history
from a “doctrinaire perspective” causes the historian to lose ob-
jectivity by way of seeking out only confirming evidence.
Funnell [1996a, p. 41] argued that no single research paradigm
could serve as the “repository of enlightenment” in explaining all
historical events or time periods. An anonymous reviewer, draw-
ing upon recollections of Kuhn, pointed out to us that a fuller
examination of the paradigms under review mandates consider-
ation of where they “coincide, overlap or are disjoint.” To this
purpose, it might be observed that the utilization of the power/
knowledge that accounting brings to bear on labor discipline or
the deployment of accounting methods by entrepreneurs to ex-
ploit labor for the purpose of generating surplus value within a
capitalist framework may be construed as economically rational
actions. Consequently, the paradigms may to a considerable de-
gree be interrelated, and the elements that have given birth to
scholarly discourse (labor discipline, economic class conflict,
economically rational behavior) may reflect divergent emphases
within the same overarching paradigm.
The hope has been expressed by traditional and critical re-
searchers alike that the gulf between and among the various
paradigms is not so wide that dialogue, minimally, and perhaps
joint venturing can take place [Merino and Mayper, 1993;
Fleischman et al., 1996a; Funnell, 1996a, 1998c; Merino, 1998].
This paper echoes these pleas for conciliation and mutual re-
spect. Research had already begun in the 90s in hopes that dif-
fering viewpoints can contribute additively and synergistically to
enhance our knowledge of important events in accounting’s his-
tory [Fleischman et al., 1995; Fleischman, 2000; Fleischman and
Macve, 2002]. We underscore the recommendation also es-
poused in the 90s that accounting historians overtly disclose to
their readers their paradigmatic predispositions [Fleischman
and Tyson, 1997; Merino, 1998].
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NEW AND OLD ACCOUNTING HISTORY
At the beginning of the decade, Miller et al. [1991] intro-
duced the term “new accounting history” into debate. In an es-
say scarcely eight pages in length, the authors, all representa-
tives of critical-research paradigms, summarized in a welcoming
and democratic fashion certain of the central themes that were
to characterize accounting historiography in the 90s. Their mes-
sage was less combative, perhaps because the olive branch was
being extended to accounting historians rather than to main-
stream traditionalists. Several of the tenets central to this “new
accounting history” were issues with which scholars who had
just been relegated to “old” accounting historians could readily
identify. These included a “pluralization” and “proliferation” of
methodologies [p. 395], accompanied by a promise of the inap-
propriateness “to specify criteria that would exclude certain
types of research on the basis of methodological protocols” [p.
400]. Also, historians of all persuasions were invited to take up a
“heterogeneous range of issues” [p. 396] and a “heterogeneous
range of theoretical approaches” [p. 400]. A bit more controver-
sial, but not in any way threatening to Neoclassicists, was the
questioning of “received notions” from the old accounting his-
tory, such as the progressive and evolutionary nature of history
[p. 395] and the traditional mandate to record historical events
as they really happened [p. 396]. Also challenged was the older
tradition’s view of the “objectivity question” – that facts are “uni-
tary rather than perspectival” and that history and values are
rigidly dichotomized [p. 397]. Finally, the new accounting his-
tory claimed to recognize the limitations of primary sources,
including problems of interpretation, authenticity, and com-
pleteness [p. 400], not to mention the suppressed voices previ-
ously discussed. If this breadth of vision was a critical preserve
at the beginning of the decade, it is without question the case
that many traditionalists bought into these values by the end.
This testament of faith in a “new accounting history” paral-
leled a similar development in the larger discipline of history
itself that predated the 1990s. Gaffikin [1998, pp. 633-635] noted
corresponding directions of the “new” history – an expansion of
focus beyond the political history traditionally privileged; analy-
sis of structures rather than narration of events; concern with
the histories of the disadvantaged rather than the elite; a move-
ment away from dependence upon official, written records; a
greater awareness of movements rather than single events; a
questioning of objectivity in favor of a variety of opposing view-
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points; and an appreciation for the historical input of non-pro-
fessional historians.
Carnegie and Napier [1996, p. 8], in attempting a balanced
view, also provided a caricature of the new accounting historian
in contrast to the traditionalist previously discussed. Traits here
included an historian who writes to a paradigm, is willing to
deploy speculation in lieu of hard evidence, and fills most of his/
her published pages with “obscure theorization,” with varying
degrees of eloquence. Although overstated, these points distin-
guish an old school that is more inclined to see historical evi-
dence as representing some sort of an historical reality that
must be respected. While many “old” accounting historians do
subscribe to the economic-rationalist paradigm and are willing
to debate issues with critical researchers, others, content to
bring new information to light either with or without accompa-
nying evaluation, do not choose to become involved in direct
paradigmatic statement. As Napier [1989] suggested, these ef-
forts have a role even for critical theorists given the importance
of such “discovery” phase work in providing grist for the
“contextualising” mills, lest the same articles be continuously
rewritten.
There are a number of substantial philosophical differences
that separate old and new historians. Whereas the old attempts
to make the past understandable, new narratives try to make
“the familiar, strange” [Funnell, 1998c, p. 144; Merino, 1998, p.
606]. Old accounting historians privilege the written archive of
the past [Chua, 1998, p. 619], while the new are wary of primary
sources, in part because of the silenced voices, and suggest an
expanded view of what can constitute archival evidence
[Carnegie and Napier, 1996, p. 8; Chua, 1998, p. 618]. The new
accounting history provides new forms of historical discourse
and different lenses for viewing the past [Gaffikin, 1998, p. 632].
Debates between old and new historians in the 90s focused
on some of these issues. A mutual distrust over the role and
interpretation of evidence was featured in archival research into
the Springfield Armory and the New England textiles industry
by Hoskin and Macve [1988, 1994, 1996, 2000], on the one hand,
and by Tyson [1990, 1992, 1993, 1998, 2000; see also Funnell,
1998c], on the other. Disagreements over the relationship be-
tween past and present informed an exchange between Miller
and Napier [1993] and Fleischman and Tyson [1997; see also
Funnell, 1996a]. As Carnegie and Napier [1996, p. 14] observed,
some researchers on both sides were more tolerant; some less
so.
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Theoretical disputes notwithstanding, the gulf separating
new and old accounting historians seemed more easily bridged
than the divide between traditional and critical researchers.
Funnell [1996a, p. 41, 1998c, p. 153] made two points in this
regard. First, neither side is itself homogeneous so that dis-
course tends not to be so doctrinaire. Second, both new and old
historians, even the most radical post-modernist, use the narra-
tive form as a primary tool. Chua [1998, p. 620] observed that
the “core difference” between the two schools is not large and
that both share a “collective fear of dogma, of being duped or
gagged, and of the pernicious exercise of despotic authority,”
particularly by other academics. She shares the perception of
Merino and Funnell that substantial differences do not exist
[Chua, 1998, p. 617]. Funnell [1998c, p. 157] agreed with
Fleischman et al. [1996a] that traditional, economic-rationalist
historians could claim “new” history status with a widening of
perspectives and perhaps a more questioning view of historical
objectivity and facticity. By contrast, many traditionalists could
not aspire to be critical researchers, not so much because a
traditionalist cannot be critical of capitalism or the status quo,
but because the proactive component to amend the system, ei-
ther through regulation or radical change, would in most cases
be lacking.4
THE HISTORICAL PANORAMA
Major Projects: During the 1990s, a number of accounting histo-
rians undertook major projects that resulted in a string of ar-
ticles and books in which their research results were presented.
Many of these major endeavors were done with reference to
archival materials, a significant development of the decade.
Contributing factors here included increased publishing outlets,
the opening of archives previously not catalogued (e.g., the
Wedgwood papers), and the use of the internet for facilitating
research access, literature searches, collaboration at a distance,
and other activity.
An example of one topic that was the center of attention for
numerous major projects was the concerted effort to backdate
the chronology for sophisticated cost/managerial accounting to
4 We are indebted to a reviewer who referred us to Burrell and Morgan
[1979] who dichotomized paradigms into those imbued with a “sociology of
regulation” and those subscribing to a “sociology of radical change.” Our feeling
is that critical scholars could potentially embrace either of these classifications.
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periods earlier than Taylor and the advent of scientific manage-
ment. Boyns and Edwards, Fleischman and Parker, and Will-
iams made the case for the British Industrial Revolution; Hoskin
and Macve and Tyson opted for the early 19th century U.S., but
debated whether the venue was the Springfield Armory or the
New England textile industry.
Appendix A is a listing of “major projects” we were able to
identify from a limited number of sources mentioned below for
the 1990s. A minimum of three articles or books was arbitrarily
determined to constitute a major project. The columns of au-
thors and their topics are somewhat self-explanatory; the refer-
ences column is highly abbreviated but should serve as an ad-
equate guide to fuller citations that appear in the paper’s
extensive bibliography. We do wish to make the following dis-
claimers regarding the listing:
1) The 1990s are defined as spanning the eleven years from
1990-2000. The extra year is included to avoid disputes
as to when the decade/century/millennium actually con-
cluded.
2) In some cases, the referenced publications do not consti-
tute an author’s most valuable contributions to the ac-
counting history literature. For example, Warwick
Funnell wrote numerous articles about public auditing
in Australia and the U.K., but, from our perspective, his
historiographic pieces on narrative and counter-narra-
tive [Funnell, 1996a, 1998c] and his exposé of accoun-
tants’ complicity in the Holocaust [Funnell, 1998a] are
far more provocative. Similarly, the historical output of
many prolific authors far transcended the relatively
small number of articles grouped around the topics
identified in Appendix A (e.g., Chua, Covaleski and
Dirsmith, Fogarty, Neu, and both Parkers).
3) We are sensitive to the fact that the major projects iden-
tified in Appendix A are far more likely to omit the work
of critical scholars than traditional historians. This ten-
dency is explained by the fact that critical researchers
concentrate more extensively on current issues and in-
form their arguments by recourse to the historical ante-
cedents. Prolific authors who fall into the category de-
scribed above include the Coopers (both Christine and
David), Dillard, Robson, Sikka, and Tinker.
4) We have selected articles for inclusion that relate to
themes that appear to us to be the most prominent dur-
ing the 1990s. We also concentrated heavily on those
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journals most closely linked with accounting history
(Abacus, AAAJ, ABFH, ABR, AH, AHJ, AOS, BAR, CPA),
augmented by the Garland series.
We are very aware that these reservations and disclaimers
diminish the possibilities for a full disclosure of accounting
history’s progress in the 1990s. Many accomplished accounting
historians and many significant scholarly contributions to the
discipline go unmentioned in this survey. We regret the limita-
tions imposed by space and by our own imperfect knowledge of
the field. We apologize for any omissions and beg forgiveness.
Major Topics: Appendix A furnishes clues as to most of the is-
sues that occupied accounting historians during the 1990s. For
example, no fewer than seven of the major projects identified,
those of Bryer, Chua, Fleischman, Merino, Mouck, Napier, L.D.
Parker, and Previts, focused on historiography. Similarly, all the
discursive exchanges mentioned in the section on “debates” (see
below) centered either on historiographic or methodological is-
sues. Additionally, other important historiographic articles ap-
peared, authored by Duke and Coffman [1993], Mattessich
[1992, 1995], and Oldroyd [1999a].
Six of the major projects surrounded the professionalization
processes in various countries – Lee, Shackleton, and Walker for
U.K. accounting with particular emphasis on Scottish develop-
ments; Carnegie and R.H. Parker and Poullaos and Chua for
Australia; and McMillan for the U.S. Other historical studies of
the professionalization of accounting in the English-speaking
world include, for Britain and her empire: Briston and Kedslie
[1997], Kedslie [1990] and Maltby [1999b]; for Australia: Allen
[1991]; for Canada: Neu and Saleem [1996]; for New Zealand:
Hooper et al. [1993]; and for the U.S.: Cross [1998], Preston et
al. [1995] and Romeo and Kyj [1998]. The development of the
accounting profession in other parts of the world had not made
much impact on the English-language journals heretofore which
is why AAAJ’s special issue on Asian professional development
(Vol. 12, No. 3) was a particularly significant contribution. How-
ever, studies of non-English-speaking societies were increasingly
finding their way into English-language literature even if the
focus during the decade was more on industrial accounting and
financial theory than professional development. Six major
projects listed in Appendix A (those of Carmona et al., Graves,
Lemarchand, Mattessich, Nikitin, and Scorgie) are representa-
tive of this trend.
Biography was another prominent research area of the
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1990s with major projects by Carnegie & R.H. Parker, R.H.
Parker, and Scorgie being representative. ABFH and AHJ were
the journals of most frequent placement for biographical studies
with eight and 11 articles respectively during the decade. We
mention here only the two historians with multiple placements
in these journals – Previts for his studies of Samuel Broad
[Previts and Robinson, 1996] and Paul Garner [Previts and
Samson, 1997] and Heier for his biographies of John Colt and
Albert Fink [Heier, 1993, 2000].
We conclude this sub-section by mentioning two other top-
ics, one archival and one methodological, which received signifi-
cant attention during the 1990s and have become even more
prominent beyond. The archival project is railroad accounting,
currently under investigation by McCartney and Arnold in the
U.K. and Flesher, Previts, and Samson in the U.S. Two articles
appeared at the end of the decade that augur for many more to
follow in the near future [McCartney and Arnold, 2000; Previts
and Samson, 2000]. Oral history methodology has also been
used widely as a research tool and can be seen in work by
Baskerville [1999], Burrows [1999], Collins and Bloom [1991],
Hammond and Sikka [1996], Matthews [2000], L.D. Parker
[1994], and Tyson [1996]. Hammond and Sikka [1996, p. 79], in
urging oral history as a mechanism to give voice to suppressed
groups, warned us that, “traditional historians elide the com-
plexity of accounting change and ignore the impact on and the
contribution of ordinary people’s struggles in checking, advanc-
ing, facilitating and resisting accounting developments.”
Special Issues: During the 1990s, a number of journals under
our review featured special issues on accounting history or on
contemporary issues with long historical pasts. Three account-
ing history anthologies are particularly noteworthy because
their introductory articles have had significant impact on the
discipline for diverging reasons. An AOS special issue (Vol. 16,
No. 5/6, 1991) was the location for the welcoming article of
Miller et al. [1991] in which the phrase “new accounting history”
was coined. Another AOS special issue in 1993 (Vol. 18, No. 7/8)
featured more combative work as Miller and Napier [1993], in
promoting a genealogical approach to accounting history, pre-
sented what was seen as a harsh critique of traditional histori-
ans, and one that brought acrimonious response. Christopher
Napier co-edited and introduced a 1996 AAAJ collection (Vol. 9,
No. 3, 1996). Carnegie and Napier [1996] presented a balanced
view of the strengths and weaknesses of critical and traditional
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history. A CPA special issue (Vol. 9, No. 6, 1996), billed “critical
accounting history,” will be discussed subsequently in the “de-
bates” section.
A number of special issues gave voice to those suppressed
groups so integral a part of the critical agenda. Two 1992 edi-
tions of journals – AOS (Vol. 17, No. 3/4) and AAAJ (Vol. 5, No.
3) – devoted issues to feminist perspectives and gender studies.
The most prolific scholars in this vital critical focus were repre-
sented here – Ciancanelli, Cooper, Hammond and Oakes, Hines,
Hooks, Kirkham, Lehman, Loft. A rapidly emerging area for
critical historical study was the use of accounting to contribute
to the subjugation of indigenous peoples. The AAAJ special issue
on this subject (Vol. 13, No. 3, 2000) included articles by some
of the leading scholars in the field (e.g., Davie, Gallhofer, and
Neu).
Other special issues with particular reference to accounting
history included the AH issue on regulation (Vol. 3, No. 1, 1998);
an ABFH number on the history of accounting profession-
alization (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1999); the AAAJ edition (Vol. 13, No. 4,
2000) on accounting in the home; the memorial Abacus issue
(Vol. 36, No. 3, 2000) dedicated to the late R.J. Chambers; the
AH number on accounting in crises (Vol. 5, No. 2, 2000); and the
ABFH edition (Vol. 10, No. 2, 2000) on U.S. historiography. The
most significant of the special issues that pointed the way to the
21st century may be those that featured historical studies in
non-Anglo-Saxon countries. Several of those that appeared in
the 1990s were an ABFH issue on French accounting history
(Vol. 7, No. 3, 1997) and two AAAJ numbers on Japan (Vol. 3,
No. 2, 1990) and Asian accounting professional development
(Vol. 12, No. 3, 1999) respectively.
The Debates: An intriguing feature of the journal literature of the
90s was the prevalence of historiographic debates among adher-
ents of the major paradigmatic schools described above. Per-
haps the most compelling was the special issue of CPA (Vol. 5,
No. 1, 1994) on Marx vs. Foucault. The issues were set by the
journal’s editors [Cooper and Tinker, 1994] and then debated
skillfully by Hoskin [1994] and Grey [1994] for the Foucauldians
and Neimark [1994] and Armstrong [1994] for the Marxists. A
more focused discourse appeared in CPA (Vol. 10, No. 5, 1999)
when Bryer [1999a, b] articulated a Marxist critique of the
FASB’s conceptual framework. Commentaries on Bryer’s per-
spective were forthcoming from Macve [1999]. Robson [1999],
Samuelson [1999], and Whittington [1999], culminating in that
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of fellow Marxist Tony Tinker [1999] who accused Bryer of mis-
interpreting the paradigm’s philosophical father.
Traditional accounting historians have likewise become en-
gaged in discourse with critical scholars. Keenan’s [1998a, b]
rebuttal to Miller and Napier [1993] became the focal point of a
special CPA issue on critical accounting history (Vol. 9, No. 6,
1998) wherein Keenan alone defended traditional history as he
saw it against advocates of the more genealogical approach ad-
vocated in Miller and Napier [Bryer, 1998b; Napier, 1998]. The
issue included articles by Chua, Gaffikin, Merino, and Poullaos
that seemingly urged a reconciliation of interests.
An earlier discussion in AOS (Vol. 16, No. 3, 1991) pitted the
late and very influential David Solomons against the most pro-
lific U.S.-based Marxist of the past two decades, Tony Tinker.
The subject was “accounting and social change: neutralists or
partisans.” Bryer’s [1993a] articles reignited an older debate
about capitalism and the origins of double-entry bookkeeping
that originally had seen Yamey [1947] critique the Sombart the-
sis. Yamey’s position was now taken up by Macve [1996] and
Edwards [1996] at the 1994 Pacioli Festival sponsored by the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland. A methodologi-
cal debate appeared in AAAJ (Vol. 9, No. 4, 1996) as Humphrey
and Scapens’ [1996a, b] defense of the potential for the case-
study method’s role in the development of accounting theory
was questioned by Young and Preston [1996] and Llewellyn
[1996]. Another prominent exchange focused on the literature
about U.K. company reporting regulation in the 19th century,
centering on the work of A.V. Dicey [1914]. The debate featured
Jones and Aiken [Jones and Aiken, 1995; Jones, 1999] in dia-
logue with Walker [1996] and Maltby [1998, 1999a]. Finally, as
previously discussed, there was the decade-long debate over the
origins of cost accounting and managerialism in America and
Britain that culminated in an exchange of views in AHJ (Vol. 27,
No. 1, 2000) between Hoskin and Macve [2000] for Foucauldian-
ism and Boyns and Edwards [2000] and Tyson [2000] for eco-
nomic rationalism.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND A CAUTIONARY WORD
The nineties proved to be a highly productive time for schol-
arship in accounting history. It was a time marked by a profu-
sion of outlets, a considerable volume of work, and great de-
bates. It was indeed the roaring nineties. Scholarship in
accounting history deepened and broadened our understanding
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of accounting. Historical work flourished under a variety of ban-
ners, with notable contributions from those labeled old and
new, critical and traditional, with considerable breadth and dex-
terity demonstrated throughout. Achievements were made in a
body of work that brought a wave of bold new avenues of in-
quiry, fresh empirics, and new insights to the discipline. New
work fleshed out our understanding of the role of accounting in
facilitating social action. Original scholarship in a wide array of
empirical settings brought new insights into matters as diverse
as old-world studies of tobacco production in Spain [Carmona
et al., 1997, 1998] to the accounting that accompanied the new-
world exploration of the Hudson’s Bay Company (Spraakman
and his coauthors). Substantial studies of contributors to ac-
counting thought broadened the discipline’s achievements [e.g.,
Zeff, 2000]. There was progress in a real sense in advancing
knowledge throughout the decade.
As the decade closed, there were signs of rapprochement
between various groups, thereby refining work, altering lines of
inquiry, and choosing empirical ground mindful of its potential
contribution to discussion. The confrontational energy of earlier
debates had ebbed by the decade’s end, for better or worse, and
in its place there seemed to be at least a mutual awareness of
approach.
While lauding the substantive development of accounting
history as a discipline, in looking to the future it is reasonable to
ask if the conditions for continuation of the resurgence in ac-
counting history are still present or whether what lies ahead will
be different from the successes of the previous decade. While
the intellectual advancement of the field during the 1990s has
been notable, the future capacity of accounting history to make
similar advances will be driven not just by the accomplishments
of the current body of work but by the material conditions for
the conduct of historical research. Crucially, the field’s prospects
in the U.S. seem to be diverging from the promising conditions
seen in much of the rest of the world. Accounting historians as a
whole have yet to appreciate the important contextual differ-
ences now seen in the U.S. academic environment. In particular,
the field has yet to see the full ramifications either of institu-
tional discrimination against accounting history or of the pro-
nounced demographic changes facing American colleagues. Be-
yond this, the organizational field of accounting history has
brought a decoupling between accounting history and the main
U.S. academic accounting body, the American Accounting Asso-
ciation (AAA). We discuss each of these issues in turn, but note
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now that conditions in the U.S. are significant for researchers
worldwide, not only because history is threatened in one juris-
diction but because that jurisdiction has proved to be an influ-
ential model in both the practice and the study of accounting.
Accounting history’s exclusion from the major U.S. journals
is an area in which traditional and critical researchers have a
common experience. This exclusion causes particular pain to
traditional researchers, some of whose careers were creden-
tialed in important respects by early publication in the Account-
ing Review. It may be difficult for colleagues elsewhere to appre-
ciate the full institutional significance and legitimacy that
publication in the AAA’s longest standing, official journal repre-
sents in North America.5 The ramifications of accounting
history’s seeming exclusion from such outlets have yet to be
fully played out, but already most elements can be seen. The
small group of accounting historians now seeking a career in the
U.S. is unlikely ever to match the institutional positions or ca-
reer success of their forbearers. In important respects, the fu-
ture of accounting history has been mapped out in the U.S., and
it is one that stands to be considerably smaller, less prestigious,
and less influential than in the past. On their retirement over the
next decade, American accounting historians will in the main be
replaced by adherents of prevailing econometric paradigms, an
implicit sign of the roadblocks impeding the transfer of their
work to a new generation.
While the demographics of the professoriate suggest broad
failure in renewing itself across disciplines, this trend has been
particularly acute in accounting history in the U.S. where it will
collide with the impending retirement of many currently active
American historians. The reasons for this failure of renewal are
complex, but one element is a seeming lack of confidence of
U.S. historians in their own work, or at least in transferring it to
a new crop of academics. Even at American institutions whose
leading faculty are accounting historians, it has long been very
difficult to secure doctoral training in which accounting history
would be the core of scholarship. Instead, history is seen as
a kind of hobbyist’s work, something undertaken only when
the obligatory rites of passage in other traditions have been
5 We are grateful to a reviewer who has pointed out to us that a great danger
lurks as far as non-American scholars considering historical research are con-
cerned. In countries where governmental funding is dependent upon an external
assessment of research quality, the biases of these flagship journals could deter
historical investigations.
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performed. It is apparent that econometric work faces none of
these problems, even as the furor of Enron brings the greatest
state intervention in markets since the Great Depression, the
ideological certainties of laissez-faire are upended, and account-
ing history seems needed more than ever in understanding
American institutions.
The Academy of Accounting Historians, committed to the
internationalism of its discipline, has chosen not to become a
section of the AAA. One meaningful benefit of this decision has
been to keep membership costs low for international scholars
for whom AAA membership would often have little relevance.
With the advent of the AAA’s increased emphasis on a decentral-
ized organizational structure that stresses its sections, there
have been unintended consequences of this approach. Lacking
formal standing within the association, accounting historians
have come to rely on the good will of member sections, a situa-
tion which gives us marginal presence at national meetings and
little voice in its institutional governance.6
At the start of the nineties, accounting history was strong in
the U.S. and enjoyed great success there. At the close of the
decade, by contrast, the Academy was facing a precipitous de-
cline in American membership. In important respects, this de-
cline is specific to the U.S. in that elsewhere, there is a profusion
of work in accounting history and of vehicles for the presenta-
tion and publication of results. Europe presents a large and
growing crop of talented new scholars. Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand similarly see bright, young academics turning to
the empirics of home with a mind to speak to issues of intellec-
tual concern at large. There is likewise an upsurge of young
Japanese accounting historians.
U.S. historians might find a brighter future in having a
surer sense of self, being unapologetically who they are, and
forging ahead with the recruitment and training of successors
while there is still time. A first step is an acknowledgment that
efforts at assimilation with the prevailing orthodoxy have borne
little fruit and that it is time to claim a place at the institutional
table for accounting history in its own right. It is still possible to
alter course and to create a more promising future. While our
6 Several sessions at the 2004 AAA national convention in Orlando were
designated for history papers, representing the first time in several years that
history papers have not been required to go through member sections to achieve
a platform for presentation. It is hoped that this development will augur a new
era of cooperation between the AAA and the Academy of Accounting Historians.
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review indicates it was indeed the roaring nineties for account-
ing history, the decade may eventually be seen as the start of an
explosion of work in the world at large. It is our hope that it will
not also be regarded as ending with the quiet but discernable
death of accounting history in the U.S. Join us in a decade’s
time for the sequel.
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APPENDIX A
Major Projects in Accounting History (1990-2000)
Author(s) Topical Area Citations*
Aiken, M. & Lu, W. Chinese accounting AL 93a,b,c,98
Amernic, J.H. & Craig, R.J. Accounting rhetoric A96;AC92,00a,b;Clarke,C,
&A99
Boyns, T., Edwards, J.R., & British cost accounting B93;BE96a,b,97;EBA95;
Anderson, M. BAE96;B,E,&Nikitin97;
Matthews,AE98
Bryer, R.A. Marxist historiography B91,93a,b,94a,b,95,98a,b,
99a,b,00a,b
Buckmaster, D.A. Income smoothing B92,97,01
Carmona S., Ezzamel, M.A. Royal Tobacco Factory (Spain) CEG97,98,02
& Gutierrez, F.
Carnegie, G. D. Australian pastoral accounting G93a,95,97
Carnegie, G. D.& Parker, R.H. Early Australian accounting C93b,CP94,96,99;C
&Varker95;C,P,&Wigg00
Chandler, R.A. & British auditing history C97a,b;CE94a,b,96;C,E,
Edwards, J.R. &Anderson93
Chua, W.-F. Historiography C96,98;C&Degeling93
Coombs, H.M. & UK municipal accounting CE93,94,96;C,E,&Greener97
Edwards, J.R.
Edwards, J.R., Anderson, M., British financial accounting E91,92;AEM96;EAM97
& Matthews, D.
Fleischman, R.K. Historiography F00;F,Kalbers,&Parker96;
F,Mills,&Tyson96;F&Tyson97
Fleischman, R.K. & British Industrial Revolution FP90,91,92,97
Parker, L.D.
Fleischman, R.K. & US cost accounting history FT96,98,99,00a
Tyson, T.N.
Flesher, D.L. US South accounting Schmelzle&F91;Barney&F94;
McCoy&F98
Fogarty, T.J. US standard setting F92,98;F,Ketz,&Hussein92;
F,Hussein,&Ketz94
Funnell, W.N. Governmental auditing F90,94,96b,97,98b
Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. Bentham in accounting history GH94a,b,96
Graves, O.F. German accounting history G91,92;G,Dean,&Clarke89
Gwilliam, D.R. & Macve, R.H. Insurance and Lloyd’s MG93;Horton&M93;G,M,
&Meeks00
Hammond, T.D. African-American accountants H97b,02;H&Streeter97
Hammond, T.D. Gender issues H97a,c;H&Oakes92;
H&Preston92
Hooper, K.S., Pratt, M.J., New Zealand indigenous HPK93;HP93,95;HK97
& Kearins, K.N. people and accounting
Hoskin,K.W. & Macve, R.H. US cost accounting history HM90,94,96,00
Jones, M.J. Accounting at Oxford J91,92,94a,b
Jones, S. & Aiken, M.E. UK Companies Acts JA94,95,99;J95,97,99
Kirkham, L.M & Loft, A. Gender issues K92,97;L92;K&L93
Lee, T.A. Professionalization (Scotland) L95a,96,97b,00;Walker&L99
Lee, T.A. Controlling accounting research L95b,97a,98;L&Williams99
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Lemarchand, Y. French industrial accounting L93,94,99;L&Parker96
Llewellyn, S. & Walker, S.P. Domestic accounting W98a;LW00a,b;WL00
Maltby, J. British auditing M98,99a,b,00a,b;
Bowden&M98
Mattessich, R.V. Near Eastern/Indian accounting M94,98a,b,c
McKinstry, S. UK industrial accounting M93,96,99;Fleming,M,
&Wallace00
McMillan, K.P. Early US professionalization M98a,b,99
McSweeney, B. Accounting ambiguity M97,00;M&Duncan98
McWatters, C.S. Canadian accounting history M93,95,98
Merino, B.D. Historiography M93,98;M&Mayper93
Michael, R.R. Quincy Mining Company M94,96;M&Nelson98
Mills, P.A. Accounting and the law M90,93b,94;M&Harmon94;
M&Young99
Mouck, T. Accounting theory M92,93,94,95a,b,98,00
Napier, C.J. Historiography N96,98;Miller&N93;
Carnegie&N96
Neu, D. Canadian indigenous N99,00a,b
people and governance
Nikitin, M. French industrial accounting N90,96; Boyns,Edwards,&N97
Oakes, L.S., Covaleski, M.A., Labor-management relations OC94;C,D,&Samuel95;OCD99
& Dirsmith, M.W.
Oldroyd, D. Pre-modern accounting O95,97,98
Oldroyd, D. British coal-mining history O96,99;Fleischman&O01;
Brackenborough,McLean,
&O01
Parker, L.D. Historiography P97,99;Fleischman,Kalbers,
&P96;P&Roffey97;Guthrie,P,
&Gray98
Parker, R.H. Biographical studies P96,97;Carnegie&P96;
Carnegie,P,&Wigg00
Poullaos, C. & Chua, W.-F. Australian professionalization P93,94;CP93,98
Preston, A.M. Hospital accounting P92;P,Cooper,&Coombs92;
P,Chua,&Neu97
Previts, G.J. Historiography P,Parker,&Coffman90a,b;
P&Robinson96
Radcliffe, V.S. Governmental auditing R97,98,99;R,Cooper,
&Robson94
Richardson, A.J. Canadian accounting history R97,00;Lew&R92
Scorgie, M.E. India/China accounting history S90;S&Nandy92;Reiss,S,
&Rowe96;S&Ji96
Scorgie, M.E. Biographical studies S93,95;S&Joiner95
Shackleton, J.K. British professionalization S95,99;S&Walker98;
Walker&S95,98
Spraakman, G.P. Hudson’s Bay Company S99,Roy&S96;S&Davidson98;
S&Wilkie00
Toms, J.S. Lancashire cotton industry T94,98;Higgins&T97
Tyson, T.N. US industrial accounting T90,92,93,95,97,98
Vent, G.A. & Milne, R.A. Mining accounting VM97,00;V&Birk93
Vollmers, G.L. US industrial accounting V93,96,99
Author(s) Topical Area Citations*
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Walker, S.P. British professionalization W91,93,95,96a,98b,00
Walker, S.P. & Mitchell, F. British printing industry WM96,97,98
Williams, R. British Industrial Revolution W97a,b,99a,b
Wootton, C.W. US public accounting W&Olson91;W&Wolk92;
W&Tonge93;W&Kemmerer00
Young, J.J. US standard setting Y94,96;Y&Mouck96
Zeff, S.A. US financial accounting Z98,99,00a,b
* The methodology of the “Citations” column is as follows: the capital letters that appear
there refer back to the names in the “Author(s)” column. Additional coauthors on works in
the “Topical Area” are mentioned by name. Hence, Aiken and Lu wrote three articles about
Chinese accounting in 1993 and one in 1998. Amernic wrote a sole-authored article about
accounting rhetoric in 1996; Armenic and Craig wrote an article on the topic in 1992 and
two others in 2000; Clarke, Craig, and Armenic jointly published an article in 1999. Full
citations to all of these may be found in the references list.
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Abstract: In traditional Anglo-Saxon accounting historiography the
birth of sophisticated management accounting practices was dated at
the end of the 19th century [Jonhson and Kaplan, 1987]. However,
some more recent investigations have questioned this idea and dem-
onstrate the existence of sophisticated management accounting and
control techniques before the industrial revolution in differing con-
texts such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Spain.
Fleischman and Parker [1991] have demonstrated that these practices
were present in a significant number of British companies. However,
evidence for Spain is based on isolated case studies. While case stud-
ies are essential to explain how these techniques were used, there has
been no research to assess their frequency in Spain before the indus-
trial revolution. By examining files concerning 13 large and medium-
sized 18th century Spanish companies, this paper corroborates
Fleischman and Parker’s [1991] thesis. It reveals that knowledge of
sophisticated cost accounting methods was fairly widespread in Spain
during the 18th century. Interestingly, however, the knowledge and
use of these techniques were not connected to economic success and
to the industrial revolution, as was the case in the United Kingdom.
INTRODUCTION
Management accounting historiography traditionally sus-
tained the thesis that most of the costing techniques used before
the late 19th century were very rudimentary [see Fleischman
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and Tyson, 1993; Loft, 1995].1 According to Chandler, modern
cost accounting emerged in the U.S.A. after 1850 with the ad-
vent of the railroads and large companies’ needs for sophisti-
cated administration and coordination [see Johnson, 1972]. Pol-
lard [1965] arrived at a similar conclusion in the British context
and argued that the development of cost accounting to support
management was not among the achievements of the British
industrial revolution. His explanation was based on the high
profits the early companies in the industrial revolution achieved
(which rendered cost accounting unnecessary), and on the lack
of integration between cost and financial accounting.
The majority of the early Anglo-Saxon studies that dated the
advent of modern cost accounting to the late 19th century were
not based on the examination of business archives which might
reveal accounting practices in real settings. Rather, this conclu-
sion was based on the lack of references to costing techniques in
accounting manuals (primarily directed to merchants) before
the 19th century [Johnson, 1972; Fleischman and Tyson, 1993;
Fleischman and Parker, 1997]. This argument was also made in
non-Anglo-Saxon countries. For example, in his examination of
the history and doctrines of European accounting, Vlaemminck
[1956] contended that industrial accounting attracted the atten-
tion of accounting authors only from the beginning of the 19th
century and that practice preceded accounting treaties.2
In recent decades some accounting historians have tested
traditional assumptions about the use of cost techniques by
investigating surviving business records [Johnson, 1972;
Fleischman and Parker, 1990, 1991; Edwards and Newell, 1991;
Fleischman et al., 1996; Fleischman and Tyson, 1993, 1996].
However, until very recently, the extensive study of early cost
accounting practices through the examination of surviving busi-
ness archives in the U.K. and U.S. has not been matched by
studies in continental Europe.
The reasons for this are difficult to fathom. Admittedly, the
British industrial revolution was unique and associated with
particular socio-political changes [Wilward and Saul, 1973].
1 For the purpose of this paper, we do not make any distinction between
terms such as ‘costing’, ‘cost accounting’, ‘management accounting’, or ‘manage-
rial accounting’. We use these terms interchangeably to refer to the use of cost-
based information for various purposes. The use of any of these terms does not
imply per se any commitment to a particular theoretical framework.
2 Vlaemminck [1956] and Boyns et al. [1997] mention some French authors
who wrote on industrial accounting early in the 19th century.
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Arguably, the introduction of sophisticated costing techniques
by British entrepreneurs during the industrialization could have
resulted from other significant economic advances [Fleischman
and Parker, 1991]. But continental European manufactures
reached a comparable level of complexity and technological in-
novation [Herr, 1958; Townsend, 1791]. Wilward and Saul
[1973] argue that transformations in Europe were caused by
external events, by the unbalancing of political power brought
about by increasing productive capacity in Britain. Concerns
about the distribution of power led continental governments to
become variously involved in manufactures, whereas the British
industrial revolution was based on entrepreneurship. These
facts would fit with a notion of cost management developed by
entrepreneurs to face competitive markets and tight profit mar-
gins [Fleischman and Parker, 1991]. However, there is increas-
ing evidence – especially for Spain – of the early use of sophisti-
cated costing techniques in organizations operating in
non-competitive markets [Hoskin and Macve, 1986, 1988;
Carmona et al., 1997; Núñez, 2002a; Carmona and Donoso,
2004] and in firms operating in competitive markets with gov-
ernmental support [Prieto and Larrinaga, 2001; Carmona and
Gómez, 2002].
The present study of organizations in 18th century Spain
provides evidence not only of the evolution of cost accounting in
a continental European country, but also of its practice and
development in settings characterized by limited competition
and monopolies conducted by the Crown. While some such evi-
dence already exists in the form of the case studies above-
mentioned, this paper aims to extend their conclusions by ex-
ploring whether sophisticated cost accounting techniques were
present in 13 large and medium-sized Spanish companies dur-
ing the second half of the 18th century. The paper presents the
results of a systematic and cross-sectional study, along the lines
of the research conducted by Fleischman and Parker [1991] for
British firms. The paper is structured as follows. The next sec-
tion provides a brief introduction to the manufacturing environ-
ment in 18th century Spain, paying particular attention to gov-
ernment involvement. The subsequent section describes the
categories and features that modern cost accounting should
evince, according to the existing literature. Thereafter the re-
search method is explained. The findings are then presented and
interpreted, and their wider relevance for understanding the ad-
vent of sophisticated cost accounting are explored. Then follows
some concluding remarks.
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SPANISH MANUFACTURES, 1760-1800
When Carlos II, the last Hapsburg monarch, died in 1700, a
new dynasty, the French Bourbons, settled in Spain. This dynas-
tic change brought about innovations in social and economic
policy inspired by the Enlightenment principles of rationality
and the search for public happiness. One of the peculiar in-
struments for the diffusion of Enlightenment ideas was the
Economic Societies of the Country’s Friends (Sociedades
Económicas de Amigos del País) [see Álvarez-Dardet et al., 2004],
which constituted a medium for pursuing the extension of edu-
cation among the peasantry and played an active role in the
economic development of Spain [Sarrailh, 1992]. The reign of
Carlos III (1759-1788) was a period when Enlightenment ideas
had much influence. Out of a sincere desire to improve the
nation, Carlos III fostered new ideas and promoted to power key
Enlightenment intellectuals (such as Floridablanca, the Conde
de Aranda, Campomanes, Carrabús, and Jovellanos) [Herr,
1958; Vicens Vives, 1987]. While Enlightenment principles were
commonly adhered to, fear of the consequences of the French
Revolution after 1789 moderated their advance [Vicens Vives,
1987].
Spanish economic policy in the 18th century was the out-
come of a conflict between protectionism and economic liberal-
ism [Vicens Vives, 1987]. On the one hand, economic policy was
based on the reformulation of the colonial pact in favor of met-
ropolitan industry and trade [La Force, 1965; Anes, 1994]. Fol-
lowing mercantilist ideas, policy was aimed at creating a more
regular and competitive trade in order to decrease foreign com-
petition and maintain the monopolist advantage of some privi-
leged Spanish companies, such as the Caracas Trading Com-
pany [Vicens Vives, 1987; Eugenio, 1988]. Protectionist
measures for the textile industry, such as the banning of fabric
imports and the restriction of raw material exports, were passed
from the early 18th century. The nightmare of Spanish mercan-
tilists was the legitimate importation or smuggling of French
and English goods that were aimed mainly for colonial trade. It
has been estimated that by the end of the 17th century only one-
eighth of the goods shipped from Spain to America were manu-
factured in Spain [Herr, 1958].
On the other hand, Spanish economic policy was also influ-
enced by physiocrat ideas, or a form of advanced mercantilism
[Herr, 1958]. Under Carlos III, the government ended the re-
strictions on trade between Spain and the colonies [Herr, 1958].
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Further, the previous attitude towards favoring the guilds
shifted and the Council of Castile engaged in curtailing all the
restrictive aspects of guild regulations [Lynch, 1991]. For ex-
ample, the guild regulations on the manufacture of cloth were
completely eliminated by 1787.
Political reforms in 18th century Spain were carried out
under monarchial absolutism. Administrative uniformity and ra-
tionalization was to be achieved through the suppression of the
ancient charters of some regions. Vicens Vives [1987] argues
that the main mechanism for implementing the Crown’s policies
of uniformity was the abovementioned Council of Castile. This
institution brought about a rationalization of taxation and
sought to overcome the traditional differences in taxation be-
tween the various regions. Also important in relation to unifor-
mity were the monopolies. These constituted an important
source of public revenues at this time. Vicens Vives [1987] con-
tends that among the salt, playing cards and tobacco monopo-
lies, the last mentioned was most remunerative, raising as much
as 82,000,000 reales in 1797. The preference for uniformity and
the need to increase revenues to sustain the empire led to plac-
ing public activities and leased monopolies (like the gunpowder
monopoly) under direct state management, often in the form of
royal factories. This was the case with tobacco, which was
manufactured in the Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville. The
changeover to direct state control of the Crown’s monopolies
began in 1741. It culminated in 1761 with the issue of the In-
struction for the Internal Administration of the General Board
of Monopolies, and specific instructions for provincial and gen-
eral monopolies, salt mines, textile factories, lead mines, and
gunpowder production [Artola, 1982, p. 254].
Royal Factories: Spanish entrepreneurs failed to secure the pro-
duction of sufficient goods for the trade with the Spanish colo-
nies. In order to halt the consequent dependence on manufac-
turers in other European countries, the Bourbons created royal
factories along the lines of French Colbertism [Helguera, 1991;
Fernández et al., 1992]. Foreign machinery was imported to es-
tablish the new manufactories [Anes, 1994]. As well as produc-
ing competitive goods for both the colonial trade and the Ibe-
rian market, the royal factories served at least three other
purposes. First, they were conceived as technical institutions for
the dissemination of industrial knowledge and skills [La Force,
1965]. Second, in the case of some monopolies the royal facto-
ries were also devised to maximize public revenues. Third, even
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though in the early 18th century royal factories were compatible
with guilds, following the liberal reforms begun under Carlos
III, they were used as instruments to destroy the guild privileges.
The term ‘royal factory’ is confusing and, according to sev-
eral authors [La Force, 1965; Helguera, 1991], relates to three
different types of companies. First, those that enjoyed some kind
of tax exemption. Second, those organized as public companies,
in which the king and/or the royal family had some participation
(called Royal Joint-Stock Companies by La Force [1995]) and
secured resultant privileges in exchange for state involvement.
Third, those companies created on the state’s initiative, wholly
financed by and charged to the Treasury and predominantly run
by civil servants. This was the case with the Royal Textile Fac-
tory of Guadalajara, founded in 1718 [La Force, 1965], the Royal
Tobacco Factory [Carmona et al., 1997], and the Gunpowder
monopoly [Núñez, 1999].
The fortunes of the royal factories varied. Generally, only
those that effectively placed monopolies under governmental
management accomplished the aim of increasing public rev-
enues. This was the case with the Royal Tobacco Factory and
the Gunpowder monopoly. In contrast, those royal factories that
aimed to compete with the import of fabrics and other goods
were not financially successful. Herr [1958], La Force [1965],
and Vicens Vives [1987] provide details of the misfortunes of
some of the royal factories. Herr [1958] attributes limited suc-
cess to poor management, high transportation costs (for central
manufactures in mountainous Spain), and the resistance of
guilds. La Force [1965], referring to the royal textile factories,
argues that they were established according to purely technical
rather than economic considerations. Diseconomies of scale
emerged because factories were integrated before the advent of
cost-reducing technologies [La Force, 1965]. However, large fac-
tories were needed in order to overcome the most important
shortcoming of Spanish industry - the lack of skilled workers.
Integration was pursued to develop learning, and the solution
envisaged was to “import” foreign skilled craftsmen [Larruga,
1794]. As a result of these problems the royal textile factories
depended on royal subsidies to survive. One of the most extreme
cases was the Royal Textile Factory of Guadalajara, which re-
quired 2,000,000 reales per annum during the reign of Fernando
VI (1746-1759).
Along with the rest of Europe, Spain experienced a period
of economic growth in the second half of the 18th century,
which was reflected in a population increase of 40% [Lynch,
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1991]. This fact meant a growing demand for products and an
increasing supply of labor for manufacturing work. Lynch
[1991] estimates that 200,000 people worked in the industry and
service sectors by the end of the century. Arguably, Spanish
industrialization also contributed to greater prosperity. By 1789
the share of Spanish-made goods in the trade with the colonies
had increased to one half, compared to one-eighth in 1700
[Milward and Saul, 1973].
Yet, by the end of the 18th century the economic advance
was halted. There were a number of reasons for this. First, the
fear caused by the French Revolution slowed and even reversed
the pace of reform [Burrel, 1988]. For instance, in 1791 all pri-
vate Spanish periodicals were suspended [Herr, 1958]. Second,
the war between England and Spain, which broke out in 1796,
contributed to the loss of trade routes with the Americas until
1802. Vicens Vives [1987] estimates the loss of trade to the port
of Cadiz, the busiest in Spain, at 2,700,000 reales. Third, free-
dom of trade between the Americas was granted in 1778 and
reinforced in 1797, signifying the beginning of the colonies’ in-
dependence. Finally, the Spanish economy was adversely af-
fected by the Napoleonic invasion of Spain (1808-1814). All
Spanish manufacturers suffered during this period. Vicens Vives
[1987] contends that from 1800 until 1832 the textile industry
returned to a predominantly artisan character.
In summary, the context of Spanish manufacturing during
most of the 18th century was characterized by change inspired
by the Enlightenment. The pace of reform increased after 1759,
with the support of Carlos III. Some of the reforms were aimed
at free trade, while others, such as the creation of royal facto-
ries, were aimed at the protection of national industries. For
manufacturing concerns in Spain the mid-late 18th century was
a period of economic success followed by adversity.
LITERATURE ON THE ADVENT OF SOPHISTICATED
COST AND MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING
A growing body of research has supported the revision of
Pollard and Chandler’s thesis by revealing the use of sophisti-
cated cost accounting techniques in different settings before the
second half of the 19th century. Johnson [1972] examined the
cost management techniques used in a textile mill, the Lyman
Mills Corporation (U.S.), before 1860. He concluded that its
elaborate costing system was used to facilitate internal control
of operations. From 1819 the Springfield Armory (US) also kept
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detailed records on raw materials, processes, and finished prod-
ucts, as well as on the average time required to perform each
task and every worker’s wages. From 1840 more frequent use of
these techniques was applied to improve internal control
[Hoskin and Macve, 1988; Tyson, 1990]. Fleischman and Parker
[1990] have also established the existence of advanced manage-
ment accounting techniques in the Carron Company, a forerun-
ner of industrialization in Scotland.
In the Spanish context, Carmona et al. [1997, 1998] have
documented the existence of modern cost accounting techniques
in the Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville before 1779. Flores
[1983], Prieto and Larrinaga [2001], Núñez [2002a], and
Carmona and Gómez [2002] have also examined the use of so-
phisticated cost accounting techniques in several Spanish com-
panies during the second half of the 18th century. They studied
specific cases in depth, analyzing the particular circumstances
that gave rise to the use of cost accounting and demonstrated
the existence of sophisticated costing techniques in settings
characterized by the absence of competitive markets and ex-
tended governmental intervention. Despite these advances in
identifying the use of costing in Spanish concerns, there re-
mains a lack of cross-sectional surveys that would permit the
generalizing of findings beyond the isolated cases studied to
date.
Thus, the aim of this paper is to explore the extent of cost
accounting practices and knowledge in 18th century Spain.
Fleischman and Parker [1991] conducted a cross-sectional study
of 25 British companies, forerunners of the industrial revolu-
tion, with the aim of exploring Pollard’s thesis. To perform this
kind of analysis, it is necessary to establish categories that can
be investigated in each of the cases examined. Fleischman and
Parker assumed that the development of sophisticated cost ac-
counting equaled the frequent use of certain costing techniques:
(i) the use of cost control techniques, including costing based on
responsibility centers; (ii) overhead allocation to products; (iii)
the use of costs for decision making (including cost compari-
son), and (iv) the use of budgets, forecasts, and standards. While
Edwards and Newell [1991] also reviewed several cases where
an appreciable development in cost accounting existed before
1850, the categorization proposed by Fleischman and Parker
[1991] is more systematic and is adopted here.
Of the 25 British companies studied by Fleischman and
Parker [1991], the majority (72%) routinely recorded costs.
More precisely, costs were used to control materials, waste,
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labor and even the profitability of different blends of materials.
Some textile mills also recorded daily production measures.
Other companies managed their costs through the use of re-
sponsibility centers, and in these organizations there was evi-
dence of profit calculation. As regards overhead allocation to
products, 64% of the companies added manufacturing and com-
mercial overhead to direct production cost, although only 20%
did an excellent job of overhead allocation (Fleischman and
Parker [1991] do not define the difference between ‘excellence’
and mere ‘activity’ in a given area). Costs of up to 31 different
batches were calculated, and arguments based on the contribu-
tion margin logic were also present. Of the 25 companies, 56%
used cost information to make decisions on technological inno-
vation, vertical integration, the abandonment of production
lines, or alternative merchandise transport routes. However,
only 28% did an excellent job in this area. Finally, in 80% of the
cases Fleischman and Parker identified the application of some
kind of standard, usually to control inventories and occasionally
in relation to budgeting. The association between standards and
inventory control was in some cases related to the awareness of
the difference between manufacturing cost and the realizable
net value for obsolete products. Moreover, some businessmen
also conducted sophisticated experiments to establish standards
for different processes.
The approach followed by Fleischman and Parker [1991]
and other authors such as Tyson, Boyns and Edwards has pro-
voked a number of critiques. Loft [1995] brands such work the
“revision by neoclassicists of traditional history”. Hoskin and
Macve [2000] charge this approach with three different levels of
problem. First, at the theoretical level, they contend that
Fleischman and colleagues oversimplify causality in conceiving
the new accounting practices of the 18th and 19th centuries as
driven by the need for coordination in larger industrial firms.
Rather, Hoskin and Macve [2000] maintain that we should con-
sider whether causes include other organizational, social and
economic changes. Recently, Boyns and Edwards [2000, p. 153]
have acknowledged that sociopolitical and historical contexts
may be important factors in the adoption of management ac-
counting. Moreover, recent collaborations between Fleischman
and Macve [2002] suggest that the so-called neoclassical revi-
sionists and their critics recognize the potential relevance of
their respective theoretical positions. As is suggested by the
brief historical context provided earlier in the current paper, the
authors consider that the social and political contexts are
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important to understanding the adoption of cost and manage-
ment accounting techniques in Spanish concerns.
Second, at an evidential level, Hoskin and Macve [2000]
contend that it is not possible to infer purpose from the exist-
ence of formal accounting records. That is, the evidence of com-
plex cost accounting records-related to past performance and to
the preparation of double-entry accounting ledgers- permits
only assertions about how techniques ‘might’ have been utilized.
Imposing present-day categories on the past can also be a mis-
leading line of causation. However, Hoskin and Macve [2000]
admit that the purpose of cost accounting can be inferred if the
accounts compute future outcomes, if they are prepared in the
context of decision making or negotiation, or if they are used as
a base for contractual negotiations. In order to avoid these evi-
dential pitfalls, we have carefully examined the context in which
cost accounting practices were introduced and applied.
Finally, at the historiographical level, Hoskin and Macve
[2000] question the general significance of routine cost and
management accounting practices, as investigated by authors
such as Fleischman and Parker [1991]. In contrast, Hoskin and
Macve [2000, p. 109] argue that the “historical crux is to identify
the discontinuity between early attempts at costing for account-
ability, decision making, and control purposes, and what may be
seen as the modern approach based in a human accounting”.
They hypothesize that human accounting emerged in the U.S.
during the second half of the 19th century. Nonetheless, Hoskin
and Macve [2000], together with Fleischman and Tyson [1993]
and Boyns and Edwards [2000], agree on the desirability of fur-
ther research in cost and management accounting history and
encourage the examination of business records for all countries
[Boyns and Edwards, 2000, p. 157]. It is hoped that the evidence
presented in this paper will contribute to these debates in the
history of cost and management accounting.
RESEARCH METHOD
While pioneering British firms have been the focus of much
attention [Fleischman and Parker, 1991], their contemporaries
in Spain have not been systematically studied through surviving
business records. In Spain information on archives containing
business records is dispersed and the relevant collections have
received less consideration than state administrative documents.
Therefore, we devised a research method comprising of three
different approaches in order to identify the records of Spanish
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companies during the second half of the 18th century and ana-
lyze their cost and management accounting practices.
First, we examined cases already covered in the literature:
the Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville [Carmona et al., 1997,
1998], the Riotinto Mines [Flores, 1983], the gunpowder mo-
nopoly in New Spain [Núñez, 2002a, b], and the Royal Textile
Factory of Ezcaray [Prieto and Larrinaga, 2001]. Second, we
explored surviving business records of other factories contained
in various archives, mainly in the Archivo General de Simancas
and the Secretaría y Superintendencia de Hacienda section (AGS-
SSSH), which contains state administrative documents dealing
with economic matters during the relevant period. Third, we
considered the indirect evidence contained in contemporary
printed sources, in particular, Larruga’s Political and Economic
Memoirs [1794].
We focus on factories, on the assumption that cost account-
ing most probably emerged and gained some degree of sophisti-
cation in this kind of organization. The institutional context of
the period (1760-1800) should be taken into consideration, since
in Spain the most important factories were owned by the Crown
or benefited from some kind of royal protection. These links
with the Crown explain not only the development of administra-
tive and accounting techniques (given the obligation to render
accounts), but also the survival of records.
It is difficult to establish the total population of firms dur-
ing the period studied. Admittedly, the fact that our sample con-
tains only 13 cases, while Fleischman and Parker [1991] ana-
lyzed 25, could limit the wider validity of the conclusions.
However, it should also be considered that (i) for the reasons
explained above, the period we examine (1760-1800) is less than
half that studied by Fleischman and Parker; (ii) as we have also
argued above, the industrial fabric of 18th century Spain was
less developed than that of Britain; (iii) our cases span a broad
spectrum of capital-intensive industries and include the most
important companies in the textile, mining, and tobacco indus-
tries - companies that have been cited by economic historians
such as Herr [1958], La Force [1965], and Vicens Vives [1987].
Further, (iv) and more importantly, our conclusions are condi-
tioned by the Spanish political and institutional context, which
encompasses a particular category of companies (the royal fac-
tories and the rentas, or monopolies belonging to the Crown).
In the British case, Fleischman and Parker [1991] estimated
the survival of costing records at less than ten percent. This
survey encountered a similar difficulty. Bookkeeping for finan-
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TABLE 1
Documentary Sources Used in This Paper
Institution Primary sources Secondary sources
Esparto Textile Factory Larruga [1794], Vol. 17
of Vallejo
Alcoraya Mine Archivo General de Simancas, Sección
de Secretaría y Superintendencia de
Hacienda, file 803
Río Tinto Mines Flores Caballero, M. [1983]
Royal Liqueur Factory Archivo General de Simancas, Sección
of Madrid de Secretaría y Superintendencia de
Hacienda, file 812
Royal Arsenal of Eugui Archivo General de Simancas, Sección
and Orbaiceta de Secretaría y Superintendencia de
Hacienda, file 805
Royal Textile Factory Archivo General de Simancas, Sección
of Cuenca de Secretaría y Superintendencia de
Hacienda, file 787
Royal Textile Factory Archivo General de Simancas, Sección Prieto and Larrinaga
of Ezcaray de Secretaría y Superintendencia de [2001]
Hacienda, file 788; Larruga [1794]
Royal Textile Factory Larruga [1794] Vols. 14, 15 and 16 Carmona and Gómez
of Guadalajara [2002]
Royal Textile Factory Archivo General de Simancas, Sección
of San Fernando de Secretaría y Superintendencia de
Hacienda, files 784-785
Royal Textile Factory Larruga [1794], Vol. 12
of Segovia
Royal Gunpowder Factory Archivo General de Indias, Audiencia Maniau [1793]; Humboldt
of New Spain de México. Files 1013, 1123, 1249, [1822]; Núñez [1999,
1250, 1260, 1261, 1405, 2216, 2217, 2002a, 2002b]
2218, 2228, 2230, 2232, 2233, 2235,
2236, 2240, 2347, and 2450
Royal Tobacco Factory Archivo Histórico de la Fábrica de Rodríguez Gordillo [1975,
of Seville  Tabacos de Sevilla (Altadis, S.A.); 1977, 1990, and 1993];
Archivo Histórico Nacional; Archivo Morales Sánchez [1989];
General de Simancas Carmona et al. [1997,
1998]; Gutiérrez [1993,
1999]
Royal Textile Factory
of Ávila Archivo General de Simancas, Sección
de Secretaría y Superintendencia de
Hacienda, files 755-758
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cial accounting is more easily found in the Spanish archives.
Thus, for instance, all the files studied in the AGS-SSSH contain
documentation gathered by the Junta General de Comercio y
Moneda (Royal Committee for Trade and Money), which repre-
sented the Crown’s interests in these manufactures. Fortunately,
despite the overwhelming dominance of financial accounting
records, a careful archival survey allowed us to identify evidence
of costing practices. For all the organizations examined for the
period 1760-1800, files existed containing evidence of the use of
costing techniques. While in some cases a complete series of
costing and budgeting records survive or exist, in other in-
stances we have only isolated cost studies for decision making
or a reference to them in the correspondence.
In addition to the AGS-SSSH, we visited private archives to
examine the Royal Tobacco Factory case (Historic Archives of
Altadis). Primary sources for the gunpowder monopoly were
gathered at Seville’s Archivo General de Indias (AGI), which con-
tains copies of the accounting statements required by the
Contaduría General del Consejo de Indias (Council of the Indies
General Accounting Office). As in the case of the AGS-SSSH,
information on costing was found with financial accounting in-
formation.
Memorias Políticas y Económicas [Larruga, 1794] is a 30-
volume treatise about the advancement of Spanish industry in
the last years of the 18th century. It is a descriptive account,
with occasional physiocratic remarks, that essentially tran-
scribes documents from diverse origins, mainly the companies
themselves. For some companies, we verified Larruga’s refer-
ences to costing exercises against the records found in the archi-
val survey. Larruga is also referred to by economic historians
such as Herr [1958] and Vicens Vives [1987]. We thus consider
evidence contained in the Memorias as important primary
source material.
We analyzed all information from primary and secondary
sources according to the four criteria mentioned by Fleischman
and Parker [1991]. As the cases vary in quantity and quality of
information, we devised a checklist which covered the four ar-
eas of costing activity and allowed us to describe and contrast
all the companies’ activities in outline form (see Appendix 1).
DESCRIPTION AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS
Table 2 shows the degree to which each company satis-
fies the four main criteria for ‘sophisticated’ cost management.
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Following Fleischman and Parker, we have distinguished be-
tween companies that show some kind of activity in a particular
area (sporadic use of a technique, denoted with an ‘A’) and those
with an excellent development (formal definition and routine
application of cost management, denoted with an ‘E’).
TABLE 2
Spanish Factories Practicing Management Accounting in
the Second Half of the 18th Century
Institution Costs Control Overhead Costs for Standards,
(Responsibility Allocation Decision Forecasts,
Centers) Making and Budgets
Esparto Textile Factory of Vallejo A A – –
Alcoraya Mine A – – –
Río Tinto Mines E E E –
Royal Liqueur Factory of Madrid E A E –
Royal Arsenal of Eugui and Orbaiceta E – – E
Royal Textile Factory of Cuenca A – – –
Royal Textile Factory of Ezcaray A E A E
Royal Textile Factory of Guadalajara E E E E
Royal Textile Factory of San Fernando A A – A
Royal Textile Factory of Segovia E E – A
Royal Gunpowder Factory of New Spain E E E E
Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville E E E E
Royal Textile Factory of Ávila E – A A
Total Activity 13 9 7 8
Percentage 100% 69% 54% 62%
‘A’: companies that show some kind of activity in a particular area (sporadic use of a
technique).
‘E’: companies that show an excellent development (formal definition and routine applica-
tion of cost management).
At first glance, Table 2 illustrates that cost accounting was
often used by companies in Spain during the second half of the
18th century. All the companies in this study carried out some
form of production cost control. More than two-thirds allocated
manufacturing overhead, and more than half used that informa-
tion for decision making and to elaborate a form of standard or
budget.
Cost Control: As Table 2 shows, every company in the study
undertook some kind of cost control. In the tobacco and gun-
powder factories and in the arsenal, materials were weighed,
registered, and controlled as they passed through the different
phases of production, and there were rules for these procedures.
For instance, in the tobacco factory snuff underwent a complex
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production process involving seven stages (sun drying, first mill-
ing, mixture, airing, second milling, fermentation, and distribu-
tion), which was controlled by a manager who was held ac-
countable. Control was based on accounting records and aimed
essentially at avoiding the theft and smuggling of luxury raw
materials and goods (for a further explanation, see Carmona et
al., [1997]). For the gunpowder factory, the Gunpowder Ordi-
nances established “usual wastes” in the production process,
and the factory manager was accountable for higher wastes
[AGI, file Mexico 2216]. By-products of the production process
(‘gunpowder powder’) were reused. For the Ávila textile factory
there are a few reports on production wastes in 1798, and in the
Guadalajara factory materials shrinkage costs were calculated.
The quality of the products was controlled in four factories
(textiles in Guadalajara and Ávila, tobacco, and gunpowder). In
the tobacco factory a supervisor controlled the quality of the
cigars; cigar makers were paid 16 maravedís per properly made
batch [Álvarez et al., 2002]. In the gunpowder factory, a quality
control network was established involving strict regulations and
a system of rewards and sanctions at different levels. The three
major stages in the process of gunpowder production (grinding,
pasting and corning) could not commence until the main raw
materials (saltpeter, sulfur, and carbon) met certain quality
standards necessary to guarantee the success of the final prod-
uct. In some cases, the so-called assays for raw material quality
evaluation, which varied according to the different ingredients
and intended use of the gunpowder (by the army or by the
public), determined that re-processing was necessary. Tests
were also made to verify the quality of the finished gunpowder
[Núñez, 1999].
For the Ávila textile factory there exists a series of monthly
records of machines and workers, classified according to the
different productive phases, as well as production data and costs
[AGS-SSSH, file 755]. One example is exhibited in Figure 1. The
statutes issued by the government for the management of this
factory [AGS-SSSH, file 756] required that “all the weavers em-
ployed in the factories have to be accounted for in the books, as
well as the fabrics that each one weaves and all the different
production processes”. Hoskin and Macve [2000] contend that
early costing attempts should be differentiated from a modern
approach based on human accounting. In Figure 1, however,
both machines and weavers are classified by processes. Weavers
are also classified by sex and age. Here we see how “Accounting
is able to establish new modes of accountability by rendering
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human activities visible, thereby promoting new areas of dis-
course, and enabling social fields to be represented as areas of
rational economic action” [Carmona et al., 1997]. Whether the
practices of the Ávila factory are the embryo of, or an unsuccess-
ful endeavor at, a shift in focus from machines to men is beyond
the scope of this paper.
FIGURE 1:
Monthly Production Reports, Classifying Workers and
Machinery. Royal Textile Factory of Ávila
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FIGURE 1 (continued)
Monthly Production Reports, Classifying Workers and
Machinery. Royal Textile Factory of Ávila
Source: AGS-SSSH. File 755.
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FIGURE 1 (continued)
Monthly Production Reports, Classifying Workers and
Machinery. Royal Textile Factory of Ávila
Month of October, 1790
State of the Royal Cotton Textiles Factory of Ávila
Number of machines Number of people employed
in use
Sept. Oct. Total Men Women Apprentices Boys Total
Machines
Carding machines 4 4 4 4
Benches for arranging 3 3 3 3
Spindles 3 3 3 3
Spinning wheels 12 12 12 6 24 42
Reeling machines 5 5 3 3
And one wheel for ropes 1 1
Occupations and posts
Pickers 10 10
Spoolers 10 10
Blacksmiths 6 6
Carpenters 4 4
Machinists 3 3
For the machinists’ wheels 2 2
Craftsmen, skilled work- 4 4
men, and apprentices of
warp-bar making
Looms
Factory 12 12 12 12
In town 50 5 55 12 43 55
Occupations and posts
Spool makers 3 3
Dispatch and stock 4 4
90 5 95 69 29 46 24 168
Daily spinning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27 lbs
3⁄4 and 8 fingers wide and 30 varas length pieces of muslin for printing
until the end of September, 154; and cottonade3 and cotton fabric of
the same length, 10; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
And during this month one piece of cottonade and 47 of muslin, everything
the same as the last ones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
This (report) is in accordance with the Royal Factory’s actual state without considering
machinery and other stocks, which are in process until all of them be employed for the
purposes for which they should be applied. Those that are finished but not employed were
expressed in the preceding months.
Ávila, October 31, 1790
Signed: Vicente Cisneros and Juan Berry
Expensed in the factory from the month of April until the end of
September this year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116,958…14
Idem month of October . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33,383… 3
Total . . . . . . . 150,341…17
3 Cottonade (Cotonía in Spanish) was a kind of coarse cotton fabric.
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Some other examples of complex managerial accounting
follow. In the textile factory of Ávila, there is evidence that the
costs of 79 different products were calculated (see the extract in
Figure 2). In San Fernando’s textile factory, labor costs were
FIGURE 2
Statement of Costing for Seventy-nine Different Products.
Royal Textile Factory of Ávila (extracted).
Source: AGS-SSSH. File 756
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FIGURE 2 (continued)
Statement of Costing for Seventy-nine Different Products.
Royal Textile Factory of Ávila (extracted)
Account for six collections of various samples of cotton fabric from the Ávila Royal Facto-
ries: Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Numbers, classes, varas, costs, selling prices, and consequent
profits are as follows:
N0 1
Selling
Number price
of [per [Sales]
Pieces Varas Costs4  vara] Reales Profit
5125 Pink ordinary cottonade 30 11R 20m 15R 450 102..12
3393 Fine smooth cottonade 313⁄4 15R 6m 20R 635 153..5
1054 White Cordoné cloth 351⁄2 19R 14 m 24R 852 162..30
5048 Pink corduroy 30 27R…… 30R 900 90
5010 Fine striped cottonade 293⁄4 21R 14m 24R 714 77
00 Striped cotton cloth 30 14R 19m 18R 540 103..8
3948 Smooth regular cloth 303⁄4 14R 19m 18R 553..17 105..273⁄4
3295 Medium striped cottonade 311⁄4 14R 23m 22R 687..17 228..231⁄2
4864 Fine striped cottonade 303⁄4 14R 23m 24R 738 286..24
4789 Lisa ccottonade 313⁄4 20R 17m 26R 825..17 174..211⁄4
2538 Striped cottonade 313⁄4 14R 23m 22R 698..17 232..17
5456 Smooth velveteen 30 20R…… 24R 720 120
5108 White fine linen cloth 291⁄4 13R 25m 17R 497..81⁄2 95..163⁄4
000 Striped cottonade 31 14R 23m 22R 682 227..1
4845 Fine cotton cloth 32 18R 20m 20R 640 45..6
0000 Striped cottonade 32 14R 23m 22R 704 234..12
N0 2
5368 Dyed smooth velveteen 26 22R3⁄4 26R 676 84..17
4151 Dyed smooth cottonade 313⁄4 17R 6m 22R 698..17 153..5
3717 Printed cotton cloth 311⁄4 21R 20m 25R 781..8 106..201⁄2
5516 Dyed ordinary cloth 333⁄4 14R 16m 21R 708..25 220..123⁄4
4585 Printed canvas 321⁄2 12R 15m 15R 487..17 83..51⁄2
4019 Idem 301⁄4 12R 15m 14R 423..17 47..4
4306 Idem 303⁄4 12R 15m 15R 461..8 78..223⁄4
4495 Idem 291⁄2 12R 15m 14R 413 45..331⁄2
3991 Idem 30 12R 15m 15R 450 76..26
3761 Idem 303⁄4 12R 15m 14R 430..17 47..313⁄4
16,367..51⁄2 3,383..9
4 Figures in reales are followed by “R,” and their remainders, accounted for in
maravedís, are followed by “m”. In the two last columns, in the original reales are followed
by two points and the remainder in maravedís. Please note that the remainders are not
computed on a decimal base.
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checked weekly. In Madrid’s liqueur factory the costs of five
products were computed for consecutive years with the aim of
providing evidence of the progressive decrease of margins for
some of the products (see below).
In seven cases, costs were separated for the company’s dif-
ferent areas of activity. In the Ávila and tobacco factories, ma-
chines and workers were sorted into different phases of the pro-
duction process. In the arsenals, monthly reports of the
expenses at Eugui and Orbaiceta were elaborated in each fac-
tory by the accountant and then endorsed by the managers.
Even though costing was related to inventory control and its
inclusion in the companies’ general statements,5 we cannot con-
clusively reject the possibility that these records were used for
internal management purposes, as Hoskin and Macve [2000]
might suggest. On the contrary, costing in most cases was re-
lated to controls over materials, product quality, waste, cost and
labor.
Overhead Allocation: There is evidence to show that the impor-
tance of overheads was generally recognized. As Table 2 shows,
nine factories took some account of them, of which eight allo-
cated overheads to products. Madrid’s liqueur factory warned
that the “wages of the employees are not included” in the calcu-
lation of costs. In contrast, in the gunpowder factory, “the wages
of the permanent job assistants and employees of the Account-
ing Office” were included in production cost. Hence, a report
contended that the more pounds of gunpowder produced, the
less a pound would cost, since administration unit costs de-
creased [AGI, file Mexico 2228].
In some factories, the costs of several products were calcu-
lated and different foundations for overhead allocation were
used. For example, as Figure 3 illustrates, Ezcaray’s factory stor-
age costs were allocated to products at seven reales each, while
damages and contingencies costs were figured at one and a half
percent of production cost. Baling cost and the managers’ and
accountants’ wages were allocated at a different rate for each
type of fabric depending on its class - allowing higher rates for
higher quality fabrics. In the same vein, in the tobacco factory
the porters’ cost was allocated to snuff and cigars at 60% and
40% respectively, according to experts’ estimations.
5 The general statements formulated by these companies followed not the double-entry
system, but the Venetian style of credits and debits. Hernández Esteve [1996] contends that
this was a general practice in 18th century Spain.
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FIGURE 3
Statement of a Cost Study Where Overhead Is Allocated to
a Product. Royal Textile Factory of Ezcaray.
Source: AGS-SSSH. File 788
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In the Ezcaray textile factory and the gunpowder factory
depreciation costs were formally noted. In Ezcaray the impair-
ment cost of tools was allocated to different products. In the
gunpowder factory the depreciation of boilers “due to the con-
tinuous torment of fire” was taken into account [AGI, file
Mexico 2228]. For the tobacco factory, payback was calculated
for the investment in a new building [Carmona et al., 2002].
Documents also reveal awareness of the importance of fixed
costs. It should be noted that royal textile factories faced finan-
cial difficulties due to substantial investments, integration of
activities before the application of the first inventions decreased
costs, high transport costs and lack of skilled workers [La Force,
1965; also Prieto and Larrinaga, 2001]. The correspondence of
many textile factories reveals that the impact of fixed costs was
cause for concern. The fact that interest on the substantial debts
and accountants’ and managers’ high salaries were fixed costs
was a matter of a great importance.6 Hence, in the Ezcaray
factory, for example, debt was double yearly sales and 16 times
the profits the manager claimed to have made. In the textile
factory of Segovia “there was little and contingent work and the
FIGURE 3 (continued)
Statement of a Cost Study Where Overhead Is Allocated to
a Product. Royal Textile Factory of Ezcaray
Costs of each piece of cloth, according to its quality, adding all its transport, wages, selling
rights, warehousing, recoveries, and baling expenses; distinguishing qualities and items as
demonstrated in the following manner:
First Class Cloth, superfine and “thirty-hundreds”
I assume a liquid cost of fifty-three reales per vara, where each piece usually has thirty-five
varas, whose expenses are demonstrated as follows.
For the carriage of one arroba and three cuartillas weight, nine reales each
arroba gives fifteen reales and twenty-five maravedís . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.25
For half the rights, for privileges acquired by royal letter patent, for each
piece of this quality, forty-two reales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Stocking in the Clothing Guild, seven reales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Baling, forty-five reales every three pieces, fifteen reales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Salaries of the accountant and the scribe from Madrid, for each piece of
this quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Damages and eventualities, one and a half percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,10
Porters carrying from customs to the store, custody of the bales, and
unbaling, gives two reales each piece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Salaries of the director, the accountant, and the scribe of Ezcaray, thirty-six
reales for each piece of this class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
175.1
The cost that must be added to each piece.
6 In the tobacco factory, the superintendent’s emoluments were 18 times higher than
the workers [Gutiérrez, 1993].
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fixed salaries were 13,200 reales yearly . . . Although the drapery
was of superior quality, such a small amount could not have
been enough to pay the salaries” [Larruga, 1794: 12, pp. 254-
255].
Costing for Decision Making: Although nine of the 13 factories
worked out costs and profits, we found evidence of the actual
use of these calculations for decision making in only seven cases
(see Table 2). Figure 2 exhibits how the textile factory of Ávila
computed costs and profits for 79 different fabrics. Other docu-
F
IG
U
R
E
 4
Y
ea
rl
y 
P
ro
d
u
ct
 C
o
st
in
g 
fo
r 
P
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y 
A
ss
es
sm
en
t,
 R
o
ya
l 
L
iq
u
eu
r 
F
ac
to
ry
,
M
ad
ri
d
S
ou
rc
e:
 A
G
S
-S
S
S
H
. F
il
e 
81
2.
142
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 32 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss1/10
135Gutiérrez, Larrinaga, and Núñez: Accounting in Pre-Industrial Spain
F
IG
U
R
E
 4
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
Y
ea
rl
y 
P
ro
d
u
ct
 C
o
st
in
g 
fo
r 
P
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y 
A
ss
es
sm
en
t,
 R
o
ya
l 
L
iq
u
eu
r 
F
ac
to
ry
, 
M
ad
ri
d
R
oy
al
 L
iq
u
eu
r 
F
ac
to
ry
, M
ad
ri
d
C
re
am
 R
os
ol
io
Y
ea
r 
17
94
F
u
n
d
s 
an
d
 s
u
p
p
li
es
 i
n
ve
st
ed
 i
n
 C
re
am
 R
os
ol
io
 p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
, w
it
h
 a
n
 e
xp
la
n
at
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
, e
xp
en
se
s,
 a
n
d
 p
ro
fi
t 
yi
el
d
ed
.
O
rd
in
ar
y
‘H
ol
la
n
d
’-
R
ef
in
in
g
S
u
ga
r
T
yp
e 
S
p
ir
it
C
of
fe
e
C
oc
h
in
ea
l
C
in
n
am
on
E
ss
en
ce
s
F
ir
ew
oo
d
P
ro
d
u
ct
A
rr
ob
as
A
rr
ob
as
A
rr
ob
as
P
ou
n
d
s
O
u
n
ce
s
P
ou
n
d
s
O
u
n
ce
s
A
rr
ob
as
A
rr
ob
as
S
u
p
p
li
es
 a
n
d
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s
25
0
54
25
41
21
⁄ 2
66
8
39
68
22
5
36
7
73
7
R
ea
le
s
V
al
u
e 
of
 C
re
am
 R
os
ol
io
 7
37
 a
rr
ob
as
; 8
 r
ea
le
s 
p
er
 c
u
ar
ti
llo
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 1
88
,6
72
E
xp
en
se
s
25
0 
ar
ro
ba
s 
of
 r
ef
in
in
g,
 8
8R
 2
83
⁄4 
m
 p
er
 a
rr
ob
a,
 a
m
ou
n
t 
to
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 
22
,2
11
..1
3
54
 a
rr
ob
as
 o
f 
or
d
in
ar
y 
su
ga
r,
 1
07
R
 1
3 ⁄4
 m
 p
er
 a
rr
ob
a
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. 
5,
78
0.
.2
6
25
4 
ar
ro
ba
s 
an
d
 1
21
⁄2 
p
ou
n
d
s 
of
 ‘H
ol
la
n
d
’ s
p
ir
it
 1
0R
 2
91
⁄2  
m
 p
er
 p
ou
n
d
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. 
69
,1
45
..1
4
66
 p
ou
n
d
s 
an
d
 8
 o
u
n
ce
s 
of
 c
of
fe
e,
 3
6R
 1
11
⁄3 
m
 p
er
 p
ou
n
d
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. 
2,
41
6.
.6
39
 o
u
n
ce
s 
of
 c
oc
h
in
ea
l, 
3R
 2
51
⁄ 2 
m
 p
er
 o
u
n
ce
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
14
6.
.8
6 
p
ou
n
d
s 
an
d
 8
 o
u
n
ce
s 
of
 c
in
n
am
on
, 2
0 
R
 p
er
 p
ou
n
d
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 
13
0.
..
22
5 
ou
n
ce
s 
of
 e
ss
en
ce
s,
 8
R
 p
er
 o
u
n
ce
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. 
1,
80
0.
.
36
7 
ar
ro
b
as
 o
f 
fi
re
w
oo
d
, 6
0 
m
 p
er
 a
rr
ob
a
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
64
7.
.2
2
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. 
10
2,
27
72
1
N
et
 p
ro
fi
t
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
86
,3
94
13
T
h
es
e 
op
er
at
io
n
s 
yi
el
d
 a
 p
ro
fi
t 
ov
er
 8
4%
N
ot
e
T
h
er
e 
is
 n
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
re
co
rd
s 
on
 t
h
e 
n
am
es
 o
f 
th
e 
li
qu
eu
rs
. T
h
e 
su
p
p
li
es
 a
re
 v
al
u
ed
 a
cc
or
d
in
g 
to
 a
 f
ai
r 
va
lu
e,
 a
n
d
 s
om
e 
of
 t
h
em
 a
re
 v
er
y 
h
ig
h
. T
h
e 
w
ag
es
of
 t
h
e 
em
p
lo
ye
es
 a
re
 n
ot
 i
n
cl
u
d
ed
.
143
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2005, Vol. 32, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2005
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2005136
ments for the same factory revealed that these calculations were
used to compare the profitability of particular products. For
instance, we found a document in which the profits of eight
products were compared and calculated as a percentage of cost.
In the Madrid liqueur factory, the percentage profit achieved on
five products was compared annually and it was revealed that
margins were gradually decreasing.
Cost information was used as a basis for pricing, which,
given the institutional setting described above, involved negotia-
tions with the economic authorities. The Ezcaray and Guada-
lajara textile factories had trouble placing their products in the
market since their production costs were higher than costs in the
English textile industry. Similarly, the gunpowder monopoly used
cost as a basis for pricing subcontracted gunpowder. The admin-
istrator of Rio Tinto Mines asked for the selling price of copper to
be increased since “the sales income was not even enough to
cover production costs” [Flores, 1983, p. 78].
As Fleischman and Parker [1991] proposed, cost compari-
son was also used to assess the impact of innovations and im-
provements. For instance, a careful cost analysis of a new proce-
dure that would allow production to treble was carried out at
the tobacco factory, and managers studied a new sieve hung on
the ceiling that would allow dispensing with 114 of the factory’s
laborers (almost eight percent of the staff) [Gutiérrez, 1999]. In
the Rio Tinto Mines, calculations were performed on the cost of
recovering rose-like copper in an oven [Flores, 1983, p. 44]. In
Guadalajara, cost studies were carried out to assess the impact
of a new method introduced by English craft weavers that al-
lowed savings of various materials.
We could find no evidence that cost accounting was used to
make decisions about the vertical integration of firms. Even
though vertical integration did take place in many sectors, such
as textiles and gunpowder, integration in the textile factories
was a response to English industrial supremacy as opposed to
internal economic rationality [La Force, 1965]. In many cases
(such as Ezcaray or Ávila) cost studies in textile factories were
aimed at asserting legitimacy by showing their profitability,
when, in fact, they depended on the Royal Treasury to cover
their operating costs [La Force, 1965].
Standards, Forecasts and Budgets: Five companies used stan-
dards for budgeting (see Table 2). The arsenal prepared budgets
every four months and sent them to the treasury yearly. The San
Fernando factory elaborated periodic budgets for the construc-
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FIGURE 5 (continued)
Monthly Budget of Production and Costs in the Royal
Gunpowder Factory of New Spain
Report on the gunpowder that could be made monthly in the new Santa Fé factory;
and on its costs at the same time // Eight mills will process, quintales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
Warehouse costs9
60 workers, 3 reales daily each, amounts to 22 pesos and 4 reales
and for the 25 workdays in a month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562p 4.
3 reliable laborers for those same days, 5 reales each . . . . . . 46p 7.
Warehouse foreman, 2 daily pesos amounts in a month to . 60p .
The foreman’s assistant, 10 reales daily, in this period . . . . . 37p 4. 144p 3.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706p 7.
Mills
16 millers, one peso daily, in 25 workdays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400p .
The foremen, 12 reales per day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45p . 445p .
Shop assistants
One Lieutenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Two guards, 12 reales each . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
One concierge, 1 peso daily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Stable, servants, muleteer, and other ordinary
expenses at the factory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 420 p
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,571 p7
Materials
The 475 gunpowder quintales total cost, at the rate of 2.005 pesos
each 100 quintales; that is what the contractors actually pay . . . . . . 9.523 p4
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.095 p3
Four hundred and seventy-five gunpowder quintales, paid at four and
a half reales per pound, amount to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.718 p6
Yields a monthly profit to the king . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.623 p3
Royal Gunpowder Factory, July 10, 1782. José Manuel Barela. Salvador de Dampierr. This
is a copy of the original reported to Colonel Don Melchor Vidal de Lorca. Signed: Castro.
9 Costs are expressed either in pesos or in reales, totals are expressed in pesos.
tion of new buildings. The Ezcaray factory computed standards
and prepared budgets on annual operating costs. As Figure 5
illustrates, the gunpowder factory presented a one-month pro-
duction forecast together with a budget of the costs associated
with that production. The tobacco factory extrapolated the pro-
duction cost of the years 1770 to 1775 in order to predict future
costs [Carmona et al., 1997, p. 433].
Five other companies calculated and used standards to con-
trol inventory and reduce costs. In the case of Guadalajara, it
was possible to find successive regulations containing technical
and labor standards and a report about the chances of employee
pay cuts [Larruga, 1794]. Other studies were conducted to esti-
mate the savings of materials from implementing new methods.
The tobacco factory established standards to improve the pro-
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duction of tin tobacco containers and commissioned an experi-
ment to check the production cost. The outcome of the experi-
ment set the norms for materials and labor used. If the daily
production differed from the standard established in the experi-
ment, then the superintendent was to be informed and that
could result in the punishment of the person in charge of the tin
workshop.
EARLY COST AND MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING IN SPAIN, 1760-1800
Fleischman and Parker [1991] and other scholars have re-
vised Pollard’s [1965] contention that cost accounting for deci-
sion making was not one of the achievements of the British
industrial revolution. Fleischman and Parker [1991] argue that
in fact between 1760 and 1850 cost accounting practices reveal a
substantial degree of sophistication and matched the informa-
tion needs of entrepreneurs operating in competitive markets
and facing narrow profit margins. At first sight, the findings
reported in the last section of this paper provide further support
for the notion that sophisticated knowledge and actual use of
costing techniques existed in Spanish manufacturing in the pe-
riod of nascent industrialization. For each of the analytical cat-
egories proposed by Fleischman and Parker [1991], our percent-
ages in the Spanish survey are comparable to their results. It is
really difficult to extract any conclusion from the small differ-
ences reveled in Table 2, given the fact that, arguably, the small
percentage of surviving business records could bring about
larger biases.
Following in-depth analysis, our conclusions on the devel-
opment of particular techniques or uses of cost management are
also very similar to those obtained by Fleischman and Parker.
Costs were routinely controlled in some factories. We found
books or cost recording sequences showing that costs were com-
puted on a weekly basis (cigar production and San Fernando),
on a monthly basis (Ávila, gunpowder factory and arsenal), and
on a yearly basis (liqueur factory). Furthermore, it can be estab-
lished that in several cases (tobacco, Ávila, Guadalajara and
gunpowder) expenses were systematically recorded according to
Instrucciones, i.e., governmental regulations on managerial mat-
ters. Additionally, we verified a degree of quality control, atten-
tion to materials waste, and responsibility accounting.
Regarding overhead allocation, in addition to knowledge of
the importance of overheads and fixed costs, it appears that
147
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2005, Vol. 32, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2005
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2005140
these greatly concerned contemporary analysts because of the
financial problems caused by high overheads (the outcome of
inefficiency and political considerations). Cost accounting was
used for decision making to a similar extent as in Fleischman
and Parker’s [1991] sample. Cost accounting was used for pric-
ing decisions and for innovation assessment. Interestingly, cost
accounting was not used for vertical integration as in the British
industrial revolution. It had different objectives: (i) it was used
to rationalize the transfer of leased monopolies (gunpowder) to
direct state management (a kind of nationalization); cost studies
(like the one presented in Figure 5, which implied the use of
standards) were aimed at evaluating the benefits that the new
state-owned monopoly could yield to the Crown; (ii) in the case
of the textile factories, cost accounting was also used to rational-
ize and negotiate the support of the Crown, in the form of finan-
cial aid, protectionism, or permission for higher prices. Finally,
as in the cases examined by Fleischman and Parker [1991], stan-
dards for the Spanish manufactures were associated with the
aim of controlling costs and the preparation of budgets.
Therefore, our findings fit with the assertion that sophisti-
cated cost management was one of the achievements of early
industrialization, but not necessarily of an industrial revolution.
According to Wilward and Saul [1973], industrialization took
place in continental Europe in the 18th century, but an indus-
trial revolution of the British kind, characterized by entrepre-
neurship was not present in Spain. Continental and Spanish
industrialization was characterized by governmental leadership.
Thus, the evidence gathered in this survey casts doubts on the
straightforward link between sophisticated cost management
and entrepreneurship. Sophisticated cost management could
also be a response to bureaucratization, monopolies and govern-
mental intervention.
A number of questions arise from these findings: why did
sophisticated cost accounting emerge in Spain in this particular
period? Why did it emerge in the different settings of Britain
and Spain? Carmona and Donoso [2004] have shown that in
Spain standard costing was used for decision making (negotia-
tion involving pricing goods in monopolies) as early as the 17th
century. Carmona and Gómez [2002] have illustrated that cost
control and overhead allocation were present between 1717 and
1744 in the Guadalajara textile factory, operating under medi-
eval guilds in a pure Colbertist context [Vicens Vives, 1987]. We
would argue, however, that there seems to be little room for
sophisticated cost management in a production system based on
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guilds. Carmona and Gómez [2002] conclude that cost manage-
ment at the Royal Textile Factory of Guadalajara had an ad hoc
character.
As we explained above, what is singular in the period begin-
ning in 1759, under King Carlos III, is the combination of en-
lightenment in politics, uniformity and centralization in govern-
ment, and measures of economic liberalization (free trade and
the curtailment of guild regulations). The power of guilds was
limited not only by governmental action, but also by the devel-
opment of new industries such as the cotton mills. This was an
era of economic growth and industrialization in Spain that
came to an end by 1800 for various reasons, as explained above,
but mainly because of the loss of the colonies. Between 1760
and 1800 industrialization was associated with a growing num-
ber of larger, complex organizations. The relative scarcity of
business records outside this period indicates that industrial ac-
tivity before 1760 and from 1800 to 1832 had a predominately
artisan character [Vicens Vives, 1987].
In accord with the findings reported in the literature and
this survey we would hypothesize a common pattern of imple-
mentation of sophisticated cost management for the different
organizations in Spain. This pattern is based on three features:
(i) Carmona and Donoso [2004] and Carmona and Gómez
[2002] reveal that there existed some knowledge of cost account-
ing before 1760. Subsequent sophisticated cost management in
Spain appears to be linked to industrialization and to changes in
the organization of production brought about by decreases in
the power of guilds. (ii) Contrary to conceiving nations as dis-
crete entities, there were substantial commercial and intellectual
connections as well as technological transfers, among 18th cen-
tury European countries. Thus, even though Spain did not lead
industrialization, the literature and this survey shows various
examples of the import of foreign skilled workers and tech-
niques by Spanish manufactures. Arguably, as technology was
transferred, cost management knowledge and practices would
be transmitted among companies and travel across national
boundaries. Several manufactories were run by non-Spaniards,
who signed their cost exercises. (iii) Finally, the Crown played a
potentially substantial role in the implementation of sophisti-
cated costing techniques. In the case of the monopolies, direct
state management was possible due to an effective administra-
tive system, conducted by a set of trained and competent civil
servants. In 1745 administrative functions in the monopolies
were separated from auditing functions (performed by accoun-
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tants) [Artola, 1982]. The accountants were capable bureaucrats.
Both managers and accountants had to follow detailed
instrucciones that regulated various organizational aspects of
the manufactories as well as bookkeeping and costing. Similar
experts applied regulations in the textile factories.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the last two decades, a body of literature based on the
examination of surviving business records rather than instruc-
tional literature on accounting, has questioned the assumption
that modern cost accounting emerged in the late 19th century.
Among others, Fleischman and Parker [1991] have shown that a
sophisticated knowledge and use of cost accounting was present
in the pioneer companies of the British industrial revolution
between 1760 and 1850. Though the theoretical approach and
the implications of this body of research are contested by some
critical scholars, both proponents and critics alike concede the
merit in extending archival research to beyond Anglo-Saxon
countries. Hoskin and Macve [2000] have outlined the theoreti-
cal and empirical pitfalls of ignoring context.
Applying Fleischman and Parker’s [1991] model to Spain
between 1760 and 1800, and examining primary as well as sec-
ondary sources, we have shown that a sophisticated knowledge
and use of cost accounting also existed in Spain before 1800.
While Fleischman and Parker [1991] examined a 90-year period
(1760-1850) and we examined a 40-year period (1760-1800), it is
significant that the emergence of modern cost accounting is
dated at about the same time (1760) in both surveys. And
whereas Fleischman and Parker [1991] studied pioneers of the
industrial revolution, we surveyed a completely different institu-
tional context, characterized by bureaucratization, monopolies
and governmental intervention. Most of our Spanish companies
suffered economic failure at the end of the 18th and the begin-
ning of the 19th century.
The study suggests that an important distinction might be
made between industrialization and industrial revolution. It
could be said that sophisticated cost management was associ-
ated with industrialization in both the British and Spanish cases
given that this entailed complex organizations and bureaucra-
cies in the second half of the 18th century. However, costing
associated with an industrial revolution, with its attendant entre-
preneurship and competitive markets, was only present in Brit-
ain.
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In sum, the evidence reported in this paper supports the
view that the causes of cost accounting evolution are complex
[Hopwood, 1987]. Sophisticated costing emerged as the cumula-
tive result of economic and political reasons. Some arguments
in this survey favor economic causes. For example, in the textile
industry which was opened to foreign and national competition,
most factories experienced increasing complexity and managers
required information for decision making. Even in the case of
some monopolies, management accounting was used to maxi-
mize the royal income. However, the fact that most factories
were closely related to the Crown points to the significance of
political factors. The advancement of national industry and at-
tempts to increase international prestige impacted on decision
making. Many factories suffered financial troubles and needed
legitimacy in order to obtain financial subsidies from the
Crown.
It is hoped that the findings of this study will encourage
further research in this area. In particular by enlarging the num-
ber of companies studied is desirable. Some historians, such as
Herr [1958] and Vicens Vives [1987] have identified a larger
number of manufactures in this period, though their total is not
likely to compare with the number of enterprises in the British
industrial revolution. As more work is performed to identify
firms with surviving records and more historians become inter-
ested in particular companies, wider cross-sectional research
may uncover further evidence of cost accounting practices in
18th century Spain. In particular, the Catalonian textile indus-
tries deserve a closer inspection.
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APPENDIX 1
Checklist used to Analyze each Case
• Primary sources
• Secondary sources
• Characteristics:
– Sector
– Ownership of company
– Number of workers.
– Is responsibility for cost accounting separated from that for financial
accounting?
• Cost control
– Does the company register costs?
– Does it compare costs?
– Does it define responsibility centers? How many? What type?
– Is company ownership separated from management? Geographically?
– Raw materials inventory control
– In-process inventory control
– Semi-finished products inventory control
– Finished goods inventory control
– Is there any quality control?
• Overhead allocation
– Does the company calculate the cost of products? How many?
– Does it separate direct from indirect costs?
– Does it allocate indirect costs?
– Does it use stated criteria to allocate overhead? What criteria?
– Does it separate variable from fixed costs? Does it consider the use of
capacity?
– Does it allocate depreciation?
• Use of costs for decision making
– Does the company calculate unit results?
– Does it use information to determine the profitability of different prod-
ucts?
– Does it use data on costs for pricing?
– Does it use data on costs to evaluate processes?
– Does it use information to support vertical integration?
– Is there any feedback about cost information?
– Frequency of cost statements
– The objectives of cost accounting
• Budgets and standards
– Is there any evidence about budgeting?
– Is there any evidence about standards?
– Does it calculate variances from budget?
– Does it calculate variances from standard?
– Is there any evidence about a concern for process improvement
through budgeting?
• Motivations to manage costs
– Does the company operate in a competitive market?
– What is the company’s economic and financial situation?
– Is the company under a protectionist policy?
• Accounting Office
– How is the Accounting Office organized?
– Is there any procedure (rule) for bookkeeping?
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APPENDIX 2
Units of Measurement Referred to in Figures
Currencies
Real: The Real (or Real de Vellón) was the main Spanish currency unit in
the late 18th century. One Real equalled about 20 United States
cents in 1792 [La Force, 1965].
Peso: One peso equals 8 reales.
Maravedí: One real equals 34 maravedís.
Linear measures
Vara: Ancient Spanish measure that equals 0,835905 meters.
Foot: One vara equals 3 Castilian feet.
Pulgada: One Castilian foot equals 12 pulgadas.
Finger: One Castilian foot equals 16 fingers.
Weight measures
Quintal: One quintal equals 4 arrobas (46,025 kilograms) or 100 pounds. Plu-
ral noun ‘quintales’.
Arroba: One arroba equals 11,502 kilograms.
Pound: One arroba equals 25 Castilian pounds. One pound equals 460 grams
or 16 ounces.
Ounce: One arroba equals 400 Castilian ounces. One ounce equals 28,7
grams.
Capacity measures
Arroba: The arroba is also a traditional measure of capacity that equals ap-
proximately 16,133 liters.
Cuartilla: One Arroba equals 4 cuartillas.
Cuartillos: One Arroba equals 32 cuartillos.
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INTRODUCTION
Research on the historical evolution of corporate gover-
nance in the UK is still at an early stage [Toms and Wilson,
2003, pp.3-4]. While there is a growing literature on this topic
[Keasey et al., 1997; Hopt et al., 1998; Cheffins, 2001; Toms and
Wright, 2002] it is generally the case that such discussions are
not informed by detailed empirical evidence.1 There are, how-
ever, some exceptions. An appreciation of the significance of
governance to industrial administration, within a French con-
text, was demonstrated in 1916 by Henri Fayol [1949] though it
has been argued that subsequent (English) writers blurred the
distinction between management and governance [Tricker,
1984, p.280] and thus the subject remained obscure in the En-
glish speaking world of business. Writing in 1984, Tricker ar-
gued that in Britain interest in the issue of corporate governance
appeared to be of recent origin: “In the past there seemed little
challenge to management’s prerogative to run the company un-
impeded, no demand for independent supervision or disclosure,
no intervention in matters of accountability, no questioning of
corporate power and legitimacy, little interest in involvement or
participation in management decisions” [1984, p.5]. More re-
cently, Sheikh and Chatterjee have argued that despite corporate
governance being a well recognized concept in Australia, New
Zealand, the USA and some European countries, “it has received
hardly any attention in the UK, primarily because of the tradi-
tional view maintained by the (corporate governance) system
that directors are to maximise profits for their shareholders, as
the interests of the latter are paramount to directors” [1995,
p.1].
Maclean [1999] has suggested that business historians are
well placed to contribute to the contemporary debate on corpo-
rate governance. The long-standing concerns of business histori-
ans implicitly if not explicitly pertain to such issues. Indeed,
issues such as board selection, board performance, family con-
trol, shareholder maneuvering, and the influence and regenera-
tive potential of business elites, are all topics which might profit
from systematic, closely documented, historical enquiry. Yet,
Maclean argues, few of the voluminous company histories one
might consult in expectation take up such themes. Nor are the
pages of business/accountancy history journals replete with ar-
ticles which inform the heated debate on corporate governance
1 See, however the work of Quail [2000].
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currently raging across the world [Maclean, 1999, p.109]. An
important exception has been the work of John Quail who has
argued that in the British case the “separate roles and preroga-
tives of the directors . . . led to a fixity of structure” which acted
to limit the evolution of “managerial hierarchies beyond the de-
partmental or functional level” and also restricted the growth of
firms “beyond a certain size or complexity of operation” [Quail,
2000, p.2]. While there has been some recent response to this
call for further research, as O’Sullivan has argued, “more em-
pirical research is required to understand the institutions of cor-
porate governance as they have emerged in different countries
and as they have evolved and continue to change over time”
[2000, p. 295]. Further, O’Sullivan argues that in the literature
on corporate governance, the treatment of these issues has been
too superficial, partly because much of the empirical analysis of
systems of corporate governance has not been sufficiently his-
torical or comparative. A central aim of this paper is to begin to
address this shortcoming by reporting the results of an histori-
cal investigation of the governance system of an important, in-
ternationally recognized British engineering firm, Birmingham
Small Arms.
DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
The empirical work of accounting and business historians is
not conducted in a vacuum, and the approach in this paper is
informed by a theoretical framework that is embedded in the
institutional arrangements of corporate governance. Corporate
governance is taken to mean a concern “with the institutions
that influence how business corporations allocate resources and
returns. Specifically a system of corporate governance shapes
who makes investment decisions in a corporation, what type of
decision they make, and how returns from investments are dis-
tributed” [O’Sullivan, 2000, p.1]. In addition corporate gover-
nance is concerned with the form, extent and quality of disclo-
sure of ‘relevant’ business and financial information and the
means by which directors project, articulate and justify the
corporation’s role as a socio-business organization. Defined in
this way corporate governance is facilitated by the estab-
lishment of a system whereby directors are entrusted with re-
sponsibilities and duties in relation to the stewardship of a
company’s affairs. Based on a system of accountability an effec-
tive corporate governance system should provide mechanisms
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for regulating directors’ duties in order to restrain them from
abusing their powers and to ensure that they act in the best
interests of the company in its broadest sense [Sheikh and
Chatterjee, 1995, p.5].
Three important principles follow from the above discus-
sion. Firstly, there is a need to distinguish between the ‘manage-
ment’ of the company and its ‘governance’, whereby the latter “is
not concerned with running the business of the company per se,
but with the directors giving overall direction to the enterprise,
overseeing and controlling the executive actions of manage-
ment, and satisfying legitimate expectations for accountability
and regulation by interests beyond the corporate boundary”
[Sheikh and Chatterjee, 1995, p.6]. Secondly, this approach to
corporate governance allows considerable scope for an extensive
empirical study because it facilitates an analysis of actual gover-
nance systems and institutions. In the specific British context,
the historical evolution of corporate governance is closely re-
lated to the institutional arrangements of personal capitalism. In
the literature there is an important distinction between personal
and managerial capitalism [see Gourvish, 1987; Chandler, 1990;
Church, 1990, 1993, 1995; Supple, 1991; Lloyd-Jones and Lewis,
1994, 2000, 2003; Wilson, 1995; Quail, 2000]. Both these differ-
ent styles of capitalism represent forms of control over compa-
nies and are clearly linked to the issue of corporate governance.
The business historian, closely associated with the notion of
personal capitalism is A.D. Chandler jnr, who has asserted that
the persistence with personal forms of control shaped the gover-
nance of British manufacturing companies into the second half
of the 20th century [see Toms and Wilson, 2003, p.3]. Despite
the growing challenge to Chandler’s work [see Teece, 1993,
pp.199-225; Wilson, 1995; John, 1997, pp.151-200] it remains
the dominant paradigm [Toms and Wilson, 2003, p.3] and the
notion of personal capitalism is a useful means of trying to
understand the evolution of British business organization in the
20th century.
Thirdly, while the analysis of personal capitalist firms rec-
ognizes the importance of the development of common patterns
of governance, such an approach necessarily places considerable
emphasis on the idiosyncratic behavior of firms. It is because
firms are not simply a set of transactions but can (and clearly
do) build organizational capabilities not available on the market
(‘the way we do things here’!) [see Langlois and Robertson,
1995, ch.1] that they are idiosyncratic and consequently lend
themselves to the case study approach that remains one of the
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key methodological frameworks of accounting/business history.
This method of enquiry is also consistent with the specific his-
torical trajectory of business development. For example, as
Easterbrook and Fisher have pointed out, the permissiveness of
British company law in the first half of the 20th century means
that the firm can be seen as “a complex set of explicit and im-
plicit contracts” [quoted in Monks and Minow, 2001, p. 89]. This
requires a historical case study of corporate governance to look
at the specific behavior and relationships of the different parties
— directors, shareholders, finance providers, auditors — to the
contract and raises the notion of “strategic position”, which is
concerned with who has the power to make the key decisions
within a company [Herman, 1981, p.19]. It is also related to
Nelson’s proposition that what business organizations “can do
well has something of a life of its own” and this applies as much
to the firm’s governance system as it does to its other core capa-
bilities across the range of its business activities [1996, p.111].
In the following analysis, a wide definition of governance has
been adopted which enables engagement with the broader lit-
erature as well as the detailed empirical evidence at the level of
a firm.
THE CHOICE OF BSA AS A CASE STUDY
The case study explores the exercise of control and the man-
agement of conflict and concessions in an engineering company.
BSA was selected for four main reasons. Firstly, BSA was a long
established company. It was founded in 1861 and by the begin-
ning of the 20th century it had gained a national reputation for
the quality of its products. Secondly, it was a large company,
securing a place in Britain’s 100 largest manufacturing firms
throughout the period under study [see Johnson, 1990, pp. 20-
39; Shaw, 1990, pp. 11-12]. Thirdly, BSA was an innovative firm;
it produced a range of engineering products some of which, for
their time, were at the leading edge of technological develop-
ment (e.g. bicycles, motor cycles and motor cars). Fourthly, and
more importantly because it is directly related to corporate gov-
ernance, the composition of the BSA board 1906-1933 showed
different groups exercising control through what Herman has
referred to as “strategic position” [1981, pp. 26-28]. That is, their
status within the board gave them an authority and dominance
over the types of strategic decisions that were outlined by
O’Sullivan above. In particular a dominant group emerged fol-
lowing the company’s merger with Daimler in 1910 and main-
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tained control within the generic form of personal capitalism for
the next 20 years.
The case study examines three episodes that focus on the
struggle for control at BSA. The first is essentially concerned
with an insider/outsider conflict between directors and share-
holders, which was partially resolved by court action in 1906.
The second examines the change in board composition and the
consequence for the company’s governance brought by BSA’s
merger with Daimler in 1910. The third explores a protracted
dispute which extended over the 1920s and into the early 1930s
between the board and shareholder dissidents, two of whom
were ex-directors. The latter dispute only ended when reforms of
the company’s governance were apparently conceded, and there
was a change in the occupants of “strategic position” at BSA
when the firm experienced the leadership of four different chair-
men between 1928 and 1933.
SHAREHOLDER/DIRECTOR CONFLICT: NEWTON V BSA
The Newton v Birmingham Small Arms court case heard in
1906 attracted wide contemporary comment in the financial
press and continues to feature as a landmark. It was recognized
immediately as an important decision: The Accountant com-
mented that “It is some years since a legal decision has been
delivered of such far-reaching importance to the profession” [14
July 1906]. Two aspects of the case are of relevance to the
present paper: firstly, as an indication of the relationship be-
tween BSA directors and shareholders, and secondly, as a prece-
dent for financial reporting, and hence for corporate governance
in Great Britain for the next quarter-century. We argue that the
use of secret reserves was intended to extend directors’ control
over BSA’s assets by preventing shareholders from monitoring
the annual performance of the company. It was also a portent of
the increasing influence of Dudley Docker, who was to be in-
volved in a subsequent major episode, the merger of BSA and
Daimler.
The Court Case: At extraordinary meetings of the BSA sharehold-
ers in early 1906, the directors had passed a special resolution to
allow them to create an “internal reserve fund” out of profits,
which they could use for any purpose they thought fit. Transfers
into the fund might be made in any year in which the company
had paid a dividend of at least 10% on the ordinary shares and
had paid all preference dividends. The auditors were to be
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informed of this fund and any transfers to or from it, but they
were not to be permitted to disclose information about it to the
shareholders, and it was not to be disclosed separately in the
balance sheet. The result would be the creation of a fund about
which the shareholders were not entitled to be informed.
In June 1906, Sir Alfred Newton, a shareholder, applied for
an injunction to prevent the directors from implementing this
resolution. He argued that the directors were acting ultra vires,
exceeding their powers under company law and taking away the
right of shareholders to knowledge of “the true position of the
company” [Law Report 2 Chancery, 382, 1906]. He succeeded in
his challenge, but only on the grounds that the directors might
not prevent the auditors from making disclosures to sharehold-
ers. Buckley, the presiding judge, endorsed the acceptability of
internal or secret reserves. The creation of such reserves had the
effect of producing a balance sheet that would “shew the finan-
cial position . . . to be not as good as it in fact is. . . . (S)uch a
balance-sheet will not, in my judgement, be necessarily inconsis-
tent with the Act of Parliament” (the Companies Act, 1900) [Law
Report 2 Chancery, 387, 1906]. Buckley made the assertion,
which has frequently been quoted since, that “The purpose of
the balance-sheet is primarily to shew that the financial position
is at least as good as there stated, not to show that it is not or
may not be better” [Law Report 2 Chancery, 387, 1906]. Com-
pany law protected audit, but it did not impose detailed disclo-
sure obligations; it was up to shareholders and directors to
agree the terms of the contract between them as it affected fi-
nancial reporting.
Shareholders’ Resistance and Directors’ Victory: The directors of
BSA promptly responded by calling another extraordinary gen-
eral meeting to pass an altered resolution, identical to the previ-
ous one except that it did not place any restriction on the audi-
tors’ freedom to communicate with shareholders where it was
their duty to do so under the Companies Act 1900. Newton and
a number of his fellow-shareholders did their best to rally oppo-
sition, by letters to The Times, circulars to shareholders and
their behavior at meetings during the year following the court
case. At the meeting on 16 July 1906 to revise the special resolu-
tion, the directors’ motion was defeated on a show of hands by
36 votes to 27. The majority of dissenting voters then walked out
of the meeting; following which the directors resorted to a poll,
according to shares held rather than show of hands. The direc-
tors had the support of the majority of the shares polled. They
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won by 27,983 to 95 [The Times, 17 July 1906].
The dissenters circularized all BSA shareholders the follow-
ing week to warn them that the new resolution “will be injurious
to the shareholders by keeping them in ignorance of the position
of affairs” [The Times, 23 July 1906]. They proposed an amend-
ment which would allow an inner reserve to be created “when-
ever a dividend of not less than 171⁄2% is recommended to be
paid” [The Times, 25 July 1906] in contrast to the 10% of the
original resolution. There was “a long and heated discussion” at
the meeting held on 31 July to confirm the new resolution, but
the directors prevailed, by 79 votes to 42, having received 33,000
proxies in favor of the resolution and 9,000 against [The Times, 2
August 1906]. Newton attempted to revive the issue at BSA’s
annual general meeting in October, but “he was interrupted by a
number of shareholders and a motion was passed that he be not
heard on the subject” [The Times, 2 October 1906]. “Several
shareholders” asked for information about the internal reserve,
and were told by the chairman, Hallewell Rogers that the direc-
tors need not disclose it. The Times [2 October 1906] recorded
“Applause and cries of ‘shame’” at this, but the inner reserve was
maintained in 1907 and 1908. In 1909, however, the chairman
reported in the financial statements that “the Internal Reserve,
amounting to £30,000, has been included with the General Re-
serve Fund”. The directors had ceased to take advantage of the
special resolution. The Statist [1 October 1910, p.772] noted that
the secret reserve “has now received its quietus”.
Although the secret reserve was short-lived, the case and its
aftermath throw light on the governance of the company, and in
particular on two conflicts between directors and shareholders
which both reappeared more markedly in the interwar period.
These were the dissatisfaction of TS Walker, leading to his resig-
nation from the board in 1921, and the much more protracted
campaign led by EM Griffiths in the 1920s and early 1930s after
he left the board, and which was reinforced by complaints from
numerous shareholders. We now outline the issues which, we
argue, underlay these later conflicts.
Accounting Disclosure, Investors and “Speculators”: The argu-
ments put forward by both sides in Newton v BSA were not new.
The case for accounting disclosure had always been the need for
interested parties to be aware of the likely risk and return. With
respect to shareholders, the counter-argument was that limited
companies were potentially at the mercy of short-termists,
‘speculators’, who bought shares solely with a view to extracting
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a large dividend and then selling the shares in the depleted com-
pany. Prudent investors, by contrast, were prepared to invest for
a long period, and to trust the directors’ judgment. They did not
require comprehensive published disclosure; if they wanted
more information they would ask the directors for it. Buckley
was aligning himself with this dichotomy, when he invoked the
idea of prudence in support of understatement, in the opinion of
which part was quoted earlier: “Assets are often, by reason of
prudence, estimated, and stated to be estimated, at less than
their probably real value” [Law Report 2 Chancery, 387, 1906].
Newton does not, however, appear on closer examination to
have been a short-term investor, given the small size of his hold-
ing (40 shares, unlikely to yield a large short-term profit) and
the pains that he took: he brought a court case, spoke at a series
of meetings, circularized shareholders and made a final unsuc-
cessful intervention at the 1906 annual general meeting. Nor
was his supporter, Arthur Chamberlain, a speculator. He was a
knowledgeable investor, part of a major West Midlands indus-
trial and finance dynasty. His uncle, Herbert Chamberlain, had
been BSA’s Chairman from 1900 to 1904, and his cousin Neville
Chamberlain was a director of BSA between 1913 and 1922.
Arthur Chamberlain’s reasons for opposing secret reserves were
reported in The Times on 2 August 1906. He stated that “he did
not know any limited company in which the circumstances were
the same. The Small Arms Company had no private reserves for
ten years, and nothing could be more satisfactory than the con-
dition of the company during the first seven of the ten years.
They had a 20% dividend. Then they came to the change of the
board, and had three years of falling dividend. He found that to
be coincident with the change in the membership of the board”.
Chamberlain was accusing the board of bringing in a secret
reserve to hide their failings; in a good year, profits could be
hidden to be paid out in a bad one, and shareholders had no
way of monitoring the directors’ actual success or failure.
The Directors’ Defense: Rogers’ case for the new policy on secret
reserves was based on two arguments. One was a detailed de-
fense of the profit performance of the current board (see Table
1).
He pointed out that average annual profits 1903-1905 were
higher than those achieved 1896-1900 (leaving out the period of
the Boer War) – £63,158 compared with £60,311 [The Times, 27
July 1906]. His other argument was that the creation of secret
reserves was part of normal practice by respectable businesses.
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This was an important claim; it was made as early as February
1906 when the original resolution was tabled. A press notice by
BSA pointed out that the reserve was “similar to those which are
possessed by several of the leading commercial companies” [The
Times, 22 February 1906]. Similarly, Carter, BSA’s auditor, had
asserted that several other companies which he had audited had
used similar powers “in every case . . . to the advantage of the
companies and their shareholders” [The Times, 2 August 1906].
BSA’s Motives for Non-disclosure: One reason for the creation of
secret reserves was the discretion they gave directors in disclos-
ing performance: while useful because they could be used to
prevent short-termists from bleeding the company dry, more
importantly, as Chamberlain suggested, they allowed smoothing
of income. This could help to ward off any expectation for
higher dividends in good years, as well as depriving employees
of a basis to demand wage increases. Moreover, the less share-
holders knew about performance, the less scope there was for
them to attack directors in bad years and hence the stronger the
directors’ positions. In addition, secret reserves could help with
an acquisition. They meant that a potential buyer’s means were
not evident to the selling company, with implications for the
price agreed, and they allowed the acquirer to move fast when a
suitable target appeared, provided that the reserves had been
invested in suitably liquid assets. BSA created the reserve a year
before it acquired the Eadie Cycle Company, and ceased to use
TABLE 1
BSA Profits and Dividends, 1897-1909
BSA Profit £000 Dividend rate
1897 88 20
1898 60 20
1899 56 20
1900 58 20
1901 88 20
1902 95 20
1903 65 15
1904 51 121⁄2
1905 81 15
1906 74 15
1907 80 15
1908 99 15
1909 84 10
Source: The Statist, 1 October 1910, p.773
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it just before its acquisition of Daimler. This would fit with the
theory that the reserve was created as a means of funding div-
ersification. With the purchase of Daimler, BSA’s thirst for
acquisition was temporarily assuaged: no more subsidiaries
were acquired till 1919.
On this interpretation, the creation of a secret reserve at
BSA was less an act of prudence than a means of empowering
the directors, both to ward off criticism and to fund projects
without attracting scrutiny from shareholders. This problem
was not confined to BSA. Edwards [1989, p.148] comments that:
“The case, which has since been described as the ‘charter for the
creators of secret reserves’ . . . was partly responsible for secrecy,
obscurity, excessive summarization and distortion becoming
common features of financial reporting for the next quarter of a
century”. The clash at BSA in 1906 is indicative of the range of
views held by shareholders. Newton and Chamberlain repre-
sented a group that took a close interest in the performance of
the business and sought information in order to monitor what
was going on, thus their aversion to secrecy. They were defeated
by the votes of other shareholders who were prepared to tolerate
secrecy provided the directors generated an adequate return on
their investment. The outcome of the 1906 controversy was sup-
port for a secretive mode of governance that went without seri-
ous challenge until after the First World War. This mode of
governance was typical of F.D. Docker, who used secret reserves
as a means of saving for acquisitions. He was a member of the
BSA board and was to become very influential in the next major
episode in the development of governance at BSA.
THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD:
THE BSA-DAIMLER MERGER
The secret reserve episode suggests that the BSA board
acted largely as a self perpetuating oligarchy, to the extent that
it took decisions which primarily satisfied itself. If shareholders
were dissatisfied, the board was prepared to resist them, even if
this involved protracted and acrimonious dispute.2 The secret
reserve was discontinued in 1910, we would argue, not because
it annoyed some shareholders, but because it was no longer
needed to fund acquisitions. As the abandonment of the secret
reserve policy occurred at the same juncture as the Daimler
2 For the role of boards see Keasey et al. [1997, p.7].
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merger, it is of interest to explore the strategic issues and mo-
tives underlying the merger and consider the consequences for
the company’s corporate governance.
Four broad conclusions may be drawn from BSA’s merger
with Daimler in 1910. Firstly, the merger was of key strategic
importance and had significant consequences for the structure
of power at the top levels of governance at BSA. Secondly, the
key decisions relating to the merger were made by a dominant
insider coalition, largely under the influence of Docker.3 Thirdly,
the aftermath of the merger was a shift in the locus of power in
the company and “strategic position” was assumed by a triumvi-
rate (of Rogers, Manville and Martin) who were responsible (as
outlined earlier in O’Sullivan’s definition of corporate gover-
nance) for the post-war strategic direction of BSA and who
owed their allegiance to Docker. Fourthly, the shift in “strategic
position” at BSA is indicative of the flexibility of personal capi-
talism as an organizational form but it is also suggestive that
personal capitalism offers no guarantee of a cozy or tranquil
system of governance as the dominant coalition were, subse-
quently, to confront a sustained challenge to their authority.4
The following sub-sections draw on the historical evidence to
explore the merger and its consequences for corporate gover-
nance at BSA.
“Strategic Position” and the Context of the Merger: 1906 was a
decisive year for BSA, Sir Hallewell Rogers became Chairman
and Docker joined the board. Rogers was a well established
Birmingham businessman and a former Lord Mayor of the city.
He had joined the BSA board in 1904 and was rapidly elevated
to the chairmanship. Rogers brought to the company an exper-
tise in finance (and no doubt was familiar with secret reserves),
having been a director of the Birmingham and District Banking
Company [see Davenport-Hines, 1984, p.48; 1985, pp.109-112],
and it was under his leadership that BSA embarked on a deter-
mined diversification strategy. Rogers was a personal friend of
Docker [see Midland Advertiser, 29 October 1911], and according
to Sir Patrick Hannon, who was to become a BSA director and a
Tory Member of Parliament, Docker “was responsible for mak-
ing him chairman of BSA” [Davenport-Hines, 1985, pp.109-112].
3 For an exploration of the concept of the insider coalition see Herman
[1981, p. 20]; Davenport-Hines [1984].
4 For another example of challenge to personal capitalist authority see
Lloyd-Jones and Lewis [2000].
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Docker was a high profile business leader, not only in the
Midland industrial district but also at national level. For
example, he was instrumental in setting up the Federation of
British Industry in 1916. Docker was also active in the National
Union of Manufacturers [see Marrison, 1996, pp.326-327]. His
prestige had risen sharply following the creation of the Metro-
politan Carriage Wagon and Finance Company (MCWF) in
1902, a combination of five railway carriage manufacturers.
Docker and the Metropolitan directors had powers to create se-
cret reserves and by 1910 they had built up a balance of
£450,000. According to Davenport-Hines [1984] such was
Docker’s reputation for “business infallibility” that “his expertise
was sought by other businesses”. He joined the board of several
companies who hoped to benefit from his “general business
judgement” and in other cases he was invited to play a leading
role in “arranging mergers” [Davenport-Hines, 1984, pp. 32, 35,
47]. There was clearly a close personal connection between
Docker and Rogers. Both were embedded in business and politi-
cal networks. For example, Rogers was active in the right-wing
pressure group the British Commonwealth Union, a group of
which Docker happened to be President, [see Davenport-Hines,
1985, pp. 109-112; Marrison, 1996, pp. 346, 353], and what
emerged at BSA from 1906 was a strong Docker-Rogers axis.
Their “strategic position” at the company was further re-
inforced in 1907 when Lincoln Chandler, a co-director of
Docker’s at MCWF, joined the BSA board. Why did this power-
ful coalition, enjoying “strategic position”, initiate the merger
with Daimler?
The Merger: In 1906 BSA purchased a former Royal Small Arms
Factory at Sparkbrook in Birmingham and used the facilities to
enter the new and expanding motor car industry [see Church,
1995, p. 3; Saul, 1962, Thoms and Donnelly, 2002]. The decision
to diversify into motor manufacture mirrored similar decisions
made by other cycle firms such as Riley, Humber, Allard, Swift,
Lee Francis and Singer [Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, 2000, p.40]. By
1908 BSA had developed three models but these proved not to
be a business success [Nixon, n.d., p.132], and by 1909 the con-
dition of the motor department was deteriorating sharply. In the
following year a damaging internal report on the motor de-
partment’s organization and performance was submitted to the
board. It charged that there had been no effective cost control,
the general manager had proved incapable of effective organiza-
tion and had “presided over anarchy...in design, production and
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after sales” [Davenport-Hines, 1984, p.50; Modern Record Cen-
tre, Warwick, (hereafter MRC) Mss 19A/1/2/16-17]. Clearly the
dominant coalition at BSA feared that the company’s reputation
could be seriously damaged. Docker took action to solve the
problem of the ailing motor department by arranging a merger
with Daimler. Three factors underpinned Docker’s strategy.
Firstly, buying in Daimler’s core capabilities would act to prop-
up BSA’s motor car venture. Secondly, the merger appealed to
Docker’s penchant for financial deals and allowed him to exploit
the extensive business networks he had established in the Mid-
lands. Thirdly, Docker was impressed by Daimler’s financial
strength. The Statist, for example, sang Daimler’s praises in
1906, calling attention to the company’s “conservative financial
management” [3 November 1906].
The merger caught the attention of the financial press.
Daimler was one of Britain’s largest car producers [Davenport-
Hines, 1984, p.50] and The Financial Times commented that “the
combination is one of the most important ever effected in the
motor industry” [27 September 1910]. The merger was facili-
tated by the fact that Docker had close business, personal and
political links with a number of the top management at Daimler,
including its Chairman (Manville), its Managing Director (Percy
Martin) and a director (George Flett). Manville had a number of
business connections with Docker. Both became directors of the
Metropolitan Railway and “were political adherents during the
war period (1914-18) when Docker was President of the FBI and
Manville led the Association of British Chambers of Commerce”
[Davenport-Hines, 1984, p.51]. When Manville was elected
Member of Parliament for Coventry in 1918 he received finan-
cial support from Docker’s British Commonwealth Union.
Marrison [1996, pp. 369-370] refers to Manville in the 1920s as
“being in a close orbit to Docker”. There seems little doubt that
Docker coveted Daimler’s expertise and financial strength and
his knowledge of that company’s affairs was also reinforced by
the fact that George Flett, a Daimler director, also sat on the
board of Docker’s MCWF.5
The Consequence of Merger and Corporate Governance at BSA:
The BSA-Daimler merger was not without controversy. Daven-
port-Hines has described it as an “over-tortuous scheme of
5 For Daimler’s financial performance see Davenport-Hines [1984, p.51]; The
Financial Times [2 September 1910]; Nixon [n.d. pp. 28-29]; The Statist [1 Octo-
ber 1910, pp. 772-774].
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indebtedness, leading to over-capitalisation” [1984, p. 52].
Docker insisted that Daimler should pay BSA a dividend of
£100,000 per year and there is little doubt that this seriously
weakened Daimler by leaving it short of funds to develop its
motor vehicle and engine capabilities. This begs the question:
why did Daimler’s directors agree to such a deal? This was all
the more surprising given that their close business networks
with Docker would have meant they would have been aware of
his financial deal making. In effect a trade-off was made be-
tween the financial details of the merger and a major change in
the governance of the new amalgamation, which brought a fun-
damental restructuring of the BSA main board. The ol’ BSA
directors were culled and a leaner board, mainly consisting of
Docker acolytes, assumed a “strategic position” at the company.
The main board was reduced from 11 to seven (four former BSA
and three former Daimler directors) post merger (see Table 2).
Hallewell Rogers, Lincoln Chandler, Edward Manville and
Percy Martin with Docker at the centre formed the dominant
coalition. The other two directors were A.H.E. Wood, a major
shareholder, and A. Eadie, who was a carry-over from the 1906
acquisition and reflected the importance of bicycles to company
TABLE 2
Key Players in Three Episodes
Newton v BSA 1906:
Sir A. Newton, shareholder.
Arthur Chamberlain, shareholder, nephew of Herbert Chamberlain
former Chairman of BSA.
A. N. Chamberlain, Director on the BSA board, 1900-04, 1912-16 and
1918-22.
Hallewell Rogers, Chairman BSA.
F. D. Docker, Director 1906.
Daimler Merger 1910:
F.D. Docker, Director.
Hallewell Rogers, Chairman BSA.
E. Manville, Chairman Daimler, becomes Deputy Chairman BSA.
P. Martin, Managing Director Daimler, becomes Managing Director BSA.
E. M. Griffiths’ criticisms, 1920-32:
T.S. Walker, Director BSA.
E.M. Griffiths, joined BSA board on acquisition of Burton, Griffiths, 1919.
A. Eadie, Director BSA.
A. N. Chamberlain, Chairman BSA Cycles to 1922.
P. Martin, Managing Director BSA.
Hallewell Rogers, Chairman BSA to 1928.
A.H. Pollen, briefly Chairman in 1932. A. Roger, Chairman from 1933.
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profits. No doubt Flett would have joined the board but he had
been killed in 1910 as the result of crashing his Daimler after
leaving a MCWF board meeting [Davenport-Hines, 1984, pp. 50-
51].
The post-merger board was very much a Docker and
Daimler affair, with the incoming directors effectively gaining
strategic control of decision making at BSA as Martin became
Managing Director, and Manville Deputy Chair. These two men,
alongside Docker and Rogers played the dominant role in that
they determined strategy and structure at the company and
shaped its investment decisions. The terms of the merger deal
also consolidated ownership and control at BSA, and it retained
the form of a personal capitalist organization. Martin and
Wood, who were two of the largest shareholders at Daimler at
the time of the merger, became substantial shareholders in the
re-constituted BSA [The Statist, 1 October 1910, pp. 772-774].
Though the holdings of the new board were not substantial
enough to guarantee outright ownership, it nevertheless allowed
the members of the dominant coalition, when it suited them, to
argue that they were strongly identified, as a personal capitalist
firm, with the interests of the company’s shareholders. As Quail
has pointed out, “the theoretical justification for the larger pow-
ers of . . . directors remained their role as a group of proprietors
standing for the proprietors as a whole” [2000, p.3].
Docker left the board of BSA in 1912, but he did not neces-
sarily forgo his influence on the governance of the company. He
remained active behind the scenes, attended the annual meeting
in 1922, reappearing as a director in 1940, and apparently or-
chestrating the four changes in BSA’s chairmanship between
1928 and 1933 [see Davenport-Hines, 1984]. It is clear that from
1912, governance at BSA remained under the control of Rogers,
Manville and Martin, and it was this triumvirate who faced and
managed confrontations with a determined, knowledgeable and
sustained shareholder group. This conflict is explored in the
next section.
THE BOARD AND DISSIDENT DIRECTORS
In the interwar period, BSA went through two separate but
related episodes of conflict between directors and shareholders.
The following section of the paper considers the reactions of two
dissident ‘insider’ investors to its poor interwar performance.
We first consider T.S. Walker, who was highly critical of BSA in
the early 1920s, and then E.M. Griffiths, whose relationship
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with the company, as a director and then a shareholder, contin-
ued until the mid-1930s. Both raised similar concerns, but
Griffiths did so more persistently and vocally. The two episodes,
we argue, reveal growing criticisms of the company’s gover-
nance structure. These were motivated partly by its performance
in the difficult interwar period, and partly by a changing set of
expectations among investors. New pressures required BSA to
react in new ways, and senior management had some difficulty
in responding appropriately, as the very stable structure inher-
ited from Daimler and confirmed after 1919 rendered it difficult
to adapt rapidly to change.
Changes to the Group of Companies: After the end of the First
World War, BSA’s stated policy was that they would, in Rogers’
words, “make the smallest possible range of products on the
largest possible scale” [The Economist, 29 April 1922]. However,
over the following decade the company proceeded to make ac-
quisitions in a diverse range of industries, as summarized in
Table 3.
TABLE 3
Timeline of Events at BSA, 1861-1934
1861 Company formed.
1873 Becomes private limited company.
1896 Becomes quoted limited liability company.
1906 Acquires Royal Small Arms Factory at Sparkbrook.
F.D. Docker joins board.
Hallewell Rogers becomes Chairman.
1906/7 Merger with Eadie Manufacturing Company, producers of bicycle com-
ponents, bicycles and motor cycles.
1910 Merger with Daimler (1904) Ltd.Major board changes occur.
1918 Purchase of shares in British Abrasive Wheel.
1919 Adoption of the holding company form, BSA Cycle, Rifle and Tool de-
partments formed into subsidiary companies.
Three new acquisitions to the holding company made in 1919: 1) Will-
iam Jessop & Co., 2) J.J. Saville & Co., both Sheffield specialist steel
producers, and 3) Burton, Griffiths and Co., London machine tool
merchants.
1920 Acquisition of Aircraft Manufacturing Co. and Peter Hooker Ltd (engine
manufacturer).
E.M. Griffiths’ criticisms begin.
1923 Aircraft Manufacturing Co and Peter Hooker Ltd liquidated.
1928 E. Manville becomes Chairman.
1929 Arthur Andrews Ltd, machine tools merchants acquired.
1931 Lanchester Motor Co. acquired.Daimler Hire sold.
1932 In July A.H. Pollen replaces Manville as Chairman.
In December, Sir Alexander Roger replaces Pollen.
1934 British Abrasive Wheel sold.
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BSA’s performance was very troubled, for a variety of rea-
sons. One of these, clearly, was the series of economic crises of
the 1920s and 1930s, affecting both industrial and consumer
demand [see Buxton and Aldcroft, 1979; Glynn and Booth, 1996;
Pollard, 1983]. Until the rearmament drive of the late 1930s,
BSA Guns was very short of work. Demand for cars, particularly
at the top end of the range, was low. In addition, the post-1919
acquisitions generated disappointing returns and also absorbed
funds that might have been more profitably used elsewhere. The
Sheffield steelmakers, J.J. Saville & Company and William
Jessop & Company, had been acquired in the expectation that
they would be intensively used in post-war reconstruction, but
they did not produce the hoped-for return. The Peter Hooker
Ltd and Aircraft Manufacturing Company acquisitions very rap-
idly proved mistakes and had to be put into liquidation within
18 months of joining the group. The Lanchester Motor Com-
pany was purchased in 1931 as a means of acquiring “a name as
old as Daimler and . . . a market for high price cars” [Coventry
Record Office (hereafter CRO) PA 594/4/6/2, Lanchester take-
over file, letter dated 26 February 1931]. Unfortunately, the mar-
ket for such cars in 1931 was not healthy, and Lanchester’s
contribution to the group’s profitability was disappointing.
The result of poor investment decisions by BSA in relation
to these acquisitions was low profitability, and the reduction or
disappearance of dividends. Table 4 sets out the company’s per-
formance 1910-1939 and highlights in particular the frequent
absence of the ordinary dividend, which was paid out only six
times between 1920 and 1939. Table 5 gives the quoted price of
the £1 ordinary share from 1918 onwards. The most striking
features of this are the very rapid fall in share price in the
aftermath of the War, and the fact that it remained far below
par for most of the inter-war period. Ordinary shareholders who
had bought before 1920 found themselves saddled with shares
on which they were bound to make a loss on disposal, and
which did not generate a satisfactory return. Their dissatisfac-
tion was to be reflected in the annual general meetings of the
1930s, which are discussed below.
Management Structure: There was also a continuing and serious
problem of management, at board level and below, which re-
sulted not only in the poor investment decisions made but in
muddled internal management of operations. In 1919 Hallewell
Rogers had claimed that the new companies would have “sepa-
rate detailed management” [CRO PA 594/1/12/3 chairman’s
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TABLE 4
BSA Profits and Dividends, 1910-1939
Year BSA Profit (Loss) Ordinary Preference
£000 £000 £000
1910 98 77 10
1911* 233 114 10
1912 178 114 10
1913 188 114 10
1914 190 119 10
1915 408 169 10
1916 382 231 22
1917 428 230 22
1918 435 161 22
1919 373 232 22
(31 July)
1921 567 151 22
 (18 months to
31 Jan)
1922 (469) — 21
1923 (167) — 23
1924 125 — 24
1925 179 109 24
1926 185 134 24
1927 112 — 12
1928 72 — 24
1929 90 — 24
1930 148 106 24
1931 (204) — 24
1932 (798) — —
1933 245 — —
1934 128 — —
1935 112 — —
1936 171 — 39
1937 398 — 102
1938 431 204 22
1939 411 109 21
* including Daimler from 1911.
Source: Coventry Record Office, PA 594, BSA Financial Statements, 1910-1939.
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TABLE 5
BSA Quoted Share Price, 1918-1939
Year Share price Capitalization (£000)
1918 59s 6d 3428
1919 35s 4159
1920 27s 7 d 3801
1921 12s 2d 1689
1922 7s 9d 986
1923 11s 9d 1689
1924 10s 1408
1925 14s 1971
1926 15s 9d 2252
1927 13s 9d 1943
1928 11s 4d 1548
1929 7s 6d 1056
1930 9s 6d 1379
1931 7s 6d 1056
1932 6s 3d 844
1933 5s 7d 732
1934 14s 6d 2027
1935 8s 9d 1239
1936 12s 3d 1689
1937 27s 3800
1938 19s 3d 2674
1939 25s 7d 3519
Source: The Times, various issues.
Note: BSA had a quotation on the London Stock Exchange from 1918 onwards.
The figures here are the share price on the last trading day of March for
each year, and the market capitalization of the ordinary share capital.
speech 1919]. But the resulting structure suffered from a perma-
nent tension between the notion of separate management and
apparent unwillingness to devolve power from the main board
to the boards of the subsidiaries. Church [1990, p.710] describes
the experience of BSA from 1918 to 1940 as one of irrelevant
structural reorganizations and reshuffling of top managers un-
der a board of directors that was mediocre despite its rapid
turnover of personnel (BSA had four chairmen in the five years
ending in 1932). The one fixed point was the triumvirate of
Hallewell Rogers, Manville and Martin which was in place until
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1932. There was continuing tension between engineers and
finance/marketing management [Davenport-Hines, 1984, p.229]
and a lack of co-ordination between the different subsidiaries.
T.S. Walker: Walker became a director of BSA in 1919, following
the death of his father, T.F. Walker, who had served as a direc-
tor for 32 years and who was Chairman 1904-06. T.S. Walker
resigned from the board in December 1921. The main reason for
his departure was his unhappiness with the company’s perfor-
mance, on three grounds, which he set out in a letter to
Hallewell Rogers [CRO PA 594/2/1/59, 15 December 1921]. He
was critical of “excessive expenditure” on salaries and on capital
items, of staff selection policy, and most importantly, of BSA’s
governance structure. He wrote at the time of his resignation
that his views were “fundamentally opposed to Mr Martin’s
schemes” in this respect (“Mr Martin” here represents the ruling
group of directors).
The post-1919 structure put Manville and Martin on every
subsidiary board, and Eadie and Pollen were each on two sub-
sidiaries. There was a danger that the structure would be so
centralized that the subsidiaries could not apply local knowl-
edge and act autonomously to their own advantage. This danger
was increased by the retention of financial control by the parent
board. The subsidiaries were required to report upwards and be
subject to main board decisions “on matters of importance and
policy”, and they leased their fixed assets from the parent [CRO
PA594/1/1/3/58, 30 November 1928]. According to Walker, the
new structure resulted in over-centralization so that senior staff
at the parent company were responsible for “multifarious du-
ties” at the subsidiaries as well. Each subsidiary should, he ar-
gued, be controlled by a managing director who was “a man of
wide experience in the particular trade” and who would “give
the whole of his time to the business” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59, 15
December 1921].
BSA’s Response: Martin’s response to Walker’s criticisms was
dismissive. He justified the level of expenditure; it was impor-
tant not to destroy the organization at a time of “shrinkage in
the market”, whilst recruitment had been “on the whole ex-
tremely successful” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59, 29 December 1921].
Martin recognized that BSA’s structure was the “chief funda-
mental difference” between Walker and himself [CRO PA 594/2/
1/59, 29 December 1921]. He objected that Walker’s proposal of
devolving management would be unduly expensive, leading to
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“numerous and extravagant appointments” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59,
29 December 1921]. Martin asserted that the present structure
allowed “a very efficient form of team work” [CRO PA 594/2/1/
59, 29 December 1921]. His overall theme was that a large and
centralized organization was crucial to BSA’s success and sur-
vival: Walker’s scheme of devolved authority would destroy it.
Developments after 1921 suggest that neither side in the
dispute had quite understood the situation. Walker’s character-
ization of the group as over-centralized and Martin’s praise of
“team work” were not borne out by the levels of intra-group
trading actually achieved. A memorandum by the parent board
commented that the relationship between BSA Tools and Bur-
ton Griffiths “was that of two self-contained companies . . . act-
ing independently” [CRO PA 594/1/1/3/3, 29 February 1924]. The
Economist of 11 May 1929 referred to attempts to promote
closer working of William Jessop & Company and J.J. Saville &
Company (both Sheffield- based firms) under “a common man-
agement”. In 1932, the board considered the consultant Webster
Jenkinson’s proposal of “consolidating the subsidiary companies
into a small number of groups” [MRC Mss19A1/2/56 f19]. These
comments from different sources over a number of years sug-
gest that it was recognized that the companies in the group were
not in fact operating in an integrated way: common ownership
had not resulted in common control of their activities. It would
seem that Walker’s resignation was more about the theory than
the practice of governance at BSA. He overestimated the real
extent of centralization in the group. It appears as if the triumvi-
rate of Martin, Manville and Rogers was not open to discussion.
In Hirschman’s terminology [1970], Walker found a prompt exit
a more satisfactory option than the use of voice. In this respect
he differed markedly from the other dissident who we now con-
sider, E. M. Griffiths.
E. M. Griffiths: E.M. Griffiths was, like Walker, a director who
resigned from BSA in the 1920s. But unlike Walker, Griffiths
continued his involvement with the company until the mid-
1930s, and again unlike Walker, he did not act alone. He com-
municated with shareholders, both by circularizing them and by
his detailed interventions at shareholders’ meetings. A study of
Griffiths’ conflict with the company cannot thus be separated
from the critical reaction of shareholders generally. Further,
Griffiths is also of interest because, unlike Walker, he took seri-
ously the role of financial reporting in corporate governance,
and involved BSA’s auditors in his dispute with their clients. His
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campaign treated the company not as an isolated problem but
as part of a wider set of issues concerning the amount of infor-
mation and control conceded by quoted companies to their
shareholders. Griffiths was active at a time when minority
shareholders were becoming more assertive. For instance the
Shareholders’ Protection Association was founded in October
1932 [The Economist, 9 September 1933, p. 499]. Griffiths was
able to associate himself with a group of small investors who
were not content to stay silent when dissatisfied. This was a new
challenge to the personal capitalism of BSA, and it took the
board some time to adjust to it.
E.M. Griffiths and Corporate Structure: E.M. Griffiths was Chair-
man of Burton Griffiths (a London-based machine tool sales
agency) when BSA acquired it in 1919. He retained the chair-
manship of his company and was also placed on the boards of
BSA and BSA Tools Ltd. As a result of the acquisition Griffiths
became a large shareholder in BSA: with 45,000 ordinary shares
he was the third largest individual shareholder. When he re-
signed from his directorships between 1921 and 1922, Griffiths
used his shareholding as a base from which to launch a much
more comprehensive attack than T.S. Walker, on the governance
and performance of the company over the next decade.
Griffiths first signaled his dissatisfaction in 1921, when he
resigned from the Burton Griffiths board “as my advice was
over-ruled” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Rogers, 21 February
1922]. Like T.S. Walker, he also attacked the group structure.
He blamed this, rather than external economic conditions, for
the poor performance as signaled by the low dividend paid out.
He pointed out that the new group had duplication of services
— e.g. two firms of auditors, two lawyers — as well as “other
highly paid officials with non specific titles or responsibility”
[CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Rogers, 21 February 1922]. The
company, from his perspective was overwhelmed with “red tape,
reports, routines &c” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Rogers, 21
February 1922]. Griffiths proposed “two more managing direc-
tors, having real knowledge and experience of the particular
business they have to manage and having proper and specified
responsibilities” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Rogers, 21 Feb-
ruary 1922]. He determined to introduce more operational ex-
pertise and reduce the level of bureaucracy in the company.
Hallewell Rogers rebutted Griffiths’ criticisms. The direc-
tors had thought it a “sound policy” to restrict the dividend.
Griffiths had himself requested copious amounts of informa-
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tion; reports were in any case needed “for the general good”
[CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Rogers to Griffiths, 24 February 1922]. Evi-
dently, the board of BSA were not prepared to discuss his criti-
cisms. Griffiths soon afterwards resigned from all his director-
ships, though he continued to take a very detailed interest in the
company’s performance.
E.M. Griffiths and Financial Disclosure; The Role of the Auditors:
In 1927, Griffiths wrote to Eadie, who had “sympathized” with
him at the time of his resignation, with a list of detailed ques-
tions about the performance of the subsidiaries, including
whether BSA Tools, Burton, Griffiths and Daimler Hire were
profitable, how the obsolete BSA Guns plant was being valued,
and how the group intended to repay its 6.5% loans [CRO PA
594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Eadie, 28 March 1927]. BSA’s reaction
was initially as quietly dismissive as it had been towards
Walker’s criticisms. On 13 May 1927, Martin advised him that
“your questions were before us in outlining the chairman’s
speech”, which had been delivered at the annual meeting on 10
May. If Griffiths read this “carefully” he would find his ques-
tions answered [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Martin to Griffiths, 13 May
1927]. Griffiths did not find the answers, only “general allu-
sions”, and was provoked to take the unusual step of writing to
Carters, and to Touche and Company, BSA’s two firms of audi-
tors. His argument was that “this company’s balance sheets do
not give the shareholders sufficient information” and to ask that
the “coming balance sheet” should be more informative [CRO
PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Carters, 10 December 1927].
Griffiths was reflecting a lively contemporary debate about
the need for reforms of corporate accounting. The Greene Com-
mittee had been formed in 1925 to take evidence on the issue of
company law reform. Modernizers strongly urged the need for
financial statements to be more explicit, for publication of a
profit and loss account as well as a balance sheet, and for
groups of companies, like BSA, to be obliged to produce consoli-
dated financial statements that would show the performance of
the subsidiaries as well as the parent company. The idea of
consolidated statements had been discussed in the U.K. since
1919, but the practice had been slow to catch on [see Edwards,
1989, pp. 225-238]. General objections from within British
boardrooms were that shareholders were protected by the audit,
that they could ask the directors for any information they
wanted, and that compulsory disclosure was commercially
damaging. BSA followed this trend. The company produced a
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balance sheet showing the subsidiaries in a single line as part of
the parent’s investments, and reported a single figure of credit to
profit and loss including income from the subsidiaries. The
chairman’s speech to the annual meeting included commentary
on the performance of the subsidiaries, but in as much or as
little detail as he chose.
Griffiths’ letters to the auditors provoked an immediate re-
action. The two audit firms discussed a reply and also conferred
with Hallewell Rogers within a week of receiving Griffith’s let-
ter. Both firms were in agreement “as to the undesirability of . . .
being inveigled into a discussion with a shareholder” about the
accounts [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Carters to Touche, 11 January
1928]. These were “a matter for the discretion of the directors”
and the auditors could not intervene in this [CRO PA 594/2/1/59
Carters to Touche, 16 December 1927]. But Touche also com-
mented that they had “a good deal of sympathy” with Griffiths’
proposals. BSA’s balance sheet gave “practically no information
about the position of the operating companies”. They favored
“full and frank information to shareholders” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59
Touche to Carters, 15 December 1927]. BSA was seen by profes-
sionals as being unhelpful, but company law would not compel
them to be more informative, and the legal position was un-
changed from Buckley’s 1906 views. Carters commented that
Griffiths’ “attitude as an ex-director of the company is perhaps
not identical with that of the average shareholder” [CRO PA 594/
2/1/59 Carters to Davis n.d.], but he was taking a stance on
behalf of all shareholders. His letters to the auditors were sup-
ported by references to “recent events connected with Messrs
Vickers, Armstrong, Whitworth, Marconi etc” (i.e. financial
scandals) which had “come out to the astonishment of share-
holders and the public alike” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to
Carters, 3 January 1928].
From 1928 onwards Griffiths seems to have stepped up his
campaign to improve BSA’s communication of financial infor-
mation. He may have seen the disclosure of more information as
providing an incentive to better financial performance, as direc-
tors might then expect better-informed shareholders to be more
vocal in their criticisms and more likely to apply pressure via
their votes at the annual general meeting. In January 1928, for
instance, Griffiths sent Carters a long list of suggestions for in-
formation that might be included in the annual reports [CRO PA
594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Carters, 3 January 1928]. He was also
concerned with BSA’s comparatively poor return on capital
employed. In March 1929, he circulated the largest ordinary
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shareholders in BSA (those with 500 or more shares) with a
letter reviewing the profit position. BSA had, over the previous
81⁄2 years, produced an average return of 1.75% on its share
capital. By comparison Rolls-Royce had paid an 8% dividend in
the same period, the Enfield Cycle Company 10%, Edgar Allen
and Kayser Ellison (both steel companies) 2.5% and 5% respec-
tively [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to shareholders, March
1929]. Griffiths had chosen this selection of firms to mirror in
the minds of the shareholders the composition of the BSA group
(a prestige motor manufacturer, a respectable cycle and motor
cycle company, two specialist steel firms). Obviously the back-
ground to these better results would need to be considered: how
was it that the sum of BSA’s parts produced worse results than
one might expect from individual component companies?
Griffiths had invoked a simple but stark contrast.
Over the period of Griffiths’ criticisms, BSA had in fact
made some voluntary concessions in relation to financial report-
ing. Starting from the 1928 year-end, BSA produced a ‘consoli-
dated statement’ which stated the aggregated assets and liabili-
ties of the subsidiaries. This reflected a trend in the 1920s for “a
modest rate” of increase in the number of companies producing
group information [see Edwards and Webb, 1984; Edwards,
1989]. BSA’s statement was better than the one-line entry, but as
all the reserve accounts, including profit and loss and also de-
preciation, were according to Griffiths “lumped together”, it left
the information “difficult and obscure” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59
Griffiths to Manville, 5 April 1928].
The directors were well aware of the threat that Griffiths
represented. In July 1928, R. Rotherham, one of the directors of
J.J. Saville & Company, wrote to Martin suggesting ways to
“fight” him. One of these was to invite Griffiths to rejoin the
board. If he refused, his criticisms could be ignored: if he re-
joined, he would be placated [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Rotherham
memo to Martin, 18 July 1928]. This proposal suggested that the
board saw the problem presented by Griffiths in outsider/insider
terms. Seven years after resigning, he was no longer a well-
informed insider, but a kind of unelected representative of the
main body of shareholders.
The Annual General Meeting as an Outlet for Criticisms: Cer-
tainly, Griffiths contributed to some very tense annual general
meetings over the next few years, and although he typified Brit-
ish investors as “patient oxen” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Rotherham
memo to Martin, 18 July 1928], the BSA directors in fact had to
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deal with numerous shareholders’ criticisms at annual meetings
in the early 1930s. These included comments about the “want of
energy and ability behind the directors and the management”
and the need for “a body of competent business men”, the dona-
tions made by BSA to Birmingham University and searching
questions about the reserves [CRO PA 594/1/1/2/13 BSA meet-
ings file 1931, TS draft of discussion following chairman’s
speech, pp. 21, 22-36]. The Chairman, Manville, put up a poor
fight against these, finally telling one persistent questioner that
“It is too complicated to explain in a few words. If you want a
detailed explanation I will see you are written to” [CRO PA 594/
1/1/2/13 BSA meetings file 1931, TS draft of discussion following
chairman’s speech, p.37]. One of the directors, Pollen, later de-
scribed the meeting as a “fiasco” [CRO PA 594/2/1/2/23 Pollen to
Martin, 8 December 1931].
The 1932 annual meeting, held at the nadir of BSA’s for-
tunes, was even stormier. At this meeting, Griffiths spoke at
great length. He identified himself with investors (as opposed to
speculators) whom he saw as “the backbone of the company”
[CRO PA 594/1/1/2/15 BSA meetings file, 15 November 1932, TS
draft of discussion following chairman’s speech, p.12]. A variety
of other speakers also raised detailed queries about the results,
and in some cases criticized the structure of the board. For
example, one shareholder was critical of the appointment of a
new director (Alexander Roger) who had “twenty directorates”.
Another thought that there were “too many directors . . . pulling
the strings and getting the profits”, an allusion, presumably
to their fees [CRO PA 594/1/1/2/15 BSA meetings file, 15 Novem-
ber 1932, TS draft of discussion following chairman’s speech,
p.21].
The Effects of Criticism at Annual Meetings: The shareholders
who spoke at annual general meetings tended to rebut Carters’
suggestion quoted above that Griffiths’ interests were not those
of “the average shareholder”. The annual meeting was a forum
in which the more motivated small shareholder could make de-
tailed and knowledgeable criticisms. It could be argued, how-
ever, that there was little they could do to make fundamental
changes in the way BSA was run, and that they were an irritant
rather than a threat for the board. Minority control by a block of
board members meant that shareholders could not readily vote
down the directors. Poor performance made the prospect of
disposal of shareholdings on the market unattractive as inves-
tors would be faced with selling at a loss, and this was not a
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period in which a hostile takeover (offering a change of top
management) would have been an option.6 A bad-tempered an-
nual meeting, though a trying experience for the directors, did
not predict an upheaval in ownership.
The harm criticism might do, however, was in making BSA
appear as a bad lending risk if news coverage and gossip spread
details of a “fiasco” like the 1931 meeting. At the end of 1931 the
Midland Bank threatened to withdraw its overdraft support to
BSA. If the bank went ahead with this threat and the company
had to agree a change in financial structure, it would require the
support of shareholders at an extraordinary general meeting.
Pollen commented that at any future meeting the board would
need to get the “active co-operation” of ordinary shareholders
[CRO PA 594/2/1/2/23 Pollen to Martin, 28 December 1931]. The
reaction of the latter, he continued, “is not a pleasant kind of
music to face, but it makes the whole difference if the music is
of our own composition” [CRO PA 594/2/1/2/23 Pollen to Martin,
28 December 1931]. The implication was that BSA could no
longer rely on bland responses or on the support of the courts: it
would have to get the shareholders on its side by persuading
them that the board was competent to steer the company
through financial hardship.
Thus the effect of the criticisms at annual meetings was to
further undermine the strategic position of the controlling tri-
umvirate, which was already seriously threatened by the bank’s
increasing concern about the company’s liquidity situation. This
combination of shareholder and stakeholder dissatisfaction gave
Docker, by now a senior member of the Midland Bank board, an
opportunity to intervene again in governance at BSA. Through
Docker’s backroom influence, Sir Alexander Roger was ap-
pointed chair at the end of 1932, and he assembled a new re-
gime to take BSA through the remainder of the 1930s. Share-
holder and stakeholder behavior was crucial in altering board
membership. The episode illustrates that personal capitalism
was susceptible to challenge — what Hirschman [1970] terms
the exercise of “voice” — and could be changed. Strategic posi-
tion under personal capitalism had to be defended as sustained
criticism could enforce concessions.
BSA’s Responses to Criticism: Certainly, in the later 1930s, BSA
seems to have taken a number of steps to improve shareholder
6 See Hannah [1974, p.70] on the reasons for the rarity of takeovers before
the 1950s in the UK.
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opinion. The change in board composition was not the only one.
The annual meetings appear to have been more carefully man-
aged than hitherto. Whereas the annual meetings at the begin-
ning of the 1930s seem to have been a forum in which Griffiths
(and others) went on the attack and the directors stood their
ground (or lost it) as best they could, the later meetings show
greater planning. There was more of an attempt to take control
of the event. The 1933 annual meeting was preceded by tours of
the Midlands factories, a buffet lunch and a “talking film presen-
tation” about the different cars produced by the group.
Alexander Roger, the Chairman, gave a speech, the draft of
which had been discussed with seven managers [CRO PA594/1/
1/2/16 Meetings file, 1933]. At the 1933 annual meeting, only
two questions about the financial position were asked, one with
the rider “If you think that it is inopportune to answer the ques-
tion I shall be quite satisfied” and another which Roger admit-
ted he had expected and to which he had prepared a written
reply [CRO PA594/1/1/2/16 Meetings file, 1933]. Roger could
thus give the impression of being in control.
Two other changes reduced conflict. From 1934 onwards,
the production of far more detailed consolidated accounts did
much to address shareholders’ concerns about disclosure. The
Accountant praised BSA’s 1934 accounts as “an excellent ex-
ample of modern practice” and published them in full “for the
perusal of our readers” [27 October 1934]. It did so again on 6
November 1935 and 29 October 1938. This was a remarkable
reversal of the situation in the 1920s, when The Statist [1 May
1926] had described BSA’s reluctance to disclose as “regret-
table”. Also pleasing for investors was the improvement in BSA’s
financial position, with a rather wavering return to profit from
1932 and a definite recovery, accompanied by the resumption of
preference and then ordinary dividends, after 1936. Increased
demand for armaments and also for cars, motor cycles and bi-
cycles contributed, as did internal reorganization. By the annual
meeting of 1938, there was a string of congratulations for the
chairman’s “very inspiring remarks” [CRO PA594/1/1/2/23 Meet-
ings file, 1938]. It is debatable how far investors were swayed by
the reappearance of dividends, and how far by the changes in
corporate governance — financial reporting and reorganization
— which suggested that they could have more of an insight into
BSA’s performance. The fact that the governance changes pre-
ceded the dividend resumption suggests that it was the former
which were more influential.
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Commentary on E.M. Griffiths’ Criticisms: The pressure that
Griffiths put on the company to increase its disclosure (and the
response it eventually invoked) is of particular interest because
it reflected the ongoing controversy during the 1920s and 1930s
about the extent to which companies in Great Britain should
improve their disclosure to shareholders. The Companies Act,
1929, was seen by a number of commentators as a disappoint-
ment because it did not do enough to mandate comprehensive
disclosure, such as the production of consolidated financial
statements and a profit and loss account. The Institute of Char-
tered Accountants in England and Wales stated in 1928 that
shareholders who were unhappy with corporate disclosure had
“the remedy to a large extent in their own hands” in that they
could ask questions at annual meetings and/or stipulate that
annual reports should be more informative. Hence, further legis-
lative interference was unnecessary and indeed undesirable as
this would open up companies to pressure from trades unions
and others [see Maltby, 2000].
Historians of accounting and auditing have traced the tran-
sition from this hands-off stance to the much more comprehen-
sive disclosure mandated by the Companies Act, 1947. Kitchen
[1972] and Edwards [1976] chart the varying attitudes of the
accounting profession to wider disclosure. The publicity given in
the 1930s to the Royal Mail Steam Packet scandal increased
awareness of the desirability of more informative accounts, but
did not do away with the suspicion that companies would be
better left to make their own independent solutions to account-
ing problems. Bircher [1988 and 1991] comments that the inter-
vention of some accountants and auditors prior to the outbreak
of the Second World War “produced no tangible results” [1988,
p.119] and it was only the changed national mood in wartime
that encouraged the formation of the Cohen Commission lead-
ing to the legislation of 1947.
Certainly companies did continue to employ accounting
techniques that hid profits in good years and boosted them in
bad ones. Napier [1991], for example, discusses the way in
which Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company im-
proved its results between 1915 and 1931. But it was also the
case that there was willingness to use new accounting methods
where these were seen as informative and helpful. Bircher
[1998], Kitchen [1972] and Edwards [1976] identify companies
which chose to make more explicit disclosures than the law
demanded, for example at Dunlop [Edwards, 1976, p.303].
Camfferman and Zeff [2003] similarly examine the reporting
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practices of Unilever in the 1930s and 1940s. This is a case
which suggests parallels with BSA. Although Frederick Cooper
of Lever Brothers dismissed the need for consolidated balance
sheets — shareholders, he said were “not entitled to know” that
information — he made “significant steps” towards improving
the company’s reports in that period, including very detailed
reporting of segmented sales and profits [Camfferman and Zeff,
2003, pp.176-178]. Cooper’s aversion to consolidated accounts
did not preclude wider disclosure where he thought it helpful
and informative.
In the context of the accounting history of the 1930s,
Griffiths’ intervention suggests that BSA’s directors and auditors
were acting in line with certain contemporary trends. The audi-
tors, like some of their professional colleagues, were concerned
about current mandated practice but chose not to intervene
where the law did not.7 BSA was prepared to extend disclosure
in order to improve relations with shareholders and to that ex-
tent Griffiths’ aggressive criticisms bore fruit. BSA did so, it is
argued here, because they were part of a wider debate about the
need to keep shareholders informed. BSA’s directors were not
prepared to stick their necks out by making these disclosures in
the 1920s, but they did do so in advance of legislation because
they saw a chance of improving their image.
CONCLUSIONS
Personal capitalism can take a variety of forms. It is not
reducible to family capitalism and in interwar Britain ranged
from the small family firm to the relatively large holding com-
pany.8 As a generic type, however, the personal capitalist busi-
ness organization displays a strong linkage between ownership
and control, has a limited managerial hierarchy, and tends to
evolve a governance system based on the establishment of a
governing group who place a high premium on loyalty, trust and
stewardship as core social habits.9
7 They can be contrasted with, for instance, Henry Morgan of the Society of
Incorporated Accountants and Auditors, who called throughout the 1930s for
improved disclosure to increase shareholders’ confidence. There was support in
some sections of the accounting profession for change, but by no means all
accountants were swayed by it. See Maltby [2000, p.44].
8 For the activities of personal capitalist firms in different industries see
Lloyd-Jones and Lewis [2000, 2003], for the role of the holding company see
Fitzgerald [2000] and Quail [2002].
9 The notion of social habits is derived from Veblen. See Hodgson [1998, pp.
463-477]; Lloyd-Jones and Lewis [2003, pp. 230-231].
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Quail’s approach has been particularly informative in draw-
ing attention to the broader aspects of personal capitalism and
this sets the context for exploring the idiosyncratic patterns
emerging at the firm level. Certainly at BSA the evidence sug-
gests that there was only limited development of a managerial
hierarchy. This tends to confirm Quail’s view that in a proprieto-
rial firm there is “fixity of organisational structure” which
strongly embeds the personal power of directors [2000, p.2].
However, in the case of our more detailed analysis of corporate
governance at BSA, the evidence demonstrates the underlying
flexibility of a personal capitalist firm. A dominant coalition
acquired “strategic position” at the top of the company and con-
solidated personal control for over two decades. However, a sus-
tained shareholder critique created the context for major
changes in the dominant group and in the form of governance
by the early 1930s. Our case study suggests that “strategic posi-
tion” is contingent over the long term on the capability of execu-
tive management to ensure optimal performance. It followed
that the strategic positioning evolved by the triumvirate at BSA
needed to be defended, and sustained criticism led to conces-
sions and eventually to its loss of power.
The episodes explored in the paper are all instances of shifts
in power, or in the acknowledgement of power. The case of
Newton v BSA confirmed the ability of the directors to disclose
as much or as little information as they chose, within the flex-
ibility provided by company law. Some shareholders protested,
but the majority could not be mobilized to demand more infor-
mative financial reports. This was a period when small share-
holders were not likely to attempt to intervene in governance.
BSA set a legal precedent and confirmed the practice of a num-
ber of other companies. But the fact the case was brought is also
a reminder of the potential for conflict even at a high point,
historically, of directorial power. It also indicates the impor-
tance of the close link between governance and issues of ac-
countability.
The second episode, the Daimler merger of 1910 consoli-
dated director power and produced the triumvirate who re-
mained in control of the enlarged BSA group until the early
1930s. This may be seen as an exemplar of the entrenched per-
sonal capitalism of interwar British business, which has been
attacked by Chandler. That is, a small group of directors who
acquire “strategic position” and appeared impervious to share-
holder pressure and resistant to the demands for change. The
personal control of the triumvirate was embedded at BSA in the
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person of Dudley Docker whose strong connections with the
firm led him to draw the dominant group of directors into a set
of regional and national networks (during the 1920s three BSA
directors were at various times Members of Parliament, includ-
ing Rogers and Manville) that appeared to place them at the
cutting edge of progressive business opinion. But governance,
even in personal capitalist firms, cannot simply be reduced to a
monolithic group of directors, and in the case of BSA, the events
of the 1920s and early 1930s saw the erosion of the triumvirate’s
personal power as it faced sustained challenge and eventually
lost the confidence of Docker.
The third episode, exploring a set of internal and external
events affecting BSA in the 1920s and 1930s showed that direc-
tors could not persistently resist change. The pressures they en-
countered came partly from individuals with insider knowledge,
such as Walker and Griffiths, and also from the body of share-
holders who no longer behaved passively. As O’Sullivan has as-
serted, a system of corporate governance helps shape “who
makes investment decisions in corporations, what type of deci-
sion they make, and how returns from investments are distrib-
uted” [2000, p.1], and in the 1920s BSA shareholders, influenced
by dissidents such as Griffiths, were increasingly driven by dis-
appointing results to question the business competence and
strategic decisions of the triumvirate. Changes in the external
business environment also added to the pressures faced by busi-
ness leaders in firms such as BSA. For example, the Greene
Committee of 1925 was a reflection of a growing post-war move-
ment in favor of better quality accounting disclosure. The con-
juncture of internal and external pressure came to a head at
BSA in the “fiasco” of the 1931 annual meeting which led to the
breaking up of the triumvirate (by 1932 it had lost executive
control), the re-organization of the company under a new chair-
man, an improvement in the provision of disclosure, and a rec-
ognition of the need to respond more convincingly to share-
holder questions.
While the period 1900-1950 has been described as a “golden
age of directorial power” [Hannah, 1974], this study of BSA
shows that the form of governance was more fluid as a domi-
nant group of directors was forced to give way when the balance
of power was shifted by sustained shareholder criticism and
changes in the legal and business environment. The case also
illustrates the flexibility of personal capitalist firms. At BSA,
effective choices were made concerning the firm’s governance
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and the occupation of “strategic position” was not necessarily a
guarantee of directorial permanence.
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to study the organizational, social and even political roles of account-
ing will proliferate. This view is illustrated by moving from linear
views of ‘time’ (‘time spent’) to more relative and constructed concep-
tions (‘time counted’).
INTRODUCTION
Hans-Joachim Voth opens his book Time and Work in En-
gland, 1750-1830 with this interesting question: “Did the indus-
trial revolution mark a watershed in term of time-use?” [2000, p.
1]. As Voth rightly argues, the question is interesting as it relates
to a twofold set of issues. Firstly, it concerns the productivity of
labor. Labor accounted for a major part of GDP during the
industrial revolution,1 and to a large extent still does. Thus un-
derstanding whether or not the development of new modes of
organizing and controlling production and its outcome had an
impact on productivity is a significant issue. Secondly, the ques-
tion concerns broader matters of ‘well being’. It is important to
establish the pattern of change in the proportion of time spent
at work and at leisure [Voth, 2000, p. 2].
Voth concludes his work by pointing out that:
During the industrial revolution England began to
work harder – much harder. The timing and the extent
of the rise in annual hours differed by location and
social group. None the less, the finding that emerges
most consistently from this study is that, by the 1830s,
both London and the Northern counties of England had
seen a considerable increase in annual working hours.
What drove the change was not longer hours per day.
Instead, changes in the number of days worked per week,
and in the observance of holy days, were largely respon-
sible for the rise in annual hours. In London, the demise
of ‘St Monday’2 and of numerous religious and political
festivals were the main factors [2000, p. 268, emphasis
added].
He continues:
1 It is not the aim of this essay to establish the timing roots and features of
the industrial revolution, issues which have been the subject of several studies in
economics as well as sociology [see Floud and McCloskey, 1981]. The main
concern of this paper is with time and its relevance to accounting histories.
Analogously, although it is of vital importance to understand the relationship
between increases in the productivity of labor and its remuneration, this is not
the aim of the current contribution [see Nyland, 1986].
2 St Monday was the habit of taking the first day of the week off to recover
from the heavy drinking which took place on weekends.
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Because annual working hours increased between
the middle of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
GDP per hour grew more slowly than GDP per capita. A
very substantial part of the increase in output was a
result of extra toil and not of rising productivity . . . If
our estimates of annual hours are even approximately
right, the efficiency with which the economy combined
factor of production grew barely, if at all. It is in this
sense that the First Industrial Revolution was an ‘indus-
trious revolution’ [Voth, 2000, pp. 271-272, emphasis
added].
The conclusion is clear: it was the proportion of worked hours
compared to those dedicated to leisure that changed, not effi-
ciency.
This is an interesting conclusion and an ‘industrious’ con-
clusion, given the amount of archival work which the analysis
required, for the issue Voth addresses is a difficult one. While
data on worked hours are quite reliable after 1850 the same
does not apply to the period 1750-1850, which is key to under-
standing work patterns during the industrial revolution [Voth,
2000, pp. 5-6]. As Kuznetz noted “the data are not adequate for
testing hypotheses concerning the time patterns of growth rate”
[1966, quoted in McCloskey, 1981, p. 249]. Voth manages to
overcome the problem through an interesting and inventive ar-
chival study of testimonies given in court. Looking at the evi-
dence provided by witnesses called to testify in cases of various
kinds, he constructed a data set on the timing of main daily
activities for the period 1750-1830 suitable for inferring the
number of working hours per day, week and year.3
Voth’s conclusion also has implications for the present, es-
pecially with regard to the second set of issues recalled above,
well being. As he states, thanks to the ingenious construction of
the data set “We can now contrast the period of the Industrial
3 Voth’s book is organized as follows: the first chapter illustrates the aim of
the work, the second describes the method adopted in the construction and
analysis of the data set, the third illustrates the pattern of time use for the period
1750-1830, the fourth analyses causes of changes in this pattern, and the fifth
summarizes the arguments and draws the conclusions of the work. The book is
primarily dedicated to the demonstration of the validity of the hypothesis ini-
tially stated, i.e., the increase in British GDP was due to a larger amount of
worked hours rather than greater toil. In this sense, Voth’s argument is simple
and linear (see next section), although quite disruptive of generally accepted
views on the issue.
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Revolution with the present not only in terms of real income,
but of time-utilization” [Voth, 2000, p. 272]. Given the possibil-
ity of this comparison, it is easy to demonstrate that “Instead of
work occupying more than half of ‘our’ time, making a living
now only requires 30 per cent of waking hours” [ibid.], so we
now arguably live better than during the industrial revolution.
We have all progressed.
The following section illustrates how these two sets of is-
sues are relevant for accounting history.
Relevance of Voth’s Arguments for Accounting History: The refer-
ence that Voth makes to St Monday in the quotation above is
not casual. St Monday is also one of the key themes of “Time,
Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism” by E. P. Thompson
[1967]. Thompson focused on labor discipline as the main fea-
ture of the change in work patterns during the industrial revolu-
tion. According to Thompson, one of the main features of indus-
trial capitalism was the ability to impose a work discipline on
the labor force, a discipline which homogenized and regularized
work patterns, eliminating the possibility of self-organizing
which had been key in the pre-industrial work organization of
craftsmen and women.
Both Voth and Thompson raise issues which are very famil-
iar to accounting historians, for they concern the role that the
development and refinement of various managerial techniques
(such as accounting) played in the industrial revolution and the
emergence and spread of capitalism. In this respect, accounting
has been linked to the emergence of modern enterprises in vari-
ous ways. If one looks at this role from a theoretical (and histo-
riographical) rather than from a strictly factual point of view,
the relation can assume various connotations. Since Weber
[1991], who placed accounting at the centre of rational profit
calculations, studies in the area have increased. Sombart [1953]
asserted that capitalism could develop only because of the possi-
bility of rational and economic accounting calculations. Yamey
[1949, 1964] questioned this relation along with the role of ac-
counting (specifically, double entry) in decision making. This
link was then emphasized by authors such as Pollard [1967],
who asserted that accounting played a crucial role in supporting
management by providing useful departmental cost calcula-
tions. Chandler [1977] and Chandler and Deams [1979] placed
the same emphasis on accounting as a tool for efficient alloca-
tion, monitoring and coordinating financial resources within
U.S. multidivisional firms [see also Johnson and Kaplan, 1987].
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More recent works, such as those of Boyns and Edwards [1996,
1997], have stressed the role of accounting in making economic
decisions.
Others, by contrast, view innovations in cost and manage-
ment accounting as a way to control the labor process
[Armstrong, 1987; Hopper and Armstrong, 1991]. Accounting’s
ability to establish a disciplinary regime is developed from a
power-knowledge perspective in works by Hoskin and Macve
[1986, 1988, 2000] and Carmona, Ezzamel and Gutiérrez [1997].
Others, such as Miller and O’Leary [1987], link the development
of accounting to broader trends in economies and societies to-
wards standardization and calculability in the efficient manage-
ment of individuals. This analysis was subsequently developed
by looking at the links between the spatial arrangements of the
factory and the accounting calculations carried out therein
[Miller and O’Leary, 1994; Carmona, Ezzamel and Gutiérrez,
2002].
This short and partial review of the literature identifies
studies which are very different in terms of historiographical
perspective (from realist and economic-driven interpretations to
post-structuralist approaches), temporal horizons (some con-
cern the industrial revolution others the early 20th century) and
geographical areas (Europe and/or the USA). However, the re-
view highlights wider theoretical issues. It indicates how the
emergence and historical development of accounting can be ex-
plained by multifaceted and changing rationales which can be
utilized to interpret and justify the role of accounting in modern
economies and societies.
This brief review is also for appreciating the primary impor-
tance of Voth’s findings to accounting history and to accounting
studies tout court. For if his arguments hold, accounting would
play a very limited role in organizations and societies and it
would leave accounting historians (regardless of their perspec-
tive and focus) in theoretical difficulties. This is so for two rea-
sons. The first relates to Voth’s argument on efficiency. If the
rise in British GDP was due to an increase in GDP per capita
and not in GDP per worked hour, and if this implied the stabil-
ity of labor productivity, then little scope exists for viewing ac-
counting and management controls as having a role in increas-
ing such productivity. It may well be that accounting played a
disciplinary role as a modern power-knowledge apparatus but it
had no economic impact whatsoever. To some extent account-
ing would be decoupled from the economic phenomena which
characterized the British industrial revolution. Broadly speak-
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ing, accounting would have a very limited impact on economic
matters, at least for the period under consideration.
The second set of reasons relates to the issue of well being.
If time is “a good itself – it is all we have to spend” [Voth, 2000,
p. 273], if time is a ‘thing’, an objective feature of our world and
social lives, it can easily be measured and thus no room exists
for accounting beyond mere recording and use of timesheets for
cost allocation. Voth’s argument is clear: economic production
increased not for the better use of time but for a change in how
time is spent; less leisure and more work. Accounting, pace criti-
cal accounting, would have a limited impact on organizations,
society at large and the human condition if it had no impact
either on the work versus leisure divide, or on labor conditions
and productivity. Its role, and the theoretical interpretation
which accounting historians could give it, would be limited to
‘certifying’ through recording how, from the industrial revolu-
tion onwards, the boundary between work and leisure has pro-
gressively shifted in favor of more leisure and less work.
The power of Voth’s argument is its simplicity. At the centre
of his analysis is the dichotomy between work and leisure in
which time spent can be classified. If this classification is not
questioned, it seems difficult to escape from his rigorous analy-
sis and the little room for accounting that can be found in his
story. The present paper thus intends firstly to reflect on this
dichotomy. The next section illustrates how ‘time’ and its ubiq-
uity are not objective and intrinsic features of human life but
the result of a process of time recording which defines the ob-
ject that is recorded, i.e., time itself. If one wants to recognize a
role for accounting one possibility is to conceptualize this di-
chotomy not as given, but as the result of a process of definition
which is directed towards making the difference between work
and leisure clear. Time can be conceived of as a concept which
is constructed thanks to the use of recording practices such as
accounting.4
Secondly, in the section titled ‘The missing link between
time and accounting history’, the paper speculates on the conse-
quences for accounting history (and for accounting historians)
of conceiving time not as objective but as a result of recording
4 Other perspectives on time could have been chosen and followed (see Le
Poidevin and MacBeath [1993] for a review of the debate in philosophy;
Kennedy [2003] for physics; Lefebvre [1992] for geography; and Rakoff [2002]
for law). However, the aim of this paper is to illustrate to accounting historians
the constructed nature of time, not to review how it has been conceived of in
other disciplines, not withstanding the latter’s value for accounting history.
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and prioritizing practices. If time is not a ‘thing’ but an object of
processes, of definition, then a range of issues to be studiedre-
emerge; for definitions, classifications and divisions are always
a matter of mediation, search for agreement and ultimately, of
negotiation and controversial political battles [Bowker and Star,
1999]. How the historical development of accounting techniques
contributed and was intertwined with issues of prioritizing busi-
ness objectives and time recording [see Loft, 1990] is an issue
which powerfully re-enters the agenda of accounting historians.
The arguments advanced in the paper are summarized in the
conclusion together with some possible lines of investigation for
taking ‘time’ into account in accounting histories.
IS TIME SPENT, PASSED OR COUNTED?
It is probably because time, its flowing, classification and
measurement are ubiquitous [Zerubavel, 1985] that we presently
consider time as a thing, time is reified [Berger and Luckmann,
1966]. Time seems the most natural and objective thing on
Earth. However, as Zerubavel notes, even the most obvious of
time classifications, the seven-day week, is not as plain as it may
seem:
Equating the week with a seven-day rhythm is a
result of an ethnocentric bias that is challenged through
an examination of the surprisingly wide variability of
the week’s length in different parts of the world. (Such
an examination also highlights the variability of the
functions of the week, from the regulation of religious
or economic activity to the construction of divinatory
calendars.) This comparative perspective on the weekly
“beat” helps unveil its conventional nature [1985, p. 4].
Zerubavel’s analysis sheds new light on the variability of the
week’s length across time and countries, on the various mean-
ings that one attaches to each individual day of the week and on
how modern practices, such as work patterns and discipline,
help to define it all [also Sorokin and Merton, 1937]. In other
words, time is a difficult concept to define [Jaques, 1982] and is
often left undefined. In his work on the evolution of timekeeping
technologies Landes [1983, p. 187] noted how time does not
have a metaphysical ontology and still we get to know it because
we have defined ways of keeping time. In a sense, time may not
exist but its concept does. However, this has not always been the
case and in some parts of the world it still is not the case, as the
following sections illustrate.
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Is Time Spent or Passed?: The activity of recording time has a
long history which cannot be recalled in this brief paper.5 Time
keeping has gone through an enormous technology advance. We
have moved from the sundial of Roman times to the atomic
clock of the present [Landes, 1983]. We now live in an era where
time has become self-evident [de Grazia, 1963] given the great
accuracy of time measurement. Today, “you are considered a
fool if you ask what [time] is, or doubt that it is objective, uni-
versal, irreversible, non-projectable, quantitative or set in inelas-
tic, non compressible units” [de Grazia, 1963, p. 317]. It seems
that time can be recorded in only one possible way, one which is
linear and objective: clock time.
However this has not always been the case. Thompson, with
respect to ‘primitive’ cultures, notes that:
In Madagascar time might be measured by “a rice
cooking” (about half an hour) or “the frying of a locust”
(a moment). The Cross River natives were reported as
saying “the man died in less than the time in which
maize is not yet completely roasted” (less than fifteen
minutes) [1967, p. 58, drawing on Nillson, 1920].
The following passage by Evans-Pritchard on the time con-
sciousness of a Sudanese tribe (the Nuer), quoted by Thomspon
[1967, p. 96] is another illuminating insight into different con-
ceptions of time:
. . . the Nuer have no expression equivalent to “time”
in our language, and they cannot, therefore, as we can,
speak of time as though it were something actual,
which passes, can be wasted, can be saved and so forth.
I do not think that they ever experience the same feel-
ing of fighting against time or of having to co-ordinate
activities with an abstract passage of time because their
point of reference are the activities themselves, which
are generally of a leisurely character. Events follow a
logical order, but they are not controlled by an abstract
system, there being no autonomous points of reference
to which activities have to conform with precision.
Nuer are fortunate [Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p. 103].
Generally speaking, in peasant societies, the flowing of time is
not linked to the clock but to the tasks routinely carried out
[Sorokin and Merton, 1937; Thompson, 1967; Landes, 1983].
5 Extensive analyses may be found in Cipolla [1967]; Lippincott et al. [1998]
and Landes [1983]. See also Hassard [1990a; b].
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Yet, time is by no means necessarily linear. As the etymology of
the word reveals, the concept evokes the cyclical return of sea
tides, a word with which ‘time’ shares the same root [Goody,
1968, p. 330]. Finally, a linear vision of time flowing (e.g. the
passing of the years) can be combined with a cyclical view (e.g.
the constant return of week days [Zerubavel 1985, p. 84]). Think
of a watch, usually round although it marks time linearly.
Different ways of time keeping and time recording com-
monly co-exist even in the era of the atomic clock. In this re-
spect, Zerubavel observes that there are:
. . . a variety of ways in which the very same instant
can be dated. To quote an example from fiction, “When
I was a younger men – two wives ago, 250000 cigarettes
ago, 3000 quart of booze ago” (Vonnegut 1963, p. 11).
This is also true for time reckoning. There are an infi-
nite number of temporal reference frameworks within
which one might anchor the present – the number of
days following the purchase of a bottle of milk, the day
within one’s menstrual cycle, and so on indefinitely
[1982, pp. 1-2].
The perception of time is not as objective as it may seem
[Fraisse, 1968, p. 326] and recording (and recalling) time is less
so.
In the example of the Nuer, there is nothing to spend, nor is
time passed or counted. The question to answer is then: how is
it that we now consider time as an objective thing in order to
say that it is “all we have to spend”?
With regard to this issue, it is interesting to note that spend-
ing time is an expression typical of the English language
whereas, for instance, in some Latin-rooted languages ‘time’ is
‘passed’ and not ‘spent’ [de Grazia, 1963]. Time does not have
the same connotation and attitudes toward it differ in various
societies [Sorokin and Merton, 1937; Thrift, 1980]. For instance,
arriving punctually for an appointment (i.e., being ‘on the point’,
an ap-point-ment [Landes, 1983]) is considered crucial in north-
ern European societies (e.g. by a stereotypical Englishman) but
not so much in Mediterranean countries (e.g. in stereotypical
Italy). Arriving late at a dinner, for instance, gives the host the
possibility of preparing the meal in a more relaxed manner and
the guest would not panic if trapped in a traffic jam.
This variety in attitudes goes back to the roots of the various
conceptions of work and leisure across times. With regard to
this the analysis carried out by de Grazia [1963] is insightful in
many respects. He begins his analysis on the construction of the
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difference between work and leisure in ancient Greece. At that
time the word leisure (at least in Aristotle) was “a condition or a
state – the state of being free from the necessity to labor” [de
Grazia, 1963, p. 14] and as such, it was not strictly time related.
The equivalent word to ‘leisure’, ‘schole’ was rarely contrasted
with ‘work’. Instead it was contrasted with ‘action’, which in
turn, was defined as the opposite of leisure (‘aschole’, with the
prefix ‘a-’ expressing the lack of ‘schole’, i.e., leisure). Analo-
gously in Roman times, leisure was expressed as ‘otium’ and its
opposite was ‘negotium’, that is, being occupied in affairs of
varied nature, from work to war, all these activities having in
common the negation of leisure (i.e., ‘neg-otium’). De Grazia
also stresses how otium and negotium were interchangeable by
quoting Pliny who advised “others to alternate otium and nego-
tium: when tired of one take to the other” [1963, p. 22]. What is
interesting in this etymological analysis is that in both Greek
and Roman times the emphasis was on leisure rather than work,
the point of reference in people’s lives was the former not the
latter.
But how is it that “we are now at a point were sociologists
are discussing the “problem” of leisure. And a part of the prob-
lem is: how did it become a problem?” [Thompson, 1967, p. 95].
The history of seeing leisure as a problem is long6 and
marked by a few crucial steps. Firstly, the shift from the Greek
to the Roman era was accompanied by the entrance of another
important actor in the play of time definition – Christianity.
This made the opposition otium/negotium more problematic. In
Medieval Christianity, for instance, the emphasis was given to
contemplative life (vita contemplativa). However, this contem-
plation was not for its own sake. It was an active effort to find
truth and then God (an attitude, which becomes an integral part
of monastic life with the Benedictines initially and with the ac-
tivism of the Jesuits, later). Secondly, the Rinascimento marks
another important step. As noted by de Grazia:
A Calabrian friar, Tommaso Campanella, founds the
imaginary City of the Sun, where no one works more
than four hours a day. Here too everyone works . . .
After work, people are free within the limits of the solar
city’s laws to play or to study as they wish [1963, p. 32].
Here the emphasis has already shifted from leisure to work,
which becomes central to everyone’s life, what rests is free time.
6 The interested reader can usefully consult de Grazia [1963, pp. 11-328].
202
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 32 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss1/10
195Quattrone: Missing Link Between Time and Accounting History
With the birth of free time, in contrast to work which ‘occu-
pies’ our lives, the need for measuring the time for engaging in
the activities which one likes most becomes a crucial issue
[Thrift, 1980]. Once the shift has taken place, work and free
time become geared to time along with the problem of measur-
ing it. However, we need to wait until the 19th century to wit-
ness another important shift - from natural time to shared (or
social) time.
This shift first occurred with the development of the na-
tional communication network for mail in Britain and the ex-
pansion of the railways [Landes, 1983; Thrift, 1980; Zerubavel,
1982]. It was the development of railway communications that
revealed the need for a change from local time (related to the
natural rotation of the Earth around the Sun) to a shared notion
of time. As noted by Zerubavel: “if time is to be shared as an
intersubjective social reality, it ought to be standardized” [1982,
p. 2]. The following story is likely known by many accounting
historians. The British Post Office to facilitate the control of
delivery times:
. . . started to run all its mail coaches throughout
Great Britain in accordance with a uniform standard
time [and since] the Royal Observatory in Greenwich
was the most reliable in Britain, every mail coach guard
was required to carry a timepiece indicating Greenwich
mean time (GMT) . . . This was the first attempt in his-
tory to synchronize different communities with one an-
other [Zerubavel, 1982, p. 6; emphasis in original].
This effort, which was then repeated on a larger scale in the
USA, attempted to overcome the differences between local times
(still tied to solar time) which were difficult to reproduce in a
common timetable, given the unbearable weight that this docu-
ment would have [Zerubavel, 1982]. The timetable, as much as
European Community Time, became the first example of the
materialization of ‘social time’ into a practical device. Yet, the
longer the distance between the local and the social, the longer
the chain of transformations that natural time needs to go
through [Latour, 1987] as “it is much easier to achieve temporal
coordination at the level of the family than at the level of the
community, not to mention the city, the nation, or the entire
world” [Zerubavel, 1982, p. 4, emphasis in original].7
7 An interesting example of this chain of transformations is the complicated
mediations which led to the agreement of setting the degree 0 of longitude at
Greenwich which then assumed a global relevance passing through maritime
customs, first, and railway innovations later [see Zerubavel, 1982, pp. 8ff].
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This is just one of the many examples of synchronization
which contributed to defining modernity as opposed to pre-in-
dustrial times. As Thompson noted, the first machines of the
industrial revolution in Britain were built by clockmakers and
the machine itself could be seen as a timekeeper, given that it
set the pace of work [1967, pp. 66-70]. He also observed:
Those who are employed experience a distinction
between their employers’ time and their “own” time.
And the employer must use the time of this labour, and
see it is not wasted: not the task but the value of time
when reduced to money is dominant. Time is now cur-
rency: it is not passed but spent [Thompson, 1967, p. 61;
italics in original, underlined added].
Thus, in the definition of our current view of time as a ‘thing’, as
a currency that can be spent, several other ‘things’ need to be
taken into account. These relate to religious attitudes and mo-
nastic rules, utopias, the clock, the invention of automated ma-
chines, railways, timetables and so on. The list is certainly in-
complete but it illustrates that ‘time spent’, i.e., an objective view
of time, is the least natural thing on Earth rather than the oppo-
site. In other words, the achievement of a notion of time which
is shared and objective requires the deployment of a series of
techniques, technologies and beliefs which all embed subjective
choices. Time recording is not a simple representation of the
flowing of an objective entity, i.e., time. In this sense “time, as
we know it, is a very recent invention” [Huxley, 1936/1973, p.
122; quoted in Loft, 1990, p. 13], dating back to the development
of railway communication systems, it is a notion which did not
exist previously, at least in the manner in which we now know
it.
In this transformation, accounting may play an important
albeit neglected role. For at the moment, it seems that account-
ing treats time as given [see Ezzamel and Robson, 1995]. Time
may not exist, nor pass or even be spent, but what is probably
more important is that it can certainly be produced (e.g.
through counting it), especially in contemporary societies.
Time Counted: It is worthwhile quoting here a passage from
Sebastian de Grazia’s Work, Time and Leisure, to which this
short paper is highly indebted:
Leisure time (note how familiar is the association of
leisure and time) has greatly increased today, it is said.
Since free time means time off work or not related to
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work, it ought to be possible to verify or confirm this
proposition. Has industrial society given more time to
men [sic]? . . . Let time on the job, then, be considered
work time. There are 168 hours to a week. If a man
holds down a job of 40 hours a week, how much free
time would he have – 128 hours? He would answer no.
. . . An early slogan of the shorter-hour movement in the
United States proclaimed “8 hours of work, 8 hours of
sleep, 8 hours for all the rest.” The eight-hour remain-
der is not at all free time, however. Instead it covers, as
the phrase puts it, “all the rest” – shopping, grooming,
chores, transportation, voting, making love, helping
children with homework, reading the newspaper, get-
ting the roof repaired, trying to locate the doctor, going
to church, visiting relatives, and so on. Do all these
activities belong to free time?
We are confronted with one of the toughest prob-
lems in any statistical treatment of leisure and free time
. . . It seemed that in changing from the term leisure to
the term free time we had gone from a qualitative to a
quantitative concept. We have now something that
could be measured with ease . . . We said that free time
is time off or not related to job . . . but where should
time spent in a weekly visit to the relatives be put? Or
time spent in going to church? There seems to be a
strong sense of obligation involved here, so that even if
a person wished to spend his life differently, he was not
free to do so [de Grazia, 1963, pp. 64-65].
Analogously, when reading de Grazia’s and Voth’s books and
reflecting on issues of time and accounting for this paper, I did
what academics call ‘doing research’; work for which I am paid
(or should be paid?!). However, in the case of these two books, I
am spending my time working as much as I am getting pleasure
from reading them, a pleasure which indeed sounds very much
as ‘p-leisure’.
Thus, the issue shifts from time spent or passed to how time
is classified, how it is counted, and how it is perceived. It can be
perceived as worked (and then susceptible to being paid) or
spent at leisure, but it is not the money received or given which
should be considered as the watershed between work and lei-
sure, a boundary difficult to draw. The case of do-it-yourself
work is quite illuminating in this respect [de Grazia, 1963, pp.
73ff]. If it is not done for pleasure but to save money and to be
able to pay the mortgage, then it is difficult to understand
whether this is time spent at work or leisure. Although do-it-
yourself activities are certainly time free from (official) work:
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How shall we classify these activities, as work or
free time, and how much time do they take up? Classi-
fying them as free time simply because they are unpaid
would pass only the sleepyheads of an inefficient ac-
counting system [de Grazia, 1963, p. 75].
People perform other work than their formal role and these
activities are classified as ‘free time’. Yet often they require even
more toil than one’s normal work. In other words, the issue
shifts on how time is counted and how we account for it.
With regard to this, Latour noted:
The obsession with calendar time makes historians
sprinkle technologies with agricultural metaphors refer-
ring to maturation, slowness, obsolescence or germina-
tion, or else mechanical metaphors. . . . In fact time
does not count. Time is what is counted. It is not an
explanatory variable; it is a dependent variable that
needs to be explained [1999, p. 88].
How then is time classified under ‘worked’ or ‘free’ catego-
ries? Contemporary societies seem to be characterized by a
stratification of time [Gurvitch, 1964] which privileges ‘institu-
tional time’, i.e., time devoted to work within bureaucracies,
over time devoted to ‘interaction’ with other individuals, to rel-
egate time devoted to the self to last place in the league [Lewis
and Weigart, 1981]. A major role in this stratification and
hierarchization of time is certainly played, once again, by syn-
chronization:
Synchronizing one’s life is a public achievement
which merges the unbridgeable individuality of per-
sonal existence constituted out of the embedded time
with the irreducible collectiveness of social order con-
stituted by stratified times. The synchronicity of an en-
tire society continually recreated by the millions of
multifarious actions of millions of citizens make plau-
sible the rationality of that social order. Breakdowns,
strikes, terrorist attacks, earthquakes, and other social
unsynchronized events challenge the public rationality
[Lewis and Weigart, 1981, pp. 451-452].
It is through this synchronism, and this search for and con-
trol of synchronism which makes individuals feel that time is a
scarce resource. What is theoretically the most synchronized
aspect of our life if not work? As work is carried out in constant
relation to other subjects (clients, suppliers, etc.) it inevitably
calls for synchronism. It is this required synchronism which
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makes what is synchronized prevail over other less institutional-
ized forms of time. Certainly it may well happen that one works
in a badly organized public administration. It may well happen
that some members of the family, for example children, manage
to monopolize their parents’ time (but this is the case only for
short periods and generally they do not intentionally pursue this
aim, i.e., when they are newborn). It may also happen that
within families one member of the family manages to impose a
kind of synchronism over another. However, the resources that
s/he can devote to this synchronization are limited if confronted
by those of larger networks called firms.
Certainly contemporary societies devote enormous re-
sources to the achievement of synchronicity in order to guaran-
tee linearity and to make it appear the most obvious thing on
Earth, something which is difficult to oppose [Kirk and
Mouritsen, 1996]. Think of the example of the French TGV given
by Latour [1997]. The TGV is run according to a timetable
which ensures passengers arrive at the train station at a certain
time, trains pass certain places at a given time and so on. The
TGV’s synchronization is more powerful for it is linear as a rail
track [Burrell, 1997] and belongs to a powerful network of train
stations, railways, ticket counters, electricity power stations,
clocks and timetables, which all work as a co-ordinated unity.
The result is that TGV time dominates the less synchronized
stratified times, and this makes the passenger feel that s/he is
late and can miss the train. In a highly synchronized society,
s/he cannot oppose it, either s/he takes the train on time or not.
Accounting has certainly been part of this picture of making
time linearly shared and synchronized. But, time is currently
missing from accounting despite calls to make its role visible
[notably Chambers, 1989; Ezzamel and Robson, 1995;
Hopwood, 1989; Loft, 1990]. While studies of disciplinarity in
contemporary times [e.g. Anderson-Gough, Grey and Robson,
2001] have begun to look at this relationship, historical research
does not seem to have addressed these issues. This absence is
even more relevant when we consider that synchronization is
one of the aspects of time in which accounting may play a role.
For example, while it is plausible that the interplay between
clock time and accounting can be seen as constraining and dis-
ciplining, it is less obvious how such interplay can also enable
organizational creativity [Glennie and Thrift, 2002; Jones,
McLean and Quattrone, 2004], and how synchronization is al-
ways subject to continuous political processes of mediation
[Hopwood, 1989].
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THE MISSING LINK BETWEEN TIME
AND ACCOUNTING HISTORY
A quick browse of Anderson’s compilation of accounting
history articles [1998] published in academic journals in the
years 1995-6 shows that the word ‘time’ appears only once in the
title of the 287 articles listed. Paradoxically, the word ‘future’
appears more often. The word ‘past’ is listed too and its presence
reveals the attitude to consider past, present and future as objec-
tive dots on the timeline. This example is certainly not statisti-
cally significant, but it is insightful in corroborating what
Ezzamel and Robson say with respect to how “little attention
has been given to the relevance of time and theories of time to
accounting” [1995, p. 149]. Paraphrasing Landes [1983] many
accounting works go back into accounting history but paradoxi-
cally time is absent from most of them. Despite calls to examine
the relationships between time and accounting [e.g. Chambers,
1989], time still does not seem to be an issue for accounting
historians, a claim which a more complete analysis of account-
ing history publications likely would corroborate.
What follows seeks to illustrate the considerable work
which remains to be done in at least three different areas of
inquiry. The first area concerns the role that accounting plays in
synchronizing organizing activities (e.g. by illustrating how
time-recording devices are linked to accounting records [see
Loft, 1990], and creates centers of calculation [see Robson,
1991]). The second operates in the opposite direction and re-
gards the possible role that accounting plays in de-emphasizing
linear and teleological views of technologies of synchronization
such as machines and clocks (e.g. by illustrating how accounting
deadlines and prioritizes results in constant mediations and
power struggles which allow centers of discretion [see Munro,
1999; Quattrone and Hopper, 2001, forthcoming]). The third,
but by no means the last set of issues involves the role that
accounting plays in defining benchmarks of varied nature in
order to visualize and make tangible abstract ideas of progress
(by spatializing and temporalizing [see Jones, McLean and
Quattrone, 2004]). Performance measures not only make time a
scarce resource but contribute to creating a seamless flow of
organizational time, thus showing where the firm was, where it
is and where it could be.
With reference to synchronization Landes noted:
The clock is not merely a means of keeping track of
the hours, but of synchronizing the actions of men.
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The clock not the steam-engine, is the key-machine
of the modern industrial age . . . In its relationship to
determinable quantities of energy, to standardization,
to automatic action, and finally to its own special prod-
uct, accurate timing, the best clock has been the fore-
most machine in modern techniques; and at each
period it has remained in the lead: it marks a perfec-
tion toward which other machines aspire [Mumford,
Techniques and Civilization, quoted in Landes, 1983,
preface].
Analogously, de Grazia states that ‘‘people are geared to ma-
chines” [1963, p. 302] much more than they realize, and this
gearing begins very early in the morning, if it is true that we get
up thanks to the sound of an alarm clock. However, people are
geared to time not only through machines. The synchronizing
role of the clock is also played by many other modern practices
which are less material although equally pervasive. One of these
is certainly accounting. Accounting does synchronize (and co-
ordinate through transfer prices [Chandler, 1977]), for it priori-
tizes and prompts action [Ezzamel and Robson, 1995]. Through
reporting dates and budgeting periods, it contributes to the con-
struction of a shared notion of time, as much as the unified
timetable of British railway companies did with the GMT
[Hopwood, 1989]. Accounting practices are part of the broader
process of standardization [Miller and O’Leary, 1987; 1993]
within economies and societies and constitute a crucial part in
trends toward the establishment of modernity [Hoskin and
Macve, 1986]. As noted by Loft [1990], what needs to be illus-
trated in greater detail is the “physical and social construction of
. . . useful time in the factory, and . . . ‘its coming together’ with
accounting in terms of the merger and elaboration together of
technologies of time recording and techniques of cost account-
ing” [1990, p. 36]. However, how and why this merger which
leads to synchronization is achieved, and above all, which orga-
nizational ‘time’ becomes dominant [see Quattrone and Hopper,
2001] is left at the margin of accounting history.
This lack of attention to how accounting is intertwined with
other co-ordinating technologies leads to the argument that ac-
counting has a role in defining temporal priorities and se-
quences of action and how processes aimed at this definition
may relate to other organizational specializations and tempora-
lizations (e.g. different views with respect to what should be
done first and why). This argument opens a range of possibili-
ties which go beyond a teleological and structuralist view of
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accounting and time recording as a purely and fully successful
disciplining activity. In this respect, as noted by Hopwood, “the
setting of temporal standards of performance is still a site for
struggle and compromise. Budgets and plans still do not result
in shared unproblematic notions of a temporal order and
progress. Rather they serve as practices around which the tem-
poral aspects of economic affairs are negotiated and attempts
are made to actively define frequently contested notions of tem-
poral activity” [1989, p. 1]. Budgeting is an explicit example, for
it defines what should be done, when, by whom, and implicitly
how. Once again accounting contributes to time stratification by
making some ‘times’ appear more important than others. Yet
budgeting is a source of interpretation, discussion, revision and,
in the end, of various organizational timings (i.e., various con-
current attempts to define organizational times and priorities
[Anderson-Gough, Grey and Robson, 2001; Gurvitch, 1964;
Jones, McLean and Quattrone, 2004]) rather than a single
shared time (i.e., a linear, univocal and objective view of what
should be done and when). For example, the history of how
budgeting practices have developed in various organizational
and institutional settings and have been the subject of processes
of mediation and given rise to political negotiation, is still to be
written.
With regard to the third set of issues, the definition of the
idea of progress, the role of accounting goes far beyond the
already clear and pervasive synchronization examined above.
Ezzamel and Robson [1995], for instance, illustrated how bud-
geting and planning help raise our consciousness of time as a
scarce resource.8 The stress on the scarcity of time is:
. . . reinforced through the various mechanisms of
the management control system: (i) comparison of ac-
tual results against target rates; (ii) measurement and
reporting of performance variances; (iii) interactions
between superiors and subordinates over performance
variances; and (iv) linking variances to the corporate
reward scheme. By formalizing and highlighting the
importance of the rate, accounting controls not only
monitor performance but also raise time consciousness
(and work-related stress) by increasing the perceived
scarcity of time [Ezzamel and Robson, 1995, p. 153].
8 See also Mitchell [1934] for the government and Goody [1968] for the role
of budgeting practices in giving importance to time in capitalist and in socialist
economies.
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Therefore, because of accounting, time is perceived as a re-
source and thanks to accounting we can say that we have been
more efficient in its use. What is asset turnover if not the mate-
rialization of the speed at which time has passed in an account-
ing inscription [Latour, 1987]. Could we measure and talk of
efficiency without the asset turnover ratio? Probably not. If to-
day no one would contest that ‘time is money’ and that ‘time is
gold’ (as stated by Benjamin Franklin [see Goody, 1968]), it is
likely because this ratio (and the double-entry bookkeeping be-
hind it) has made the flowing of time visible, measurable and
worthy [Clark, 1985, p. 62]. Asset turnover is the accounting and
business version of the clock, which is thus visualized on a sheet
of paper, where business operations become apparently ordered
in a clear temporal sequence (i.e., financing, investing and real-
izing resources).
Writing, as much as recording and accounting, is a means
of giving form to the distinction between past, present and fu-
ture by crystallizing oral histories or business activities in writ-
ten facts which are then susceptible to further study, analysis
and investigation [Goody, 1968, p. 337]. In the words of St.
Augustine “From what we have said it is abundantly clear that
neither the future nor the past exist . . . Some such different
times do not exist in the mind, but nowhere else that I can see”
[1961, p. 23, quoted in Jaques, 1982, p. 23]. Without being
‘counted’ [Latour, 1999] it would not be possible to see some-
thing which does not exist and therefore accounting of all kinds
is developed in order to create distinctions, classifications and
rankings [Bowker and Star, 1989]. Various temporal demarca-
tions appear under the form of closing periods and are crystal-
lized in balance sheets and income statements. Accounting is
not neutral in this respect, for by setting a benchmark in time
(and space [Burrell, 1992; Goody, 1968]), it allows for judgments
to be made on whether the firm has progressed or not. However,
this aspect seems to have been largely overlooked in historical
works, with attention being devoted to the presence or absence
of accounting periodization [Chambers, 1989; McSweeney,
2000].
As noted by de Grazia:
Industrialization gives us not only work and many
other good things; it gives us the gift of leisure, that is,
free time, more free time than ever this hitherto back-
ward old word has seen [1963, p. 87, emphasis added].
We are back to where we began – the issue of ‘well being’.
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Accounting and management controls are powerful manage-
ment practices to force people to do things that they would do
differently or would not do at all. How is it that ‘work’ has such
a negative connotation that we now consider it as the opposite
to time freed from it? Accounting history is another possible
avenue to understanding why ‘work’ is now perceived as such.
However, the emergence of this attitude has not yet been stud-
ied through an accounting lens. The link between accounting
and well being now should be clearer. We have all progressed
but, in making this claim, we have not considered the role that
accounting has played in constructing this (illusionary) percep-
tion and, above all, how various definitions of progress may
coexist, compete, win or lose.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has sought to reflect on the relation between
accounting and time in accounting history and on how aban-
doning the conception of time as an objective feature of organi-
zational worlds may open up new areas of investigation in
accounting history. The vehicle for this reflection has been pro-
vided by Voth’s Time and Work in England, 1750-1830 [2000],
which argues that the industrial revolution in Britain led to
greater production levels not from an increase in productivity of
labor, but rather the greater number of hours worked per week.
This change led, in turn, to a decrease in free time in favor of
worked time. A likely corollary of this conclusion is that ac-
counting played no role either in increasing the efficiency of the
work force, or in disciplining the shop floor to guarantee a con-
trol of the labor process. More generally, accounting would have
little role in defining the human condition and the perception of
time not only in historical but also in contemporary settings.
This paper has also sought to place accounting at the centre
of the issue of time by questioning the commonly held assump-
tion that time is linear and objective – an object which can be
‘spent’. It has done so by reviewing alternative views of time and
focusing on the simple but intriguing idea that “time does not
count. Time is what is counted” [Latour, 1999, p. 88]. Account-
ing is conceived as part of a broader trend towards time defini-
tion and standardization which has characterized the evolution
of Western economies and societies since the early Middle Ages.
The paper has also sought implicitly to set a research
agenda by highlighting some neglected issues in accounting his-
tory research. First, how the emergence of accounting as a prac-
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tice has contributed not only to the synchronization of organiza-
tional activities and the definition of time boundaries and priori-
ties in organizational actions but also allowed multiple and con-
current timings in organizations. Second, how various notions
of time have contributed to shaping accounting across different
times and organizational settings. Third, how political, social,
religious and technical conditions which have surrounded the
emergence of a standard time could have impinged upon the
emergence of contemporary accounting practices.
The conditions are auspicious that time becomes an integral
part of research in accounting history, rather than being treated
as given. As noted by Landes:
People have asked me how is it that so important a
subject has been so little studied. I’m not sure that I
know the answer; but this, I hope: that time measure-
ment will never again be so ignored [1983, p. xv].
Let us hope that the same could happen to the missing link
between time and accounting history.
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Accounting Historians Journal
Prize Winners 2004
Following a vote by the members of the editorial
board, the prize for best paper in Volume 31 is
awarded to:
Warwick Funnell
for his article
“Accounting and the Pursuit of Utopia:
The Possibility of Perfection in Paraguay”
which appeared in the June issue.
The following authors were also highly commended:
Rob Bryer
for his article
“The Roots of Modern Capitalism:
A Marxist Accounting History of the Origins
and Consequences of Capitalistic Landlords
in England”
which appeared in the June issue
and
Sally M. Schultz and Joan Hollister
for their article
“Single-Entry Accounting in Early America:
The Accounts of the Hasbrouck Family”
which appeared in the June issue.
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Academy of Accounting Historians
2005 Research Conference
jointly sponsored with
The Accounting Hall of Fame
October 6, 2005 through October 8, 2005
Columbus, Ohio, USA
The theme of the 2005 conference is “The Accounting Profes-
sion in Transition: Historical and Contemporary Perspec-
tives on Change.” Concurrent paper sessions will address both
historical and public policy issues related to recent and continu-
ing change in the accounting profession and its regulatory and
market environment, both in the United States and around the
world. In addition to Concurrent Paper Sessions, the program
plan includes speeches by Don Nicolaisen (Chief Accountant of
the SEC) and Bill Gradison (Member of the PCAOB) plus panel
discussions chaired by Art Wyatt (University of Illinois), Bill
Kinney (University of Texas), Gary Previts (Case Western Re-
serve University) and Joel Demski (University of Florida), that
will provide perspectives on business reporting, auditing, public
policy, and accounting education. Panelists will include senior
members of accounting academe and the accounting profession.
The conference will begin on Thursday evening, October 6,
2005, with a reception, and conclude on Saturday, October 8,
2005, with a luncheon. The registration form appears on the
second page of this announcement.
Concurrent Paper Sessions: Papers are invited that develop his-
torical and contemporary perspectives on the ongoing evolution
of the accounting profession, including changes in business re-
porting, auditing, corporate governance, and international ac-
counting. The deadline for submissions is July 15, 2005 but
earlier submissions would be appreciated. Papers should in-
clude an abstract of approximately 50 words. Papers should be
sent in both paper and electronic form (the latter via  e-mail if
possible) to Dan Jensen at: Jensen.7@osu.edu; Dan Jensen, De-
partment of Accounting and MIS, Fisher College of Business, The
Ohio State University, 2100 Neil Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210.
Papers will be reviewed for inclusion in the conference by a
board of reviewers including Anil Arya of Ohio State University,
Richard Fleischman of John Carroll University, Edward N.
Coffman of Virginia Commonwealth University, David Dennis of
Otterbein University, Ann Gabriel of Ohio University, Laura
MacDonald of Wilfred Laurier University (Canada), Alan G.
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Mayper of University of North Texas, James McKinney of
Howard University, and Alan Reinstein of Wayne State Univer-
sity.
The City: Columbus is the capital of the State of Ohio. Over 1.25 million people
live in the metropolitan area, one of the fastest growing in the nation. It is home
to The Ohio State University and 15 other colleges and universities. It is also
home to major corporations including Nationwide Insurance, American Electric
Power, The Limited, and Wendy’s. A typical October day in Columbus has tem-
peratures ranging from 60-80 degrees F with light winds.
Hotel Reservations: The conference will be held at the The Blackwell Inn on
Ohio State University’s campus (2110 Tuttle Park Place at corner of Tuttle Park
Place and Woodruff, Columbus, Ohio 43210). Hotel reservations should be made
directly with The Blackwell (toll free: 866-247-4003; local: 614-247-4000). Indi-
cate that you are attending the “Accounting Historians/OSU Accounting Hall of
Fame Conference;” the special rate for the conference is approximately $120 per
night (plus taxes). In addition, registrations can be made on-line at http://
www.theblackwell.com; use the group code ACCOUN1005 to receive the special
rate. Valet parking service is available at the main entrance to the hotel for a
nominal charge. The cutoff date for reservation requests is Wednesday, August
31, 2005.
Transportation from Airport: The Blackwell Inn is about 20 minutes from Port
Columbus International Airport. The Blackwell operates a courtesy shuttle ser-
vice. Taxi fares run about $25.
Doctoral Students: The registration fee for accounting doctoral students will be
waived. In addition, four travel grants of up to $250 each are offered subject
matching by the student’s home institution. Details are available from Dan
Jensen (614-292-2529 or Jensen.7@osu.edu).
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Eleventh World Congress of Accounting Historians
NANTES (FRANCE) 19-22 JULY 2006
First Announcement
Call for Papers
Six years after the Madrid Congress in 2000, the WCAH will return to Europe,
after stops in Melbourne in 2002 and St. Louis in 2004. In fact in July 2006, the
Eleventh World Congress of Accounting History will take place in Nantes, and
France will welcome this gathering for the first time.
Ideally situated, Nantes is only two hours from Paris by TGV (the high speed
train with 20 round trips daily) and approximately two hours by plane from the
majority of European Capitals. Gateway to Brittany and its ports, it is equally
very close to a number of major tourist sites, such as Mont Saint-Michel, le Puy
du Fou, the Futuroscope, and the “Chateaux of the Loire”.
Settled over two millennia ago on the banks of the Loire, fifty kilometres from
the Atlantic Ocean, Nantes was, during the middle ages, the capital of the Duchy
of Bretagne. In the eighteenth century, the city became the great merchant port
of the French crown, opening commercial and maritime routes of the Americas
and Africa. The leading industrial shipyards of the western  half of France from
the nineteenth century, noted for its naval engineering and its canning  industry,
Nantes and the Loire estuary have developed into a leading metropolis for the
service and high technology sectors. Economic capital of western France and the
major French city in terms of its rate of demographic growth, Nantes draws
interest not only for its economic achievements but also for its quality of life and
its environment.
The Congress will take place on the campus of the University of Nantes, a few
steps from the historic centre of the city and from the majority of the hotels
likely to lodge congress attendees. In 1995, the Journées d’histoire de la
Comptabilité et du Management, which takes place in France in March of each
year, was organized for the first time in Nantes. The same year, the University of
Nantes made a major acquisition of a collection of works dealing with account-
ing and its history, amassed by the Belgian Accounting Historian Ernest
Stevelinck. Deceased in 20011, Ernest Stevelinck was the initiator and organiser
of the first World Congress of Accounting Historians, which took place in Brus-
sels in 1970. Holding the eleventh Congress in Nantes will therefore possess
symbolic value and will be an opportunity to recognise his legacy.
Call for papers
Conference submissions can examine any aspect of the history of accounting,
but the history of Nantes, the presence of the Stevelinck Collection, and the
experience with the Journées d’histoire de la Comptabilité et du Management
motivates us to encourage papers dealing with the following themes:
• Accounting and Ocean Routes: maritime trade, major commercial compa-
nies, colonialisation . . .
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• 1970-2006: 36 years of accounting-history research: thematics, authors,
methodologies, prospective approaches . . .
• Accounting writers: biographies, works, influence . . . privileging new re-
search approaches and new issues . . .
• Accounting in relation to other management disciplines: strategy, manage-
ment, human resources management, marketing, finance . . .
• Interdisciplinary approaches to accounting history
Manuscripts must be submitted in English, and will be reviewed by the mem-
bers of the Scientific Committee. Submissions by electronic mail are acceptable.
Submissions for proposals:
The deadline for proposed manuscripts is January 15, 2006 and should be sent
to:
Yannick Lemarchand
Congress Convenor
Centre de Recherches en  Gestion Nantes-Atlantique CRGNA
Faculté des Sciences économiques et de gestion
Université de Nantes
BP 52331
44322 Nantes Cedex
FRANCE
Email: wcah@sc-eco.univ-nantes.fr
Authors of accepted papers will be advised at the latest by March 15, 2006.
Further information about the Eleventh WCAH will be available progres-
sively on the Congress website: www.iae.univ-nantes.fr/11wcah
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17th Annual Conference on
Accounting, Business & Financial History
at Cardiff Business School 15-16 September 2005
Announcement of Conference
Guest Speaker – Warwick Funnell
Theoretical, empirical and review papers are welcomed in all areas of account-
ing, business and financial history.
The conference provides delegates with the opportunity of presenting and dis-
cussing, in an informal setting, papers ranging from early working drafts to fully
developed manuscripts. The format of the conference allows approximately 40
minutes for presentation and discussion in order to help achieve worthwhile
feedback from those attending.
In the past, many papers presented at Cardiff have subsequently appeared in
print in Accounting, Business and Financial History, edited by John Richard
(Dick) Edwards and Trevor Boyns, or in another of the full range of interna-
tional, refereed academic accounting, business and economic history journals.
The conference will be held at Aberdare Hall, Cathays Park, Cardiff, CF14 3UX,
UK, from lunchtime on Thursday, 15 September 2005 to mid-afternoon on Fri-
day, 16 September 2005.
The fully inclusive conference fee (covering all meals, the conference dinner on
Thursday and accommodation) is £120.
Contact Debbie Harris, Cardiff Business School, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10
3EU
Tel +44 (0)29 2087 5730 Fax +44 (0)29 2087 4419 Email: HarrisDL@cardiff.ac.uk
Sponsored by:
THE INSTITUTE OF
CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANTS
IN ENGLAND & WALES
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THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
APPLICATION FOR 2005 MEMBERSHIP
Individual Membership: $45.00
Student Membership: $10.00
Name:  (please print)
Mailing Address:
City: State:
Zip Code: Country:
Accounting History Area of Interest:
Phone: Fax:
E-mail:
 ____
Method of Payment: /___/ check enclosed
 ____  ____
/___/ Mastercard /___/ VISA
Card Number:
Expiration Date:
Signature:
Mail to: Mrs. Kathy H. Rice
The Academy of Accounting Historians
The University of Alabama
Box 870220
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
USA
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